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## The position of the Entente States on the idea of Armenia's independence (1917 and early 1918)

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**Abstract:** *The article highlights the emergence of the idea of Armenia's independence at the end of the First World War. The Russian revolutions and the position of the United States brought new ideas to the problems of colonization and self-determination of nations. In the autumn of 1917, representatives of the great powers began to speak positively about the independence of Armenia. This eventually led to the declaration of independence of Armenia on May 28, 1918. The article is based on archival materials and collections of documents. Many archival sources are introduced into scientific circulation for the first time. The analyzes were presented based on verified facts. The study was conducted by the historical-comparative method, according to the principle of historicity. An attempt has been made to present the problem in its entirety. In this article, we have revealed the position of Great Britain, France and the United States on the issue of the formation of an independent Armenian state.*

**Key words:** History, First World War, Entente, Armenia, Russian revolutions, Cilicia

### Introduction

On the eve of the First World War, Armenia was not an independent state. It was divided between the Ottoman and Russian empires.<sup>1</sup> The brutal repressions and massacres taking place in the Ottoman Empire made Armenian leaders think first of all about liberation from the Turkish yoke.<sup>2</sup> There were also pressures under Russian rule, but they are not comparable with Turkish ones. Armenians had the opportunity to live more or less safely and prosperously in Russia<sup>3</sup>. During the First World War, the Ar-

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<sup>1</sup> Nansen, 2011: 298.

<sup>2</sup> Zayas, 2010: 23-4.

<sup>3</sup> Nansen, 2011: 281.

menian leaders hoped that in the event of the victory of the Entente states on the territory of the Ottoman Empire, an autonomous Armenian state would be created on the basis of Western Armenia and Cilicia. It was because of this that the Armenians tried in every possible way to support the victory of the Entente states. Armenian volunteer detachments were formed to support the Russian army in the Caucasus and liberate Western Armenia.<sup>4</sup> In Cyprus, another Armenian volunteer army was formed, fighting under the French flag, the Armenian Legion, whose goal was to liberate Cilicia.<sup>5</sup>

Initially, the Armenians sought only to gain autonomy in the territory of Western Armenia and Cilicia. In the first years of the war, the Armenians could not even imagine the possibility of creating an independent state. However, international developments led to such a point that since the end of 1917 it was a real opportunity to establish an independent Armenian state.

The aim of the research is to show how the issue of Armenia's independence was raised as a result of the developments of the First World War. The purpose of the article is to present how Soviet Russia had to abandon its ambitions for Western Armenia and declare its readiness to grant independence to it. We wanted to present why the Entente countries encouraged Armenians to declare independence.

### **February Revolution in Russia and the Armenian Question**

A new international situation arose in 1917, when the February Revolution in Russia overthrew the tsarist regime and on April 6 the United States entered the war. The provisional government of Russia expressed its readiness to make peace on the basis of the principle of self-determination of nations, while one of its goals mentioned the liberation of the non-Turkish population of Asian Turkey.<sup>6</sup>

This position of the new Russian government once again inspired Armenian politicians and aroused new hopes, since the anti-Armenian policy pursued by the tsarist authorities caused rather serious disappointment. Catholicos of All Armenians George V also raised the issue of the autonomy of Western Armenia in a letter sent to the Provisional Government (March 23, 1917):

“Currently, at the time of an unprecedented war, which is being pushed against the principle of justice and rights of small nationalities, and as a result of which the Armenians in Turkish Armenia have made unprecedented sacrifices, the problem of their future and the Armenian vilayets must finally find its just and historical solution, giving it complete

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<sup>4</sup> Papazian, 2015: 83-4.

<sup>5</sup> Varnava, 2014: 998.

