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The ethnic conflict over Karabakh in the context of the activities of the military-political representations of the Great Britain in the Transcaucasia (1918-1920)

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Abstract: In 1918-20s the steps of military politics of Azerbaijani were directed towards the frustration of Armenian State system. With this intention, Andranik’s and Dro’s forces were taken out, with the help of British generals Thomson and Shuttleworth. This allowed Azerbaijani families on the 21 of August in 1912 make the Armenian council in Karabagh temporarily obey Azerbaijani Government till the solution of this disputable issue by the French conference of allied union, which was one of the beforehand planned cunning steps of Azerbaijani government. In reality, as a result of later important military changes in the Republic of Armenia and as a result of mutually beneficial agreement between Russian and Kemal Turkey as well as taking into consideration the evident connivance of allied powers during 1920-23 Azerbaijani managed to capture not only Nachijevan, but Karabagh and other Armenian lands, as well, the struggle for which restarted in 1988-1990.

Key words: Ethnic Conflict, Karabakh, Republic of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Great Britain, Baku

Introduction

For Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict of 1918-1920 was uncompromising and bloody. In 1918-1919, the Armenian government took a number of steps to prevent various Azeri aggressions and anti-Armenian militant actions.1 Thus, on November 16, 1918, at the sitting of the Council of Ministers, the report of the Minister of Defense on the organization of military forces for Karabakh and Zangezur was heard. The session approves the draft. Noting that Azerbaijan, not waiting for the settlement

1 Harutyunyan, 1996: 11-235; see also Poghosyan & Ghrmajyan, 2023.
of the disputed issues of the Karabakh and Zangezur borders by mutual agreement, took action and confiscated the mountainous parts of Artsakh-Karabakh and Zangezur, used violence against the population, organized armed forces to protect the above-mentioned Armenian regions.²

Based on the decision of the June 16, 1919 sitting of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Armenia and based on the law of June 5, 1919, the government adopted a new law on allocating 1,500,000 rubles from the 8 million Karabakh fund to organize a military unit in Karabakh. According to the law, the Karabakh military unit was to consist of a single battalion, two mountain cannons and 54 scouts. In another document, which is a logical continuation of it, based on the above-mentioned law, the Chief of General Staff, Colonel B. Baghdasarov, on behalf of the Ministry of Defense, asked the RA Minister of Council of Ministers G. Khojamiryan to speed up and make this amount available, noting that out of eight million, 3,238,640 rubles remained.³ However, all this was either not effective enough, or the Armenian government swallowed the empty Pharisaic promises and assurances of the Allied military-political representations and governments in the Caucasus, forgetting that their little ally had shed blood in the Arab sands.

Undoubtedly, Azerbaijan took advantage of the situation, in particular, with the permission and covert support of the military-political representations in the British-European Transcaucasia and their governments. And this is in the case when the Armenian government was surprised by its Entente relatives, who had made many promises before.

**British military-political representation and Yerevan**

The British military envoy was in Yerevan from February 1 to early March.⁴ In order to comply with the law only in the mentioned areas. Tigranyan immediately drew Forrestier-Walker’s attention to the fact that the Armenian government could not consider General Thomson’s telegram an expression of even the indirect recognition of Zangezur and Karabakh by the Azerbaijani government, albeit in the disputed provinces of the provinces that should be subject to temporary sovereignty to Khosrov-bek Sultanov’s government.⁵ Tigranyan considers the status quo the only acceptable thing

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⁴ Hovhannisyan, 2005: 177.
⁵ Waal, 2005: 181: “General William Thomson, who headed the Expeditionary Corps, appointed Dr. Khosrov-bek Sultanov, an Azeri governor in Karabakh who was not extremely popular among Armenians”. According to Hoch (2020: 318) the British forces stationed in Transcaucasia during the Russian Civil War, it was decided that Karabakh should remain in Azerbaijan, and General Thomson accepted Azerbaijan government as the only legal partner in negotiations and allowed Azerbaijan to have its General-in-Chief in Karabagh.
before the Paris Reconciliation Assembly adopts a decision on borders on: Referring to the Allies’ February 19 declaration, Tigranyan inquired whether the declaration of “possession of the disputed territory by force of arms” had been sent to the Baku government in the same way.⁶

On March 11, 1919, S. Tigranyan appealed directly to General Thomson, finding that the instructions of the Peace Assembly would be violated if Azerbaijan took unilateral action, reminding that during the war Karabakh had persistently defended its freedom and now considered itself part of the Republic of Armenia. Any attempt by force to impose its will would undoubtedly have the most serious consequences, deeming Thomson’s proposal for a “so-called governor general” unacceptable,⁷ although the Armenians of Karabakh were apparently astonished by such British patronage as allies. During a meeting with Acting Prime Minister Al Khatisyan on March 27, 1919, Thomson responded to Khatisyan’s request to withdraw Azeri troops from Karabakh and temporarily keep it under British rule, saying that even if Sultanov is hated by everyone, he is still needed to help the people in the British effort.⁸

In April 1919, General Thomson, the head of the British mission in the Caucasus, was replaced by General Shuttleworth.⁹ According to the chairman of the Artsakh National Council E. Ishkhanyan, “General Shatelward, who succeeded General Thomson, surpassed his predecessor, occupying us more and more with the issue of recognizing the Sultanov province, or rather the government of Azerbaijan. Through the mission, he tried to persuade us to obey the governor’s orders”.¹⁰ Shuttleworth was so restrained that in late April 1919 he personally traveled to Goris to demand the recognition of Khosrov Bek Sultanov as Governor-General of Zangezur, but met with stubborn resistance and was forced to return, threatening Armenians, threatening to remove him with airstrikes and, claiming that the Armenian government publicly rejects Shahmazyan, but secretly finances him.¹¹ Shuttleworth, who had sent a message to Thomson about the resumption of the Armenian opposition in Zangezur in the person of Shahmazyan and other agents connected with Yerevan, would end Nakhi-chevan’s repatriation until that cooperation between Yerevan and Zangezur ceased. It also angered Thomson, who was angry with Davey, who in the first place forced him to stop repatriating, using the armed forces if necessary.¹²

After Shuttleworth left, Rasul-Zadeh, the founder of Musavat, announced on August 28 that Azerbaijan would soon extend uninterrupted from Dagestan to the Julfa and

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⁷ Hovhannisyan, 2005: 177-178.
⁸ Hovhannisyan, 2005: 188; a similar view see Akhmedova, 2009: 174-175.
¹² Hovhannisyan, 2005: 266.
Araks rivers south,\(^\text{13}\) claiming to achieve their long-held strategic goals of controlling the Araks Valley today, when Azerbaijan and Turkey persistently seek to open the Syunik-Zangezor road to Nakhichevan-Turkey, including the entire Araks Valley in their plans of ambition and isolating Armenia from all active routes with the outside world.

