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Purpose – to recognize Germany. About some activities of the Polish intelligence in the 1920s

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Abstract: *After World War I, Weimar Germany did not recognize the western borders of the Second Polish Republic. They did not accept the result of the defeat they suffered. Poland was referred to as the 'Saisonstaat', which was synonymous with aggression for the Germans. The Weimar Republic sought to rebuild its military potential and demanded the abolition of all forms of control and revision of the Versailles Treaty. From the moment Poland regained independence, the security of the state was threatened by Germany and Russia. In this situation, the identification of threats was of particular importance. Secret service structures were created under very difficult conditions. In the early 1920s, the intelligence reconnaissance of Germany was not sufficient. The organizational changes and improved methods of operation carried out in the second half of this decade had a positive impact on the effects of work. The head of the Berlin intelligence facility, codenamed 'In 3', captain, and later major, Jerzy Sosnowski provided the headquarters of the Second Department of Polish General Staff with valuable information on the expansion of the German armed forces. Also, field offices were actively exploring Germany. Agents played a special role in the activities of the intelligence service. Therefore, the process of their selection, conducting, training and supervision, on which the effects of work depended, deserves attention.*

Key words: Polish General Staff; interwar period; intelligence; reconnaissance; secret services; agents

Introduction

The article presents selected fragments of the activities of the Second Department of Polish General Staff of the Polish Army in the field of recognizing the threat posed by the Weimar Republic. The presented issues are extensive and complex. Attempts were made to present the specificity of unknown, fully secret activities in the context of German intelligence reconnaissance. The importance of agents in the performance of secret tasks was emphasized. The attention was paid to the most important factors influencing their effective use in operational activities. The article is largely based on archival materials. Their in-depth analysis and presentation of the most important aspects of the subject will enable readers to understand selected fragments of activities carried out by specialized organs of

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the Second Department. The arguments contained therein may be an inspiration for further research on this fascinating issue.

The state of research on the subject matter is not fully satisfactory, which justifies taking it up. Polish and German historians presented it only to a certain extent. The activities of Polish intelligence in the Third Reich were dealt with by Władysław Kozaczuk,¹ and later by Leszek Gondek. They made an attempt to show the Polish-German struggle on the secret front in 1922-1939. Andrzej Peplowski,² on the other hand, conducted deeper research, although he focused his attention on the activities of Polish intelligence in the USSR. The functioning of the secret services in the Second Republic of Poland was presented in a broad perspective by Andrzej Misiuk.³ Other historians have also dealt with some aspects of the activity of secret services in the 20th century. The works of Tadeusz Dubicki,⁴ Edward Długajczyk,⁵ Robert Majzner,⁶ Piotr Kołakowski⁷ and Wojciech Skóra⁸ deserve attention.

The organization and activity of Polish intelligence in Germany

Poland, reborn after 123 years of captivity, found itself in a new political system created after the First World War.⁹ The Republic of Poland struggled with many problems. The territorial shape, place in Europe and the creation of a security system were extremely important for the future of the Polish nation and state.¹⁰ A significant problem for state security was the organization and operation of secret services due to the existing threat from Germany and Russia.¹¹

The establishment of the Second Department of the General Staff of the Polish Army was preceded by the activity of intelligence and counterintelligence centers. In January 1921, the Supreme Command of the Polish Army created the organizational structures of the intelligence, which were to function under peaceful conditions.¹² Great importance was attached to the effective use of agents and very economical management of the funds held. It was established that the intelligence activities of a specific branch will cover all matters of the identified district. The branch of the Second Department of the Supreme Command in Poznań covered the German

¹ KOZACZUK, 1977.

² PEPLŃSKI, 2011.

³ MISIUK, 1998.

⁴ DUBICKI and MISZALSKI, 2017.

⁵ DŁUGAJCZYK, 1993.

⁶ MAJZNER, 2006.

⁷ KOŁAKOWSKI, 2012.

⁸ SKÓRA, 2006.

⁹ PEPLŃSKI, 1999: 5.

¹⁰ MISIUK, 1998: 15.

¹¹ ĆWIEK, 1995; PEPLŃSKI, 1996; MISIUK, 1998; ĆWIEK, 2009; ĆWIEK, 2020.

