Investigative Powers of Polish and Czech Civilian Special Services– Internal Security Agency and Security Information Service

Abstract

Despite general similarities, the Polish and Czech civilian intelligence services differ signifi-cantly in their investigative powers. The Polish Internal Security Agency (ABW) has been granted investi-gative powers by law to carry out its tasks; in contrast, the Czech Information Security Service (BIS) only has investigative powers against its own officers who commit a crime. Czech civilian intelligence services are much closer to the model adopted in other liberal democracies in Europe, such as the Federal Republic of Germany or the United Kingdom, than are the Polish services. The basis for the organization of Czech intelligence services and their place in the Czech political system is the so-called principle of necessary sep-aration (oddělovací imperativ). This principle introduced the requirement to avoid combining intelligence methods of obtaining information with executive (police) powers, which entail the use of direct coercion. This situation has deep historical roots dating back to the democratic transformation of 1989. Considering the analysis of the political processes that led to the creation of new secret services in both countries, which are historically and culturally close, after 1989, one can conclude that the primary reason for the different development of civilian secret services in Poland was the lack of vision and commitment to service reform on the part of the highest political figures representing the opposition. In Poland, practical reform concepts for the intelligence services' model were developed at the parliamentary committee level. In Czechoslovakia, and later in the Czech Republic, from the beginning of the changes in 1989, the opposition president was involved in the process of reforming the intelligence services, representing a detailed reform concept that drew directly from the Western model of intelligence services.