COULD WE LIVE IN NELSON GOODMAN’S WORLDS? THOUGHTS ON GOODMAN’S PLURALISM AND ITS RECONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY

Abstract

The idea of ​​living in a world seems to be obvious. Only a skeptical person would deny that we live in one, or that we are able to say it. And it is precisely because of skepticism that the existence and knowledge about the external world has been a recurring topic in the history of philosophy. Nelson Goodman has confronted this problem and has offered a constructivist and pluralist solution. This article explains these key points of Goodman's epistemology, as well as his ontological pluralism. Subsequently, I explain how, according to the author, these philosophical positions would imply a reconception of classical concepts of philosophy. Finally, I criticize the Goodmanian thesis that we can live in different worlds simultaneously and reconsider the problem from the perspectivist approach of the authors Manuel Liz, Margarita Vázquez and Antti Hautamäki.