¹² Centralne Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych (therefore CA MSW), sygn. 291, Pismo Oddziału II Informacyjnego SG w Warszawie do Ekspozytury Naczelnego Dowództwa w Poznaniu, z 28 I 1921 r. k. 44–45.

military districts (Wehrkreis) No. II-VII. The Gdańsk branch conducted special operations in the area of the Free City of Gdańsk, as well as the military district No. I in East Prussia.¹³

As part of the reconnaissance of the western neighbor, intelligence facilities in other countries were also organized, thanks to which it was possible to obtain valuable information. The organization of intelligence agencies in England, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Austria and Italy was included. In the event of an armed conflict with Germany, the agency located in these countries would be a very valuable source of information. The activities of the outlets outside Poland and in the country were kept secret. They were to function under the guise of various companies, most often commercial ones. Agents, employees of certain institutions, had great opportunities to perform secret tasks.¹⁴ The management of the Second Department sought to establish a network of ideological intelligence in Germany. Attempts were made to engage mainly German citizens of Polish nationality for special tasks. They were to provide information without receiving any remuneration. Most of them were hostile to the Germans who exploited them.¹⁵

The reconnaissance of the German army in the early 1920s was not sufficient. It relied heavily on the knowledge contained in official publications. Some information was obtained from representatives of the French military mission. In the summary of the activities of the Polish intelligence in 1921, it was stated:

“There is no data on the actual numbers of line units, their weapons and ammunition stocks. We have no idea about the mobilization plan. In particular, there is no precise information on the orders of the central authorities regarding works and fortifications on the Polish border [...]”¹⁶

The analysis of the obtained information was carried out in the register cells. Great importance was attached to the quality of the delivered messages. The Second Department put the problem in this way:

“First of all, the facts should be given. It is unacceptable to generalize information, e.g. it is not enough to say that demobilization or mobilization is taking place in a given country. You have to back it up with facts like: in the western district there is a mobilization of a given age group, ordered by [...]”

¹³ CA MSW, sygn. 291, Pismo Oddziału II Informacyjnego SG w Warszawie do Ekspozytury Naczelnego Dowództwa w Poznaniu, z 28 I 1921 r. k. 44–45.

¹⁴ CA MSW, sygn. 282, t. 19, Pismo Ekspozytury Oddziału II w Poznaniu do Oddziału II SG w Warszawie, z 12 X 1922 r., k. 5–6.

¹⁵ CA MSW, sygn. 289, t. 55, Wytoczne Sztabu Generalnego MSWojsk. w kwestii zorganizowania wywiadu „ideowego” na Niemcy, z 9 III 1922 r., k. 59–61.

¹⁶ CA MSW, sygn. 289, t. 55, Raport o braku materiałów informacyjnych w Referacie „Zachód”, z X 1921 r., k. 67–69.

Facts must be valuable. It is not enough to say that there are 300 soldiers and several guns in the village of X. It must be absolutely stated which unit these soldiers are from [...]. Each message must be provided with the source it comes from [...].¹⁷

Information obtained by secret service agents was used for various purposes. In July 1925, lieutenant Jan Źychoń – the head of the Information Post in Katowice – received an intelligence message that Ewa Fischer, with whom he rented an apartment, was in contact with the employees of the German consulate in Katowice.¹⁸ She provided Holtzke with information about officers working in the Katowice facility and agent Schnajder. The latter provided the Polish information service with many valuable news from the Reichswehr staff.¹⁹ Lieutenant Źychoń tried to get Fischer to cooperate. She was supposed to deal, among other things, with selecting candidates for agents.

From the intelligence instruction from 1923 we learn about the scope of interests of the Polish side. The most important were the following issues: operational plans and the state's intentions with regard to mobilization preparations; system of organization of the army, commands and central military authorities; organization of military districts; organization of particular types of weapons; organizational composition of divisions, sub-divisions, number, numbering; military aviation; armor; military mood and discipline; military supplies; army training.²⁰

Polish intelligence agents operated in difficult conditions in the area of Weimar Germany. They tried to identify civilian-military organizations that were well-equipped and trained, and were also preparing the cadre for the future army. They aimed to recognize the Reichswehr.²¹ It was very difficult to get German soldiers to cooperate. Most of them were hostile towards Poland. Their material situation was good. They were afraid of the consequences for espionage. Recruitment to the Reichswehr was organized by divisional districts, while the process was carried out by battalions and regiments. Only exemplary volunteers were accepted. The certificates of morality were issued by the police. Military authorities could request the police to provide moral certificates for the volunteer's family members. Recruitment to the Reichswehr took place twice a year, usually in April and October. The period of

¹⁷ CA MSW, sygn. 289, t. 24, Instrukcja dla wywiadu wojskowego, z 1923 r., k. 214–216.