<sup>6</sup> Avetisyan, 1997: 11.

freedom and independence. I am very hopeful that the renovated Russia, with the agreement of the brave Allies, will create a free Armenia on the former Turkish provinces".<sup>7</sup>

The entry of the United States into the war on the part of the Entente also inspired Armenian political, public and religious figures, since this country was seen as the protector of the oppressed peoples. The Catholicos hoped that the revolution in Russia and the participation of the United States in the war could create favorable conditions for resolving the Armenian Question.<sup>8</sup>

Professor Wilbur Sibert (University of Columbus, Ohio, USA), representing the suffering and unconditional sympathy of the Armenians for the Entente, wrote in early March 1917:

"With all these facts before our eyes, granting autonomy to Armenia is not only a matter of justice, but also an indisputable obligation for the Powers of agreement if they win the war".<sup>9</sup>

He also noted that Armenians have a higher development than the surrounding nations and deserve full-fledged independence. In fact, the American professor even began to raise the idea of the independence of Armenia, which until that time was considered an unrealizable dream of Armenian politicians.

On April 23, W. Williams, the former editor of the American *Sunday Strand* magazine, had an article published in *Armianskiy Vestnik* (Armenian News) journal. Developing the idea of Armenia's autonomy, Williams conditioned the necessity of the mandatory entry of Cilicia into the Armenian state, so that the latter would have access to the Mediterranean Sea.<sup>10</sup>

Thus, the issue of a united Armenia was raised again. The ambitions of France or Italy in Cilicia were questioned. It coincided with the period when sharp French-Italian disputes over that Armenian territory began.<sup>11</sup>

Garegin Pastrmacyan, who was appointed by the Catholicos as the representative to the United States, met with Russian Foreign Minister Mikhail Tereshchenko and other high-ranking officials in St. Petersburg at the end of May. He concluded from those meetings that the Russian government was in favor of creating an autonomous Armenian state through the unification of Western Armenia and Cilicia. Thus, Russia hoped to establish an economic passage with the Mediterranean through Armenia.

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<sup>7</sup> HAA, F. 57. list 5. dossier 144. P. 15.

<sup>8</sup> HAA, F. 57. list 5. dossier 154. P. 10.

<sup>9</sup> Siebert, 1917: 6.

<sup>10</sup> Williams, 1917: 2-4.

<sup>11</sup> Helmreich, 1976: 107-8.

“According to the current Russian government, the appropriate and possible solution to the Armenian question is as follows: «Armenia itself (6 vilayets) and Cilicia will together form an autonomous political union, which will be placed under Russian protection with the consent of all states.» The solution of the Armenian question in this way will give Russia an opportunity to create a direct economic connection with the Mediterranean, by which the issue of Istanbul and the straits will lose its commanding importance”.<sup>12</sup>

The French side also made pro-Armenian statements. On May 22, in the National Assembly of France, Prime Minister Alexandre Ribot announced that his country was abandoning the policy of colonization.<sup>13</sup> However, Ribot’s statement was not sincere, since it was at this time that he was negotiating with Great Britain and Italy on the division of the Middle East in Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne. Events seemed to go hand in hand with the interests and aspirations of the Armenians. In fact, France allegedly abandoned Cilicia, and Russia had already abandoned the occupation of Western Armenia.

In the new international situation, the head of the Armenian national delegation, Boghos Nubar, returned to the idea of creating a united, autonomous Armenia, which he once had had to abandon due to the colonial policy pursued by czarism. He considered it necessary to put Armenia under the general patronage of the Entente states, and one of them (he considered the USA preferable) was to take over the country’s mandate for 10-15 years to protect against external attacks and help restore the destroyed economy. In that spirit a memorandum addressed to the Allies by the National Delegation was edited on May 24, 1917. It was titled *Memorandum on the Armenian Question and the Liberation of Armenia*.