The steps taken by the Armenian government and the strategic foreign policy search do not yield significant results. The security of Armenian Karabakh will soon be significantly endangered, and consequently the national-state security of the Republic of Armenia in this periphery of its country will be undermined. In that case, after isolating Andranik and Dro from involvement in the military-political events, Musavat Azerbaijan launches large-scale crackdown on the Armenian population of Karabakh, its legitimate national-state rights, violating the inalienable right of internationally recognized ethnic groups to self-determination in some European territories. Azerbaijan had ambitions not only for Artsakh and Zangezur, but also for Sharur-Nakhichevan and even the eastern and northeastern regions of the Lake Sanaa basin. The command of the British troops in the Transcaucasia and the military-political representation pursued a two-faced, pro-Azerbaijani policy on this issue. It was with the intervention of the British military-political mission in the Caucasus that the advance of Andranik’s troops to Shushi was stopped, and the way was paved for the sake of oil interests for the establishment of Dr. Sultanov’s repressive power in Karabakh-Artsakh.\(^\text{14}\)

**Azerbaijan attempts to annex the Karabakh and Brifish support**

It was with the knowledge of Great Britain that from the beginning of 1919 Azerbaijan was trying to annex Nagorno Karabakh to Azerbaijan.\(^\text{15}\) However, the Armenians of Artsakh have never really recognized the Azerbaijani government, constantly opposing the clog imposed on it by Azerbaijan, which was going on with variable success.

Armenian progress and the pursuit of stability were halted by British intervention. On April 3, 1919, Shutleworth, a spokesman for the Entente Command, declared that the region must remain part of Azerbaijan until the Karabakh issue was resolved by the Paris Assembly.\(^\text{16}\)

The position and decision of the English side on this issue was unequivocal. Ignoring the complaints of the Armenian government and reaffirming their decision,

\(^{13}\) *Nor ashatvor*, 1919: September, 1.

\(^{14}\) In this regard, Azerbaijani historian B. Nadzhafov (1994: 66-67) welcomes Sultanov’s actions in Karabakh, expressing satisfaction with the support of the British military-political authorities.


the commander of the British troops stationed in Baku, General Shuttleworth, issued the following statement on April 3:

The British command declares for the benefit of the population of Shushi, Zangezur, Jibrail and Jivanshir provinces that: 1. By the decision of the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan in 1919, Dr. Sultanov has been appointed Governor-General of Shushi, Zangezur, Jibrail and Jivanshir Provinces and enjoys the support of the British Command.\(^\text{17}\)

In this connection, naturally, at the sitting of April 3, 1919, the Government of the Republic of Armenia responded that it was possible to speak about Karabakh with the consent of the representative bodies of the Armenian population of Karabakh. After that, through their active efforts, in mid-1919,\(^\text{18}\) the regime of Khosrov-bek Pashabek oghli Sultanov, a well-known anti-Armenian, who had a cruel reputation among the Armenians, was forcibly imposed on the people of Artsakh and Zangezur. Naturally, the Azerbaijani politician Sultanov considered it a new ‘era’ in the life of Karabakh. And as the last Prime Minister of the First Republic of Armenia S. Vratsyan rightly writes, “Unfortunately, a new era did not open, but Sultanov had the right to be proud, because, temporarily, Karabakh became part of Azerbaijan. Making ‘temporary’ ‘permanent’ was a matter of the future, and Azerbaijani politicians did not give up that idea”.\(^\text{19}\) With the active support of General Shuttleworth, Kh. Sultanov, in order to establish his power in Artsakh and Zangezur, adopts a new strategy, that is, to flatter the Armenians and to mislead and persuade them with false promises. After the command of the British troops in Karabakh, on behalf of Colonel D. Chatelworth, on April 3, 1919, \textit{de facto} confirmed the recognition of Governor-General Sultanov as the sole supreme authority and called on the population to unconditionally obey all his orders, the British became more purposeful and pro-Azerbaijani. The Armenians of Artsakh, not paying any attention to Colonel Shuttleworth’s threats and demands, convened the 5th Artsakh Congress on April 23, 1919 in Shushi and resolutely rejected the decision of the British command to accept the Azerbaijani government, to create a mood to recognize the Azerbaijani government.\(^\text{20}\)

Sultanov, too, worked separately with the Armenians, through well-known Turkish merchants, so that the Armenians could visit the governor, take part in provincial affairs, and assume positions. Dr. Sultanov believed that having Armenian officials, he would be able to establish all the efforts of the British and Sultanov to settle in Artsakh as peasants in Artsakh. Facing the resolute resistance of the Armenians of Artsakh, Colonel

\(^{17}\) Ishkhanyan, 1999: 378-379.
\(^{18}\) HAA, F. 199. list 1. dossier 43. P. 59.
\(^{19}\) Vracyan, 1993: 341-342.
Shuttleworth left for Shushi on April 23 to personally impose on Artsakh and accept the rule of Azerbaijan.\textsuperscript{21}

The Zangezur-Karabakh Regional Council, not hesitating at all and not giving in to Colonel Shuttleworth’s threats against the Armenians of Zangezur, gives the following sharp answer: “We can not submit to Azerbaijan, we can not climb a mountain. Only over the ruins of our province and the corpses of the people can Azerbaijan rule Zangezur and dictate its orders.”\textsuperscript{22}