¹⁸ Archiwum Państwowe w Katowicach, Policja Województwa Śląskiego, sygn. 233, Pismo Komendy Policji Województwa Śląskiego do Prokuratury przy Sądzie Okręgowym w Katowicach, z 25 VII 1925 r., k. 267.

¹⁹ JASTRZĘBSKI, 1994: 20–21.

²⁰ CA MSW, sygn. 289, t. 24, Instrukcja dla wywiadu wojskowego, z 1923 r., k. 216–221.

²¹ CA MSW, sygn. 289, t. 62, Opracowanie Oddziału II SG w sprawie kontaktów polskiego wywiadu w wojsku niemieckim, z 4 X 1932 r., k. 53–57.

service for privates was 12 years, during which time they could only resign for important reasons.²²

The Polish intelligence recognition area in Germany in the early 1920s was divided into three intelligence districts. Officers' posts were created at the consulates in: Berlin, Hamburg, Essen, Munich, Wrocław, Szczecin, Olsztyn, Klaipeda and Królewiec.²³ During this period, the intelligence activity was started by six full-time employees of the Second Department of Polish General Staff of the Polish Army. In 1922, they were tasked with recognizing the German military structures, arms trade, German-Russian cooperation, the activities of political and paramilitary organizations.²⁴ Intelligence tasks transferred from the Warsaw headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the consulates depended on many factors.²⁵ The Polish Legation in Berlin also set out the directions of secret activities for the consulates. It received special subsidies for this purpose.²⁶ Recognition of Germany by the consular service in the first years after regaining independence can be assessed as auxiliary.

In 1926, Captain Jerzy Sosnowski organized an intelligence facility in Berlin, codenamed 'In.3'. His agents stole the greatest secrets of the Reichswehrministerium. Therefore, the headquarters of the Polish intelligence had valuable information on the expansion of the German armed forces and the cooperation of the Reichswehr with the Red Army. The seeds of German military power were being created in the Soviet Union.²⁷ In the capital of Germany, there was also an intelligence facility called 'I.A', which performed the observation, information and technical functions. It made the work of other institutions easier. It also used its own agents. In the years 1929-1930, it recognized: German-Soviet cooperation and the armament of the Weimar Republic, using the 'Zimmert' and 'Mirecki' agent groups, led by agents '2126' and '2127'; aviation and communications development, supervised by experienced agent '506'; Reichswehr weapons and technical innovations in the military, supervised by agent '2130'.²⁸

Intelligence activities in Germany were carried out by three field offices of the Second Department: No. 3 in Poznań, No. 4 in Kraków, No. 7 (BIG) in Gdańsk and the two above-mentioned posts in Berlin: 'I.A' and 'In.3'. On the other hand, the Officer's Post No. 5 and the Officer's Post No. 3 were transferred to the organizational structure of the Gdańsk branch. The military attaché in Berlin

²² CA MSW, sygn. 289, t. 62, Opracowanie Oddziału II SG w sprawie kontaktów polskiego wywiadu w wojsku niemieckim, z 4 X 1932 r., k. 53-57.

²³ MISIUK, 1998: 71-72.

²⁴ MISIUK, 1998: 72.

²⁵ SKÓRA, 2006: 736-739.

²⁶ SKÓRA, 2006: 741.

²⁷ The intelligence activity of Captain (Major) Jerzy Sosnowski in Germany was presented in *ĆWIEK*, 2011.