“In these conditions, the National Delegation, aside from any idea of partitioning Armenia, did not hesitate to demand the formation of an autonomous Armenia, including all Turkish-Armenian lands, i.e. Cilicia and six provinces”.<sup>14</sup>

In July 1917, Arshak Chobanyan, an Armenian writer, publicist, editor and public figure, developed the idea of autonomy under the protectorat of the Entente states by uniting Western Armenia and Cilicia in Armenian newspaper *Veratsnund* (Renaissance). At the same time, he reminded that the most pro-Armenian statement was made at the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets, where the idea of granting complete independence to Armenia was voiced. Realizing that the Armenian aspirations for a united or independent Armenia might not come true due to the various interests of the Powers, he also mentioned the possibility of creating three Armenias:

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<sup>12</sup> HAA, F. 57. list 5. dossier 154. P. 17–18.

<sup>13</sup> Boghos, 1996: 437.

<sup>14</sup> HAA, F. 430. list 1. dossier 26. P. 14–15.

an autonomous one in Eastern Armenia, a semi-independent Western Armenia under the protectorate of Russia, an autonomous Cilicia under the protectorate of France.<sup>15</sup>

Chobanyan was sure that the best solution for the Armenians would be to unite all the Armenian territories under the rule of Russia, Turkey and Persia into an independent Armenia. But he realized that it was not yet possible to bring that idea to life. Therefore, he believed that at this historical moment, the Armenians should, if possible, strive to create an independent state on the basis of Western Armenia and Cilicia, and Eastern Armenia should receive autonomy within Russia. In the future, an independent Armenia will be able to unite the remaining Armenian territories.<sup>16</sup>

On October 20, 1917, at a meeting of the Provisional Council of Russia, Alexei Jivelegyan, a prominent cultural and public figure, presented the aspirations of Armenians to create an independent state with the unification of Western Armenia and Cilicia, which should have such eternal neutrality as Switzerland. In his opinion, after the war, the new independent state would need to rebuild its economy, protect itself from enemies, therefore offered to hand over Armenia's mandate to Russia for some time.<sup>17</sup>

Thus, various figures raised the idea of a united autonomous Armenian state. As we can see, the Armenian politicians, taking advantage of the new international situation, which seemed favorable, tried to come to a final solution to the Armenian Question. Some even started talking about the creation of an independent Armenian state. Before that, only the question of autonomy had been raised, and until 1917 independence seemed an unrealizable dream. The idea of independence has not yet matured in the wider circles of the Armenians. In the context of further rapidly developing events, Armenian politicians were unable to take the right steps in time to restore independent statehood. The national policy of the Provisional Government of Russia was very encouraging. It recognized the independence of Poland, the autonomy of Finland and Ukraine.<sup>18</sup> Naturally, all this begins to mature the idea of independence in the minds of Armenian political thought.

### **Russian October Revolution and new international developments**

Soon more serious opportunities opened up for maturation and even realization of the idea of independence. After the October Revolution, the Soviet government of Russia published the declaration *The Rights of the Peoples of Russia* on November 15, 1917. It gave the nations under Russian rule the right to free self-determination, even secession, and formation an independent state.<sup>19</sup> On December 29, 1917, the Decree

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<sup>15</sup> Chobanyan, 1917a: 14-5.

<sup>16</sup> Chobanyan, 1917b: 59.

<sup>17</sup> Dzhivelegov, 1917: 4.

<sup>18</sup> Kerensky, 1993: 158.

<sup>19</sup> *Documenti vneshnei politiki*, 1959: 15.

*On Turkish Armenia* adopted by the Government of Soviet Russia gave Western Armenians the right to determine their own future, up to independence.

“The Council of People’s Commissars declares to Armenian people, that Russian Government of Workers and Peasants supports the rights of Armenians of the occupied territories of «Turkish Armenia» and proclaims the freedom of self-determination up to full independence. The Council of People’s Commissars recognizes that this right can only be exercised in a number of pre-approval of the safeguards that are absolutely necessary for the people of Armenia to hold a referendum.

The Council of People’s Commissars recognises as a partial guarantee the following conditions:

Article A. Withdrawal of Russian troops from Turkish Armenia and immediate creation of Armenian national police (militia) to protect personal and material safety of Turkish Armenians.

Article B. Unimpeded return of Armenian refugees, scattered across the different countries to Turkish Armenia.