Following the instructions of General Thomson, who paid an official visit to Yerevan in early April and in a meeting with Prime Minister Al. Khatisyan and Foreign Minister S. Tigranyan, tried to persuade and impose his proposal that Karabakh could not survive without importing food from the Batumi-Baku railway to Yeghlakh station. The Sultanov regime did not hesitate to threaten with economic arguments, citing the fact that otherwise Nagorno Karabakh would starve if it separated from the eastern plain and the Yevlakh railway junction on the Batumi-Tbilisi-Baku railway.\textsuperscript{23} General Shuttleworth resolved the Karabakh issue within the framework of the British policy, without expressing any desire to oppose Azerbaijan’s aspirations. General Shuttleworth returned to Baku in 1919. On April 26, he authorized the government of Azerbaijan to make political arrests and restrict freedom of speech and public assembly. Shatelvort approved the economic boycott of Karabakh by Azerbaijan, resorting to the policy of subjugating the Armenians by starving them.\textsuperscript{24} This multilateral pressure on Karabakh was a continuing British behavior that caused some frustration as it became apparent that General Thomson, on Shuttleworth’s advice and urging, put considerable pressure on the Armenian government to end the exodus of refugees from southern Armenia. Until the Armenian government publicly renounces all insurgents in Zangezur and Karabakh, whose above-mentioned punitive measures were suspended after the diplomatic response of the acting Prime Minister Al Khatisyan to the complaints received by the British military representative General K. M. Dayvi.\textsuperscript{25}

The sharp response of the Zangezur-Karabakh Regional Council was not at all a surprise to General Shuttleworth, as he had already communicated many times with the events in Artsakh and was well acquainted with the resistance capabilities of the Artsakh Armenians and the anti-Azerbaijani mood. After receiving a sharp response from the Regional Council, General Shuttleworth, accompanied by a bodyguard of British and Turkish soldiers, left Goris, but continued to take steps to impose his position on Zangezur.

\textsuperscript{21} Ishkhanyan, 1999: 341-342.
\textsuperscript{22} Hayastani Ashatavor, 1919: July, 17.
\textsuperscript{23} Sarur [Asur], 1929; Vracyan, 1958: 285.
\textsuperscript{24} Hovhannisyan, 2005: 187-188.
\textsuperscript{25} Hovhannisyan, 2005: 190.
Interesting further developments are related to the approach and decisions adopted by the Paris Assembly in 1919. It must be admitted that the Azeri government initially opposed the withdrawal of British troops from Azerbaijan because it was unsure whether it could defend itself from the threat posed by the north, be it Denikin’s army or the Bolsheviks. In April 1919, the Foreign Minister of the Commonwealth of Independent States, M.Yu. Jafarov, wrote in a telegram to the commander of the British troops, D. Chatelworth,

> According to the official information of my government, the British troops will leave the borders of Azerbaijan in mid-August. In this regard, the Azerbaijani government decided to ask His Excellency to leave British troops in Azerbaijan. I would like to add that the conditions under which the British troops can remain on the borders of Azerbaijan can be worked out by mutual consent in case of receiving a response from the British government, in case of an agreement in principle to leave the troops.²⁶

Dissatisfied with the official telegrams and applications submitted to the Government of the Republic of Armenia, General Thomson again invited Evangulov, the Armenian diplomatic representative to Georgia, on May 8, 1919, and reported that according to the reports of General Shatelnov and Colonel Monk-Mason, in Karabakh, as in Goris. The situation and order in Zangezur province is disturbed mainly due to Captain Shahmazyan’s aggressive policy. According to General Thomson, for some reason Captain Shahmazyan, who declared himself governor-general in Karabakh, based on the authority and instructions of the Armenian government, instills in the local population the idea of disobeying the Azerbaijani authorities, as Karabakh is an integral part of Armenia.²⁷ And the main weapon of Azerbaijan against the Armenians became the commander of the British troops in Baku, succeeding General Thomson, Shatelnov, through which the Azeri Musavatists tried to impose the rule of Azerbaijan on the people of Artsakh. Leo’s axiomatic conclusion about the anti-Armenian orientation of Chatzelworth and others is very accurate.²⁸

Azerbaijan used every kind of ambush to break the resistance spirit of the Karabakh people, using a military force to which the Armenians, of course, responded as best they could. Sultan Bek Sultanov²⁹ nevertheless managed to overcome the resistance of

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²⁶ Azerbaydzhanskaya Demokraticheskaya Respublika, 309-310.
²⁷ Ashatavor, 1919: April, 17.
²⁸ Leo, 2009: 388: “Musavat knew what he was doing, and the British command was not in vain. Thomson’s successor, General Shuttleworth, stubbornly rejects all ... demands [of the Karabakh people – V.V.], is Sultanov’s agent, personally goes to Shushi to attend the congress and demand Sultanov’s recognition”.
²⁹ Sultanov Khosrov Bek Pasha Bey oggli (May 10, 1879 - January 7, 1943) – In 1903 he graduated from the Medical Faculty of Novorossiysk University. He joined the “Musavat” party in 1917. He became a member of the Transcaucasian Seim in 1918. In 1918 he was replaced the “Ittihad” party. In May-June 1918 he was the Minister of War. In June-July and March of 1919 he became a Minister of Agriculture and
the Armenians of Artsakh by deception and treachery and produced the legal order of August 22, 1919, according to which Artsakh was obliged to temporarily submit to Azerbaijan until the decision of the Paris Peace Assembly in its pro-Armenian decision. The Armenian government had no doubts, which was, in fact, the result of political miscalculations by the Armenian side, a gross political mistake, and ultimately a defeat in the military-political conflict with Azerbaijan, which was greatly facilitated by the pro-Azerbaijani position of the British command in Transcaucasia.\textsuperscript{30}

\textbf{The position of the military-political representatives of the Entente on the future of Karabakh}

During those historical and political upheavals, there were also dangerous turns, political slips and deviations. Thus, the 7th Congress of Karabakh, held on August 12, 1919, examining the current situation and making sure that it could not receive any tangible help from abroad, the British are actually supporting the Azeris, and the Armenian government, in turn, is not able to do anything serious, decided to accept the agreement with Baku on August 15, which resulted in the signing of the 1919 agreement. The famous infamous agreement of August 22, 1945, “hoping” that the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh would be resolved “unconditionally and justly” in the European Assembly of the Great Powers. It should be noted that the agreement of August 22, 1919 did not make significant changes in the situation of Armenians. Governor-General of Azerbaijan Sultanov, on the one hand, tried to divide the Armenians, on the other hand, to unite military forces with the intention of suppressing them with weapons. In the person of August 22, 1919, a sharp mistake was made and the Armenians, due to an unnecessary military-political slip of the Armenian government, agreed to temporarily submit to the Azerbaijani authorities, but soon surrendered.

