Shaping Operations for Branch Plans as an Element of Deception to the Enemy

Abstract

The article addresses the problem of employing shaping operations related to branch plans as a tool for deceiving an opponent in land tactical operations. The aim of the study was to develop a concept for using preparatory activities associated with branch plans to induce the adversary to make unfavorable decisions regarding force deployment and to indicate how this concept can be integrated with disinfor-mation. The research problem was formulated as the question: How can an opponent be induced to adopt an incorrect force disposition that will hinder further tactical operations? The hypothesis assumes that preparing and partially implementing activities linked to branch plans may cause the opponent to commit an error by prematurely or improperly employing their combat potential. The research employed methods of abstraction, comparison, synthesis, and classification, supported by the analysis of practical experiences from staff planning. The findings indicate that parallel preparation of the main plan and a branch plan, supported by shaping operations and disinformation, may create a decision-making dilemma for the oppo-nent. As a result, the adversary can disperse forces or deploy them incorrectly, allowing the achievement of local superiority. The conclusions suggest that branch planning should not only ensure operational flex-ibility, but may also serve as an active instrument influencing opponent’s decisions.