Article C. Unimpeded return of Armenians to Turkish Armenia, who during the war were forcibly exiled inside Turkey by the Turkish authorities. ... The Council of People’s Commissars Council will insist on this condition during the negotiations with the Turkish delegation.

Article D. The establishment of Interim Government in Turkish Armenia. Deputies will be elected on the principle of democracy.

Stepan Shaumyan, appointed as Commissar Extraordinary for the Caucasus, will provide assistance to Armenians of Turkish Armenia in the implementation of Articles B and C, as well as for the formation of Mixed Commission to identify the date and ways of Russian troops’ withdrawal, according to Article A.

The geographic boundaries of Turkish Armenia will be determined by the people’s democratically elected representatives together with Muslims and other residents of neighboring disputed areas and the Commissar Shahumyan”.<sup>20</sup>

Thus, the new Russian authorities officially recognized the right to independence of Western Armenia, which was under the control of the Russian army. With this step, Russia became the first state which recognized the right to establish an independent Armenian state.

On January 14 the Armenian Committee of Petrograd informed Nubar of the contents of the decree *On Turkish Armenia*.<sup>21</sup>

Events developed rather quickly and unexpectedly. After the October Revolution, Russian troops began to withdraw from the Turkish front, without waiting for the conclusion of a peace treaty with the Central Powers. This created a rather dangerous situation on the Caucasian front. Of the approximately 200,000 Armenians

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<sup>20</sup> *Documenti vneshnei politiki*, 1959: 74-5.

<sup>21</sup> HAA, F. 282. list 1. dossier 45. P. 1.

drafted into the Russian army during the war, only 20,000 were in Armenia, while the rest were on various Russian fronts.<sup>22</sup> On the one hand, Armenia faced the prospect of centuries-old independence, on the other hand, it was left alone against the Turks after the withdrawal of Russian troops.

After the October Revolution of 1917, Russian troops began to spontaneously leave the Caucasian front, and in fact the defense of the Russian-Turkish front remained on the shoulders of small Armenian forces. Armenian leaders were looking for ways out of such a difficult and dangerous situation.

On December 5, Nubar sent a telegram from Paris to the Armenian National Bureau of Tiflis, the Committee for Western Armenian Refugees and the Catholics, in which he called on all Armenian forces to unite and protect the liberated territories of Western Armenia from the Turkish invasion. He offered to establish contact and cooperate with the British forces in Mesopotamia. He said that the national delegation had begun negotiations with the governments of Great Britain and France in order to obtain military and financial support from them. He advised to enter into an alliance with the Georgians. He offered to telegraph what means he needed to receive them from the Allies. The telegram with Nubar was also signed by French Foreign Minister Stephen Pichon.<sup>23</sup> The telegram was discussed on December 15 in Yerevan at the Western Armenian National Council and aroused great enthusiasm.<sup>24</sup>

It was also discussed in Tiflis by the Eastern Armenian National Council. On December 25, in a reply telegram to Nubar, the National Council announced that the Russian army was almost completely withdrawing from the Caucasian front and the Armenian National Council of Tiflis decided to protect the liberated Armenian provinces and the Caucasus with its meager means. For this purpose, the Armenian Corps was formed, as well as the Western Armenian division and the Armenian gendarmerie to maintain internal order in the country and protect it from external enemies. In addition, they informed that negotiations on cooperation have already begun with the Georgians. The support of the Entente states was considered essential, since the Armenian people, who suffered from the war, could not defend the front alone. Given the bitter experience of the past, the Tiflis National Council considered it necessary that the Entente states immediately recognize Armenia's independence, since Russia had already officially recognized Armenia's right to free self-determination.

“Another moral and not less expensive assistance would certainly be the erasure of the secret diplomatic decision by which Armenia would be annexed to the monarchical Tsarist Russia. This unjust and by all accounts unsuccessful decision has weakened and is still weakening many wills due to the painful disbelief that it caused to entire nation in the face of this injustice. In order to raise the deeply depressed national spirit, it is

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<sup>22</sup> Hovannisian, 1968: 43-4.