As a result, Dr. Khosrov-Bek Pashabek oghli Bek-Sultanov’s administration was able to “persuade” the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh by the infamous August 22, 1919 agreement, or rather to impose its will and temporarily accept Azerbaijani rule in Karabakh until a final settlement. By the countries (England, France, etc.) that are friends of the Armenian people in the Antarctic, participating in the Paris Assembly. Thus, it radically endangers the interests of the Republic of Armenia in that corner of the region, which was a very big and gross political miscalculation, which was reflected in the results of the April 1920 Assembly of the Transcaucasian Republics.\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{30} On the interpretation of these events, see Hovhannisyan, 2005: 205.
\textsuperscript{31} Virabyan, 2004: 5-39.
Therefore, it can be concluded that Armenia failed to achieve the desired results and strengthen the position of the Republic of Armenia by deploying regular army units in the region. Having fortified itself in Zangezur, Armenia was unable to establish itself in Karabakh, suffering painful failures and defeats, which was significantly facilitated by the British authorities with their pro-Azerbaijani policy, as well as the unpromising and reckless strategy of the Armenian government. At first, Andranik and Dro military units were deceptively removed from Karabakh, which significantly weakened the position of the Armenian army in Artsakh. It should be noted with all clarity that the role of the British military-political mission in the Transcaucasus was rather negative in the pro-Armenian solution to the Artsakh-Syunik issue. wrinkles only after removal. At that time, the withdrawal of British troops began. From Baku, on August 15, the 84th Punjab Regiment stopped in Yevlakh to take with them the detachment of General Rijnald Tyler, who had closed the British mission in Shushi two days earlier to allow the Armenians of Karabakh to reconcile. The headquarters of Shuttleworth were closed with the army on August 23, and a sumptuous dinner was organized in honor of it on August 24.

In February 1920, a large part of the Azerbaijani army, about 10,000 people, was gathered on the Karabakh front. The people of Karabakh, receiving some help from abroad, resisted the implementation of those plans. On February 19, Sultanov demanded that Karabakh be declared part of Azerbaijan. The people of Karabakh rejected this illegal demand at their congresses. The Armenians of Karabakh revolted, defending themselves from the atrocities of Azerbaijan and the policy of massacres. The consequences, according to S. Vratsyan, could have been much more catastrophic if the Dro Expeditionary Unit had not reached Karabakh on April 13. He took power in the region, announced a mobilization on April 15 in Varanda and Dizak, strengthened the fronts and stayed in Karabakh for 45 days. On April 22, the 9th Congress of Karabakh was convened in the village of Taghavard.

During that time, Azerbaijan continued to implement its pro-Armenian programs step by step, ignoring everything and taking advantage of permissiveness. “The Azerbaijani authorities, considering Zangezur, Karabakh, Nakhichevan, Sharur, Surmalu, Ghazakh as an integral part of their republic, also do not release Tachka Armenians living in different parts of Azerbaijan from conscription”, the Armenian diplomatic representative wrote in Baku on September 10, 1920.

32 Arsen Shahmazyan, who had won a number of victories against the Azerbaijani, etc., which significantly weakened the position of the Armenian army in Artsakh. see Hovhannisyan, 2005: 169-215.
33 Hovhannisyan, 2014: 151.
35 Vracyan, 1993: 396.
36 HAA, F. 278. list 1. dossier 321. P. 95.
The April of 1920 conference of Transcaucasian republics

In Tiflis, the Allies and the Transcaucasian Conference demanded an end to the bloodshed, and the parties were forced to comply, which was also demanded by Evg Gegechkor, who feared the real dangers of plunging Georgia into chaos. On March 27, the Prime Minister of Georgia N. Jordan addressed the representatives of the allies asking for their mediation to extinguish the fire in Karabakh and to calm down the Transcaucasian region. Representatives of Britain, France and Italy, O. Wardrop, Count de Martel and Colonel Melkiade Gabba, addressed a joint telegram to Baku and Yerevan on April 1, “inviting energetically” through peaceful means and immediately resolving the issues of Karabakh and other provinces where “peace is endangered”. “If this solemn call for reconciliation is not heard at a time when the fate of the entire Transcaucasia is at stake, it could have dire consequences for your governments”.37 The Armenian government immediately responded on April 2 that it fully agreed with the proposal of the allied representatives, and that its deputies would be in Tbilisi on April 5 to participate in the Transcaucasian conference with the aim of resolving all disputed issues peacefully. On April 4, the Armenian parliament also dealt with the events in Karabakh and approved the government’s policy.38 On April 4, 1920, in Tbilisi, the diplomatic representative of the Republic of Armenia Tigran Bekzadyan informed in a telegram sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that a meeting with Gabba had taken place on April 2. During the meeting, the Italian Commissioner expressed regret that the Armenians had revolted in Karabakh at a time when the borders of Armenia were being drawn, and that such a step did not make sense, as did Azerbaijan’s interference in the situation in the Kars region. Bekzadyan also said that he had tried to persuade Gabba and other Allied representatives that the cause of the Karabakh uprising was not external, i.e., the intervention of the Republic of Armenia, but Azerbaijan’s violation of the August 22, 1919 interim agreement and illegal attempts to disarm the Armenians of Karabakh.39

In its April 4, 1920 issue, Mshak blamed the British and others for establishing Sultanov’s bloodthirsty regime through the unfavorable course of Karabakh’s fate, finding that it was British generals who sided with Sultanov against 200,000 Armenians with Armenian blood.40

The conference began on April 9, 1920. Influential Transcaucasian politicians took part in the conference. From Azerbaijan: Hasan bek Agha, Olgerd bek Krichinski, Faris bek Vekilov. In this regard, it should be noted that Hamo Ohanjanyan did not share this view. In his letter to Alexander Khatisyan dated April 8, 1920, thinks that

37 Hovhannisyan, 2015: 200.
38 HAA, F. 278. list 1. dossier 321. P. 397.
40 Mshak, 1920: April, 4.
having the above-mentioned representatives in the well-known conference, Azerbaijan did not attach serious importance to that conference.\textsuperscript{41} The Georgian delegation wisely and accountably tried to serve the interests of Georgia, often finding cover-ups with the Azeris, with whom they had already signed a military-political alliance in June 1919. The latter did not make a decisive attempt to reconcile the disputed Armenian-Georgian issues, despite some aspirations of the Armenian delegation, which were not sufficiently backward and conditional. This was clear from the very first moment when the issue of the cessation of hostilities was decided, which was postponed indefinitely from April 10 until the response from the Government of Azerbaijan.