<sup>23</sup> HAA, F. 57. list 5. dossier 157. P. 3.

<sup>24</sup> HAA, F. 430. list 1. dossier 18. P. 6-7.

necessary to recognize the full autonomy of Armenia by a diplomatic and military decision, which will be signed and immediately proclaimed by the Allied governments, because Russia has already officially recognized the right of nations to self-determination”.<sup>25</sup>

Nubar sent two secret telegrams to Tiflis from London through the British General Staff on February 21, 1918. The first was addressed to General Andranik, Chairman of the Western Armenian Council Vahan Papazyan and the Committee for Refugees of Western Armenia. In this telegram, he advised the representatives of the Western Armenians to act together with the Eastern Armenians and to take “any decisions about the political future of Armenia can be made only at the national assembly of the whole nation”.<sup>26</sup> As you can see, he was a supporter of national unity and was against the split of the people into Eastern Armenian or Western Armenian sectors.

The second telegram was addressed to the National Council of Eastern Armenians, Catholicos George V, General Andranik, and Hakob Zavryan. Nubar expressed his satisfaction at the creation of the National Council with the consent of all parties. He informed that the Allies are ready to help the Armenians; they will send money and military missions at the first opportunity. He again advised to cooperate with Georgians and maintain good relations with Caucasian Tatars. He especially called for increasing the number of Armenian soldiers as much as possible.<sup>27</sup>

### **The position of the representatives of the Entente on the future of Armenia**

On November 9, 1917, the Council of the Armenian Military Commissariat of Petrograd formed a delegation, which in the next two days held meetings with the French Ambassador Joseph Noulens and the heads of the French, British, and American military missions in Petrograd – Generals Henri Albert Niessel, Alfred Knox and William Judson. In the current new situation the task of the delegation was to find solutions for the future of Armenia and the Armenians, the possibility of material and military support of the allies. The French ambassador noted that Armenians cannot rely on Russia, they must rely on their own strength. He assured that France supported the idea of creating an independent Armenia and was ready to provide moral and material assistance if an authoritative governing body for Armenians would be formed which could perform the duties of the government and with which it would be possible to negotiate. The British representative Knox noted that his government had not yet made a decision, they could not just provide huge sums and ammunition, first of all, he considered it necessary to see a well-organized case. General Judson replied that

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<sup>25</sup> HAA, F. 200, list 1, dossier 5, P. 3–4.

<sup>26</sup> HAA, F. 200, list 1, dossier 5, P. 8.

<sup>27</sup> HAA, F. 200, list 1, dossier 5, P. 9.

they should wait until the problem of the Russian government was resolved, since the Armenians could not resist the Turks alone, and the allies could not help due to lack of roads.<sup>28</sup>

In fact, France supported the idea of an independent Armenia and was ready to support if an Armenian government was formed. The British side also wanted to see a government formed with which they could negotiate and cooperate.

On November 22 Jean Gout, the head of the Asia-Pacific Department of French Foreign Ministry, received Boghos Nubar and Vahan Tekeyan, a representative of Ramkavar Party. Nubar demanded that the French government fulfill its promise and announce the granting of autonomy to Armenia after the war. In a report to the Foreign Minister, Gout considered it necessary to state a Declaration on granting autonomy to Armenia after the war because of the fear that British troops might take steps to annul the Sykes-Picot agreement as they moved north of Jerusalem.<sup>29</sup>

In the fall of 1916, France had promised to grant autonomy to the Armenian territories – Cilicia and the three vilayets of Western Armenia (Kharberd, Diyarbakir, Sebastia), which would be passed to it according to Sykes-Picot agreement. In exchange, the Armenians formed a Volunteer Army in Cyprus – the Eastern (Armenian) Legion, which fought under the French flag.<sup>30</sup>

On November 23, 1917, Nubar and Tekeyan also met with French Foreign Ministry Political Director Jules Cambon and raised the same issues. In the report sent to the Minister, the Political director also noted the need for such a statement in order to avoid conspiracies by Great Britain, which, in his opinion, sought to neutralize the agreement of 1916.<sup>31</sup>

On November 29, François Georges-Picot, the French High Commissioner in Palestine and Syria, proposed to Foreign Minister Stephen Pichon to announce the granting of autonomy to Armenians, Arabs, and Syrians.<sup>32</sup>

As we can see, the French diplomats dealing with Middle East in the autumn of 1917 were inclined to declare an official statement of France on granting autonomy to the Armenians. In parallel with the British advance on the Palestinian front to the north, French diplomats had increased concern that their ally could later withdraw from the Sykes-Picot agreement and take control of Syria and Armenian territories. In order to feel stronger in that region, France needed troops, which it did not have. He tried to rely on the Eastern Legion, made up of Armenian-Syrian volunteers, but in order to win the favor of these peoples, it was necessary to promise autonomy. However, the French government has not declared its readiness to grant autonomy to Armenia and Syria, despite the proposal of the French officials dealing with the region.

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<sup>28</sup> Avetisyan, 1997: 39-40.

<sup>29</sup> *Les grandes puissances*, 1983: 413.

<sup>30</sup> Boghos, 1996: 436-7.

<sup>31</sup> Karamanoukian, 1974: 74-6.

<sup>32</sup> *Les grandes puissances*, 1983: 419.

It should be noted that the National Council of Armenians, most of the Armenian politicians were shocked to learn about the Sykes-Picot secret agreement, according to which Armenia should be divided between Russia and France; moreover, there was no talk of autonomy. Of course, the Armenian politicians had some doubts about the secret agreement and the division of the Armenian territories, but they hoped that both Western Armenia and Cilicia would receive autonomy separately. The Entente powers, who in past made loud statements about the noble idea of liberating oppressed nations, had to look for new ways to soften public opinion after the declassification of the Sikes-Picot agreement. On January 5, 1918, the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George announced that the national aspirations of Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine must be recognized and Turkey could never again lay claim to these territories.<sup>33</sup>

The Armenian Genocide committed by the Turks was a great and unprecedented crime against human civilization and had a great resonance in the world. That was also the reason for the positive attitude of the great powers towards the idea of Armenia's independence. Lloyd George wrote in his memoirs:

“From the moment war was declared, there was not a British statesman of any party who did not have it in mind that if we succeeded in defeating this inhuman Empire, one essential condition of the peace we should impose was the redemption of the Armenian valleys for ever from the bloody misrule with which they had been stained by the infamies of the Turk”.<sup>34</sup>

On December 22, 1917, a memorandum drawn up by the US State Department proposed to guarantee the autonomy of the Armenians

“not only as a matter of justice and humanity but in order to reestablish the one people in Asia Minor capable of preventing economic monopolization of Turkey by Germans”.<sup>35</sup>

On January 8, 1918, US President Woodrow Wilson delivered the famous ‘Fourteen points’ in Congress. At the same time, he put forward the idea of annulling all previous secret agreements and providing absolutely inviolable conditions for the independent development of the nations of Turkey.<sup>36</sup>

If until the end of 1917 even Armenian leaders were embarrassed to talk about the independence of Armenia, now the international situation has changed dramatically, and the governments of Russia, Great Britain and the USA have officially announced the need to grant independence to Armenia.

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<sup>33</sup> Hovannisian, 1968: 148.

<sup>34</sup> Lloyd George, 1938: 1257-8.

<sup>35</sup> Hovannisian, 1968: 153.

<sup>36</sup> *President Wilson's Message to Congress*, January 8, 1918.