E. Gegechkori then expresses the idea that the territorial issue is the main source of disagreement, the basis of the settlement of which he considered the “pacification” of the region with a homogeneous population, which would supposedly put an end to the divisive wars.\textsuperscript{42}

Nevertheless, the representative of the Azerbaijani delegation Hasan Bek Agayev announced the agreement of his government to cease hostilities throughout the Caucasus. Accordingly, Gegechkori offers to follow

(a) Measures to be taken by the Assembly to put an end to bloody conflicts;
(b) the proposed solutions to the territorial disputes of the Transcaucasian republics;
(c) decisions to be taken on the need to coordinate actions on foreign policy issues;
(d) the issue of agreeing positions on the establishment of a confederation.\textsuperscript{43}

T. Bekzadyan states to some extent that if the Assembly does not reach an agreement on the cessation of hostilities, the Armenian delegation cannot take part in the formation of any union, which causes a deadlock. The tensions and the atmosphere of disunity continue, and it is obvious that, for obvious reasons, it was also in the interests of the Georgian-Azerbaijani sides, in line with their interests.

\textsuperscript{41} Banber Hayastani archineri, 1996: 74; In our opinion he mistakenly. A study of the conference materials shows the rather high level of training of the “inexperienced” and “non-serious” representatives of Azerbaijan. And on the contrary, the inexperience and some unpreparedness of the Armenian delegates, and the prejudiced unrealistic mood and the assessments of things and phenomena, from Georgia.
\textsuperscript{42} HAA, F. 200. list 1. dossier 548. P. 158-160; Based on this, E. Gegechkori highlighted the issue of uniting against the external threat, the Bolshevik threat coming from the north, saying that they had already started it by concluding transit agreements with Azerbaijan and Armenia. As for how sincere it was, it seemed that Georgia's further position towards Armenia and Azerbaijan was taken separately, as it became a more or less real opportunity for trade, food and fuel imports, which was vital for Armenia, especially a necessary weapon for the Armenian army. Ammunition, grain and flour were imported on the basis of a transit agreement with Georgia signed on November 3, 1919. On April 10, St. Mamikonyan, a member of the Armenian delegation, addressed the sitting and addressed the issue of ending the clashes, which was joined by T. Bekzadyan. However, according to Gegechkori, the sitting is adjourned because the Azerbaijani delegation has not yet received clear instructions from its government on its official position.
\textsuperscript{43} HAA, F. 200. list 1. dossier 548. P. 164.
G. Lordkipanidze proposes the following: The “Assembly of the Transcaucasian Republics discussing the cessation of hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia” decides

a) announce its firm decision to cease all hostilities;

b) inform the governments of the respective republics of the decision of the Assembly;

c) elect a commission to investigate the events that took place.

Meanwhile, the Azerbaijani delegate Agayev shows an ambiguous approach to the issue. In solidarity with the Georgian representative Lordkipanidze, he found it necessary to mention in the resolution that the war is being waged not only in Azerbaijan, but also abroad, which was a diplomatically calculated approach and involved the Armenian side in a more difficult stage. It is noteworthy that Agha, changing the real content of national-political relations, saw in the ongoing clashes only war between the well-known “nations – Muslims and Armenians”. That is why he insisted on “stopping hostilities where they took place”. The Armenian delegation, rightly understanding the bias of the Azerbaijani side, proposes to replace the word “Muslims” with the word “Azeris”. However, the Azeri delegation insists that the resolution must state that hostilities between Armenians and Azeris take place both within the borders of the republics and outside the borders of Azerbaijan, for example, in Armenia. The latest assertion causes the discussion of the issue to reach a deadlock.  

The Azerbaijani delegation issued a statement, according to which, considering that the conflict is taking place not between the citizens of Azerbaijan and the Republics of Armenia, but Armenians and “Muslims”. Then, in order to free the border from them or other newcomers Muslims from other actions against Armenia, Azerbaijan proposes to point out in the resolution that it is a matter of clashes between “Muslims” and Armenians in the Transcaucasian region. According to F. Bek Vekilov, in the conditions of general clashes, there are no guarantees that the conflict zones will decrease, so it is necessary to show clearly and to some extent that we are talking about the native Armenian population in Azerbaijan and, consequently, the Muslim population in Armenia. The Armenian delegation suggests emphasizing the places of the clashes “Stop the clashes in Karabakh, Nukhi, Nakhichevan, Ordubad and other places where they take place, between Armenians and Azeris within the Transcaucasia”.

The Armenian delegation emphasizes that in connection with the situation of Muslims in Armenia, as well as in Azerbaijan, the Assembly of Armenians can express a general opinion that no persecution and violence on national soil should be allowed within the borders of these republics.

44 HAA, F. 200. list 1. dossier 548. P. 166.
As a result of the debate and following Lordkipanidze’s proposals, the resolution is adopted as follows:

(a) Immediately stop all the bloody clashes that are currently taking place in Nukhi, Nakhichevan, Ordubad and Karabakh;
(b) At the same time, the Assembly insists that the Governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan take immediate and decisive action to rule out any possibility of any conflict between the Armenian and Muslim populations within the respective republics;
(c) promptly notify the Governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan of this decision to take appropriate action.\(^{46}\)

At the April 12 sitting, the Assembly discusses Lordkipanidze’s resolution on restoring the legal status that existed before the military conflict. In this regard, the representative of Azerbaijan Olgerd Bey Krichinski believes that it is not even a question of full restoration of the August 22 agreement and its former status, but only of the restoration of the factual situation that existed during the November 23, 1919 agreement, and in which the two countries were together until the last clashes. And Agha adds that it undoubtedly includes the August 22 agreement between the Karabakh National Assembly and the government of Azerbaijan, as well as the other acts and agreements that existed before November 23, which was undoubtedly a reasonably calculated approach by the Azerbaijaniis.

After Agayev, T. Bekzadyan spoke, finding that “the November 23 agreement does not say anything about the status of any legal norm, but only accepts the non-use of weapons and the submission of mediation arbitration in case of disagreements”.\(^{47}\) According to the latter, this agreement seems to include the previous agreement of August 22 between the Armenian National Assembly of Karabakh and the government of Azerbaijan. In response, Kriczynski made a remark, saying that the November 23 act had already been absorbed by the current Assembly. He further added that it was necessary to restore the factual situation that existed before November 23, continuing to maintain the stereotype of the position of the Azerbaijani side towards the solution of the problem.