On February 7, 1918, US Congressman Colonel Edward Little, a former diplomatic representative in Egypt, delivered a comprehensive speech to Congress on the Armenian Question. He expressed hope that a representative government under the auspices of the powers would be created in Armenia. It would stretch from the Mediterranean, from the ports of Mersin and Alexandretta to the Russian border. He was convinced that in the event of a possible division of Russia, it would be possible to unite Russian-Armenia. The congressman was sure that in this case it would be possible to build a railway from the Mediterranean to Erzerum, from where it would connect with Tiflis, the Black and Caspian seas. He was convinced that it would allow Armenia to become part of the modern world in a few months, life would be safe, education and religious freedoms guaranteed.<sup>37</sup>

As you can see, the congressman raises the issue of creating a united Armenian state, which would include not only Western Armenia, Cilicia, but also Eastern Armenia.

### Conclusion

The vision of creating an independent Armenian state arose on the wave of Russian revolutions. Soviet Russia, then the French, British and American governments began to recognize the possibility of Armenia's independence. However, at the beginning of 1918, the Armenian political thought was not ready to accept the idea of independence. It was due to this that Armenian leaders, instead of acting independently and declaring independence, began to look for ways of cooperation with Georgians and Tatars.

The inability to declare independence, to solve the problems independently or with the support of the Entente states, eventually led to another tragedy. Russia withdrew from the war on March 3, 1918, signing the shameful Brest-Litovsk Treaty, which yielded to Turkey not only Western Armenia but also parts of Eastern Armenia – Kars, Ardahan, and Batum.<sup>38</sup> Armenia declared independence too late, on May 28, 1918, when the Transcaucasian Federal Republic collapsed.

The Armenian political elites should have declared the independence of Western Armenia in December 1917 or January 1918, and they must try to receive military and material support from the Entente Powers as an independent state. And they had to cooperate with Georgians and Caucasian Tatars only within the Transcaucasia. One of the possible options was also the establishment of close cooperation with France, the promise of the latter the mandate of Armenia if Cilicia would be united with the Armenian state. Thus, we must conclude that the Entente Powers were in favor of the declaration of Armenia's independence. However, rapid

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<sup>37</sup> Little, 1918: 8.

<sup>38</sup> *Documenti vneshnei politiki*, 1959: 121.

developments and the lack of roads did not allow the Entente states to send real assistance. Armenia was able to declare independence only when the Turks already occupied all of Western Armenia and much of Eastern Armenia. Only after the defeat of Turkey in the war it was possible to extend the borders of the Republic of Armenia over most of Eastern Armenia.

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Հայաստանի Գերագույն Կրթական Կոմիտեի Կողմից 1914-1919 թվականներին իրականացված գործունեության մասին հարցազրույցի օրինակը:

1. 1914 թվականի սեպտեմբերի 23-ին Հայաստանի Գերագույն Կրթական Կոմիտեի կողմից հռոմեացիների և օսմանների դեմ զինված ապստամբություն հայտարարվեց:

2. 1915 թվականի ցեղասպանության ժամանակահատվածում Կոմիտեի անդամները և աշխատակիցները օգնություն և օգնություններ ցուցաբերեցին հայկական ընտանիքներին, որոնք փախչում էին Կոմիտեի կողմից ստեղծված փախուցման կետերում:

3. 1916 թվականի մարտի 22-ին Հայաստանի Գերագույն Կրթական Կոմիտեի կողմից հայկական Դեմոկրատիկ Ռեպուբլիկի ստեղծումը հռչակվեց:

4. 1918 թվականի մայիսի 28-ին Հայաստանի Գերագույն Կրթական Կոմիտեի կողմից հայկական Դեմոկրատիկ Ռեպուբլիկի ստեղծումը հռչակվեց:

5. 1919 թվականի մայիսի 28-ին Հայաստանի Գերագույն Կրթական Կոմիտեի կողմից հայկական Դեմոկրատիկ Ռեպուբլիկի ստեղծումը հռչակվեց:

The document is an excerpt from the report of the Armenian national delegation of March 15, 1919, where its activities in 1914-1919 are presented. HAA, F. 430. list 1. dossier 26. P. 15

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