Trying to contradict the Azeri delegation, H. Ohanjanyan made a certain retreat in his speech, saying that the August 22 agreement was violated by the Armenian National Assembly, and only then insisted that the November 23 agreement was broken by the Azerbaijani government in the sense that the latter resorted to weapons instead of arbitration. Therefore, according to him, two ways out of that situation must be seen. Return to the status quo in both Karabakh and Zangezur, or accept the status quo, reassure them of the cessation of hostilities and suspend them where they continue.

\(^{47}\) HAA, F. 200, list 1, dossier 548, P. 167-171.
Finally, the Assembly of the Republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, at its April 12 sitting, decided to “immediately fully restore the legal status that existed before the clashes, based on the agreements reached by the Assembly of Armenia-Azerbaijan and the Transcaucasian Republics, equally with the respective governments. To the agreements of the councils”.

A member of the Azerbaijani delegation, Olgerd Konstantin Krichinski-Naiman, a Tatar of Polish origin, opposes this, claiming that the August 22 agreement was violated in many points. And now we can only talk about returning to the borders that existed on November 23, as the last border, the chord, which they also seek to see as a starting point, confirming the factual situation in terms of borders. Opposing it in principle, T. Bekzadyan claims that there was a certain confusion of concepts, without denying that Azerbaijan ruled Karabakh. In his opinion, if this agreement has been violated by one side or another, the status quo ante before the clashes should be restored, that is, the situation in which Karabakh can be under the control of Azerbaijan, according to the agreement with the National Council.

O. Kriczynski, speaking immediately after Bekzadyan, insisted that the August 22 agreement with the Karabakh National Council should not be accepted as an act of international nature, but as an act of internal (instructional) nature. T. Bekzadyan opposes the above-mentioned point of view, and finding no stronger argument, claims that if the act is not published, it will become clear that it was not an order of internal government, but an international agreement, invented and approved by the Azerbaijani government. The representative of Azerbaijan Krychinski does not agree with this view, and noting that the people of Karabakh, albeit temporarily, agreed to submit to the Azerbaijani government, arguing that after Karabakh took over the Azerbaijani government on August 22, the Karabakh issue became an internal matter of the Azerbaijani government. And if they claim here that Karabakh is in a completely isolated state, then “a state within a state” is created.

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50 HAA, F. 200. list 1. dossier 548. P. 167-170; So there can be no question of an agreement with the population [there is a contradiction here, because a corresponding, albeit temporary, agreement was reached – V.V.]. Then, continuing to develop his highly contradictory speech, T. Bekzadyan comes to the conclusion that it is no longer a domination, but a well-known agreement based on special conditions.
51 HAA, F. 200. list 1. dossier 548. P. 168-170; It is appropriate to say clearly here. The Azerbaijani diplomatic delegates did not leave the impression of new recruits at all, especially Krychinsky, while the Armenian delegates-diplomats paid tribute to the sensitivity, not sober, unpromising assessments stemming from the situation.
53 HAA, F. 200. list 1. dossier 548. P. 170-171; As painful as it is, it is necessary to emphasize here an essential consideration on the part of the Armenian historical and political literature either to cover up or to avoid the existing problem, in terms of concealing unfavorable materials, as well as outright attempt to avoid comprehensive coverage of the issue and realistic political assessments. It is obvious that by the act of August 22, 1919, Karabakh and the Armenians, Armenia, make a very fundamental mistake. Even
However, Bekzadyan and Krichinski do not agree on the views, accepting by both sides that it is just an ordinary legal act. After that, Gegechkori concludes that he should return to the well-known starting point, which was once again confirmed by the November 23 agreement, emphasizing the fact that the agreement includes August 22. In response to the latter, Hamo Ohanjanyan only insists that the legal act of August 22 be included in the agreement. Finally, a resolution is adopted, to which both parties agree, as follows: “Immediately fully restore the legal status that existed before the clashes, and build on the agreement reached in the Assemblies of the Armenian-Azerbaijani and Transcaucasian Republics, as well as in the treaties between the National Councils and the respective governments”.

On April 13, the representative of Azerbaijan Krichinski gave another Azeri surprise, making a statement on the resolution adopted by the Assembly on April 12. In his speech, he stressed that the Azeri delegation considered it necessary, in order to avoid being misunderstood, to pass a resolution on the need to restore legal “status” on the basis of treaties reached by the Assembly between the National Councils and the respective governments on April 12, 1920. The legal status deriving from the act of August 22, 1919 leads to the approval of the subordination of the known parts of Karabakh within the territorial boundaries known to the Government of Azerbaijan, if they are currently violated due to the clashes, and measures must be taken to eliminate them.

In his letter of April 14, 1920 to the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia Al Khatisyan, H. Ohanjanyan mentions this view of the Azerbaijani side, saying that the Azeri delegates to the Assembly stated that by saying the restoration of the status quo ante they understand only in the sense of restoring the borders, and they understand the internal status of Karabakh in the sense of subordinating Karabakh to temporarily, which is a very dubious, unserious and reckless approach to diplomatic-political relations, agreeing to accept the rule of Azerbaijan, the Armenians of Artsakh, hoping for almost no help from the Armenian government and the support expected from its Entente allies, found themselves in a deadlock and suffered a painful defeat. It should also be noted that the Karabakh National Council gave such a dangerous, politically undesirable agreement, giving up all hope of receiving any real help from the metropolis, the Yerevan government. And if he did, it was too late and incomplete. This is a fact, and it can be pointed out that for the Azerbaijani government it was temporarily unrestricted, and here they were “right” to exploit that fact. It is another thing that the Armenians tried not to accept the diplomatic-political defeat they suffered in this Assembly (it happens, but it should not happen) or to try to get out of the deadlock. This is already understandable.

54 HAA, F. 200. list 1. dossier 548. P. 171; According to him, it was necessary to restore the situation that existed before the conflict, as it was based on the agreement of November 23, 1919, which is accepted by both sides. Continuing to hold his point of view, the latter believes that a mistake was made on Karabakh or another issue and that the parties should be brought to order in order to restore that status. The latter then concludes that there was an uprising in the known region, or an attack on the population by the population or violence, disarmament. they must be resolved in the Assembly.
56 HAA, F. 200, list 1, dossier 548, P. 171.
Azerbaijan and nothing more.\textsuperscript{58} In response, T. Bekzadyan objects to this, arguing that it is unnecessary to make changes in the already adopted resolution. Gegechkori offers to eliminate the issue, hand over the adopted resolution to the press, and not to debate the statement made.\textsuperscript{59} For obvious reasons, the representative of Azerbaijan Krychinsky opposes the publication of the resolution in the press, which is opposed by Gegechkori, whose proposal is passed. The Azerbaijani side declares that its government can never agree to that decision, withdrawing from its own agreement given on April 12. The Armenian delegation agrees to postpone the announcement of the resolution for two days. As a result, the Armenian side finds itself in a deadlock due to Georgian neutrality and Azerbaijani force.

At the April 14 sitting of the Assembly, the issue of sending the places of clashes to the commissions is discussed. The Armenian side insists that first a Gakh commission be sent, after which they will review the April 12 decision. Krichinski emphasizes that at present they do not have the object of international discussion, in which case they have the right to insist on abiding by any agreement. According to Bekzadyan, the agreement has lost its force due to the violation of the terms of hostilities, and the amendment on the legal status proposed by Krichinski should be rejected (ie, on temporary demarcation lines). Krichinski believed that if until recently the state power in Karabakh belonged to the Armenian National Council, then, even temporarily, from the moment of recognizing the power of Azerbaijan, the power of that council disappeared, dissolving into the sovereignty of the Republic of Azerbaijan. And at that moment in Karabakh there is only that sovereignty, because legally no two sovereignties can exist in the same territory. The Azerbaijani government does not refuse from this point of view.\textsuperscript{60}

In response, S. Khachatryan continued to argue that in the absence of the Assembly, the Armenian government might agree to the above provision, but the Assembly should discuss the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan's sovereign rights over Karabakh, and if the Azerbaijani government violates the terms of the treaty, it loses its rights. In addition, there were contractual relations, relations between well-known regions and the government. Instead, Aghayev says they do not want the Assembly to affirm the right to force, that there was no war, but there was unrest, and the government has established order through the armed forces, and proposes to pass their resolution. Then

\textsuperscript{58} Banber Hayastani archineri, 1996: 80.
\textsuperscript{59} HAA, F. 200. list 1. dossier 516. P. 175-176.
\textsuperscript{60} HAA, F. 200. list 1. dossier 516. P. 178-179; It must be admitted that Kriczynski’s point of view was really somewhat invulnerable from a legal point of view, from which the Azerbaijani side skillfully clung and narrowed the Armenian side with its counter-arguments. Moreover, it is undeniable that it was a politically unique approach, which Krychinsky and the Azerbaijani delegation understood perfectly, building each calculation from the position of overriding their own national-state interests. And if Azerbaijan managed, even temporarily (it was not clear at the end, how long it was “temporary”) to persuade the Armenian National Council of Karabakh to accept Azerbaijan’s supremacy, it should be considered a diplomatic-political defeat for Armenia and for Azerbaijan, as a unique victory.
Lordkipanidze claims that, undoubtedly, the Karabakh issue is of international nature. According to him, the treaty act of the agreement states that the Armenian population is subject to the government of Azerbaijan until the decision of the Peace Assembly, and it should be taken into account as an international document. And since the ratification of the agreement on that agreement has taken place at the moment, the interests of the case demand that the two governments restore the previous situation. And if the Assembly can maintain the purity of international law, it is possible that the case will benefit from it.\(^{61}\) The Armenian delegate Mamikonyan, who followed him in his speech, claims that the Azerbaijani government has only temporarily taken over Karabakh. The Armenian people, without the support of the Armenian government, were forced to agree only to temporarily submit to Azerbaijan, arguing that if the Azerbaijani government finds it difficult to agree to this provision, it must ratify it publicly, otherwise there can be no question of an assembly. Gegechkori does not accidentally inflame the situation by suggesting whether the Azerbaijani delegation can guarantee the rights of the Armenian population of Karabakh. Naturally, the Azerbaijani side immediately expresses a certain readiness. Speaking on this occasion, Aghayev stated on behalf of the Azerbaijani government that his government would ensure all the national-cultural rights he enjoyed before the clashes for the loyal Armenian population of returning Karabakh.\(^{62}\) In response, the RA delegate H. Ohanjanyan emphasizes in this connection that the mention of the words loyal and national-cultural rights in the declaration is not enough for them, and consequently, can not agree with the above-mentioned decision. Aghayev, on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan, agrees with Lordkipanidze’s new proposal, stating that the Government of Azerbaijan will preserve the national-cultural rights to the Armenian population of Karabakh, who must return to their homes. Taking note of that statement, the Assembly decided to send telegrams to the places where the bloody clashes are still going on. Besides, to address the peoples of Transcaucasia with a special statement.\(^{63}\)

In its further work (April 17 sitting), the Assembly hears the opinion of the commission that left for Gazakh. Member of the commission G. Makharadze reports that the clash started on April 5 and ended on April 9 on the initiative of the local population. 10 villages were burnt, 9 of which were Muslim and one Armenian. These events took place from April 10 to 17. It was reported that the commission had called for an end to the clashes and for them to return to their homes. In this regard, Khan-Khoyski published a telegram from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Azerbaijan. According to Vekilov, the Muslim population in Ghazakh is in a state of alarm and is

\(^{63}\) HAA, F. 200. list 1. dossier 516. P. 180.
afraid of new attacks. St. Mamikonyan, not so sure of the completeness of his own approach, states how such a telegram could have been received, as they were there on the eve of the clashes, talked to both sides, the villagers and the governor-general, and no such statement was made. In response, Krichinski offered his own solution, finding that the Karabakh issue should be separated from the issue under discussion, and there can be no question of the legal status of Ghazakh, but only that the borders should be restored. Instead, the RA delegate St. Mamikonyan informs that they were guided by the principle of expediency. He also wants the Assembly to find out what the status should be in Ghazakh.

Feeling threatened, the representative of Azerbaijan, Khan-Khoyski, wisely expressed the opinion that such a separate approach to the issue (to Ghazakh) could complicate its solution. Khan-Khoyski thinks that the well-known demarcation line was broken in Ghazakh, and it was broken by the Armenians, who occupied a part of the territory of Azerbaijan. Therefore, according to him, Armenians should go back to their place, and this should not be confused with Karabakh. According to Khan-Khoyski, Karabakh is also the territory of Azerbaijan, and here it is a matter of internal law of the Azerbaijani government, and it is about the legal status of the Armenian population of Karabakh, the attitude of the Azerbaijani government towards a known part of its population, while in Ghazakh it is only a dividing line. According to Khan-Khoyski, there is talk of an uprising in Karabakh, and there is an opinion that the commission going there may be able to expand the privileges of the Armenian population, and thus solve the issue. E. Gegechkori, this time thinks that it is pointless to connect one issue with another. In the case of Ghazakh, it is necessary to return to the old dividing line and return the refugees, and in the case of Karabakh, it is necessary to return the population to its old places of residence, after which the legal status of the population is raised, thus pacifying the region.

The Azeri delegation believes that the Assembly should have its opinion on the report of the commission on Ghazakh and proposes the following resolution: “After hearing the report of the committee on the events in Ghazakh, the Assembly decides: In the region where the Armenian-Muslim clashes are taking place, the territorial situation that existed before the clashes must be restored”. Instead, the Armenian delegation, represented by Ohanjanyan, proposes its own resolution. The Armenian delegation

66 It seems that Ghazakh has been an indisputable Azerbaijani territory from time immemorial. Such an approach of the Armenian delegation is very strange, or were they unaware of history or not?
67 HAA, F. 200. list 1. dossier 576. P. 5-6; This is the way to approach the diplomatic-political issue, this is the way to confuse the other side, which was not badly expressed by the Azerbaijani delegates to the Tbilisi Assembly of the Transcaucasian Republics.
68 HAA, F. 200, list 1, dossier 548, P. 171.
proposes to adopt a general resolution on the restoration of legal status, adopted unanimously on April 12, to take it as a basis for both Gazakh and other regions, which was mentioned in Resolution 1 of the Assembly (April 11).  

Khan-Khoyski immediately disagreed with the resolution, objecting to the merging of the two issues, arguing that in Gazakh it was a matter of conquering foreign territory and in Karabakh a revolt within the state itself, and that the Azerbaijani government would do everything in its power to benefit the population, from all the possibilities of national-cultural autonomy.  

Ohanjanyan then answered in the affirmative to Khan-Khoyski’s question whether the Armenians wanted to “liberate” Gazakh. Thus, from H. Ohanjanyan’s letter of April 18, 1920, addressed to the RA Prime Minister Al Khatisyen, it becomes obvious that the Armenian side had some concerns related to both Karabakh and other related issues. In the above-mentioned letter, H. Ohanjanyan directly emphasizes the following: “In the current conditions, it is absolutely impossible to achieve more. Judging by the current martial law based on your letters and telegrams from places, we are forced to make the biggest concessions”.  

At the April 18 sitting of the Assembly, Ohanjanyan noted that the Assembly did not want to dwell on the April 12 resolution, which was a fundamental basis for resolving the issues of Karabakh, Ordubad, Nakhichevan and other disputed territories. The decision of the 11th to stop the armed clashes has been made. And in each case, the Assembly must make a special decision, with the consent of the Foreign Ministers of Georgia and Azerbaijan.

**Conclusions**

Naturally, there was a conflict of interest and no agreement was reached. Allies, as accurately observed by D. Lang and K. Walker, skillfully fed the Armenians and the political leaders of the Armenian people “with the dream idea of creating an Armenia extending from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea”. Those hopes led to the fatal isolation and decline of the Republic of Armenia.

However, it was only after the defeat of the Bolsheviks in Denikin’s army, in January 1920, that the Allies recognized the Transcaucasian republics as independent states, with the aim of keeping the Caucasus and Persia out of Bolshevik influence.

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70 HAA, F. 200, list 1, dossier 576, P. 7-9.
72 *Bantber Hayastani archineri*, 1996: 82.
74 The changes in the situation and the significant change in the attitude of the allies towards Armenia were accurately noticed by D. Lang and K. Walker (1992, 31): “During 1920, the situation in the world underwent such dramatic changes that the promises made by the allied powers to Armenia became meaningless. After heated arguments, the ARF government decided to hand over power peacefully to the Bolsheviks, and as the saying goes, they preferred to be «red rather than dead».”
As early as the spring of 1920, the situation in the Transcaucasian region changed dramatically, and events began to develop rapidly, particularly in Artsakh, Zangezur and around them.\textsuperscript{75} The 7th Congress of Karabakh, held on August 12, 1919, examining the situation and making sure that it could not receive any help from outside, it decided to accept the agreement with Baku on August 15, and thus the agreement of August 22, 1919 was signed, “hoping” that the fate of Nagorno Karabakh would be resolved “unconditionally and fairly” in the European Reconciliation.

In this situation, with Denikin’s final defeat, Russia became a new factor in Armenia and the Caucasus. In the late April 1920, when Azerbaijan became Soviet. The Bolshevik Revolutionary Committee of Azerbaijan sends an ultimatum to the government of Yerevan, declaring war on the Republic of Armenia, if the Armenian troops did not immediately “empty” the “indisputable lands” of Azerbaijan by April 30, 1920.\textsuperscript{76} And later, on July 5, 1921, by the decision of the Kavbiuro Central Committee, under pressure from Stalin, Armenian Karabakh was annexed to Azerbaijan, in gross violation of the decision made on July 4, 1921, in favor of Karabakh-Artsakh joining Soviet Armenia. Roughly distorting the essence of the Leninist-Bolshevik ideology of free self-determination of nations, which was also categorically opposed by the prominent Soviet statesman Alexander Myasnikyan, who at that time assumed the party-political leadership of Soviet Armenia.\textsuperscript{77}

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\textsuperscript{75} The \textit{de facto} power in Artsakh has been in the hands of the local Armenian National Council since mid-1918. The latter did not recognize or recognize the Azerbaijani authorities at the ten congresses convened by him from May 1918 to May 1920, and after that, until the infamous decision of the Bureau of the Caucasus Territorial Committee of the Central Committee (Kavbiuro) of July 5, 1921.

\textsuperscript{76} HAA, F. 200, list 1, dossier 50, P. 102; Harutyunyan, 1996, 180-182.

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