²⁸ CA MSW, sygn. 289, t. 62, Opracowanie dotyczące działalności wywiadu „Zachód” w latach 1929-1930, z 23 II 1931 r., k. 1-22.

cooperated with the Second Department.²⁹ In the officers' posts, intelligence networks were organized by branches. As part of the Poznań branch, there were two officer posts: No. 1 in Chojnice and No. 3 in Wieluń. Branch No. 4 in Krakow supervised the activities of officer posts: No. 1 in Królewska Huta and No. 2 in Katowice. The Gdańsk branch managed the activities of the posts: No. 1 in Grudziądz, No. 2 in Kościerzyna, No. 3 in Szczecin, No. 4 in Tczew and No. 5 in Królewiec. 89 agents were engaged in special operations in Germany at the beginning of 1929. Branch No. 3 in Poznań used 21 agents for special operations, including 10 as operational sources and 11 intermediaries. In the Krakow exhibition, secret tasks were performed by 31 collaborators, including 15 sources and 16 intermediaries. The Gdańsk branch cooperated with 22 agents. Of these, 16 were sources and 6 were intermediaries.³⁰

In the western branches at the end of the 1920s, there was a large rotation of the agents, which was to improve the effects of operations. In the period 1929-1930, 56 associates were dismissed and 77 agents were recruited for cooperation. Changes took place in all intelligence facilities. In Branch No. 4 unfavorable proportions can be noticed, because 29 people were dismissed and 28 agents were recruited for cooperation.³¹

The selection and training of both officers and agents played an extremely important role in intelligence activities. The 'West' department directed to Germany, to the positions of heads of posts, officers who could carry out both special activities of an observation and intelligence nature. The essence of this task was the ability to make contacts with specific people, create the appearance of intimacy and use this arrangement appropriately. Under favorable conditions, these people could pass on, even unconsciously, news that Polish intelligence was interested in. This model of operation was used, among others, in the 'Placyda' facility, operating at the Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Berlin.³²

The effects of the secret services 'activities depended on the agents' performance. Efforts were made to properly prepare them for the implementation of specific tasks.³³ Agents were divided depending on the nature of the tasks performed into: residents, recruits, volatile and intermediaries. The resident was permanently resident in a specific area (environment) that was of interest to the security authorities. A recruiting agent was recruiting candidates for covert activities. The tasks of the volatile agent were not related to the place of permanent residence. He conducted

²⁹ CA MSW, sygn. 289, t. 62, Opracowanie dotyczące działalności wywiadu „Zachód” za lata 1929–1930, z 23 II 1931 r., k. 1–22.

³⁰ CA MSW, sygn. 289, t. 62, Opracowanie dotyczące działalności wywiadu „Zachód” za lata 1929–1930, z 23 II 1931 r., k. 1–22.

³¹ CA MSW, sygn. 289, t. 62, Opracowanie dotyczące działalności wywiadu „Zachód” za lata 1929–1930, z 23 II 1931 r., k. 1–22.

³² GONDEK, 1982: 131.

³³ CA MSW, sygn. 293, Instrukcja o prowadzeniu ewidencji agentów i raportów organizacyjnych, z 1 VII 1931 r., k. 567–576.

reconnaissance activities on an ad hoc basis. Agent – an intermediary performed an auxiliary function as a liaison between the manager and the contractor. The type of agent corresponded to the nature of his activities. It often happened that the recruiting agent was also a volatile agent, and the resident also recruited.

Supervision over the agent's activities was of particular importance.³⁴ The leader had to make many complicated moves many times. Often times, cunning and deception complemented each other in these struggles. With a priori skeptical attitude towards the agent, the officer could not show any distrust of him. It was against the rules of secret activities. Even if the officer did not believe the agent's truthfulness, he tried to manifest his confidence in him. People prepared for special tasks as agents were subject to specific control rules. They were divided into cooperating for ideological or economic reasons. Most often, recruiting agents selected, characterized and recruited collaborators for secret activities. Particular attention was paid to the agent's ability to act, his character traits, opinions, political views, addiction tendencies, etc. Candidates took tests on their ability, perceptiveness, integrity and political conviction. In the field units, registration and statistical books of candidate agents were kept, in which the data necessary for the full identification of the future collaborator were recorded. In the summary, the following terms were used most often: certain, doubtful and suspicious. On this basis, the branch manager made the appropriate decisions.³⁵ Efforts were made to ensure that the agent had no contact with the offices of the secret services or with persons employed there. According to the guidelines, he should not enter into private contacts with other agents. However, he was obliged to inform his superior about making new friends of a private nature. This fact was used to test its truthfulness. The agent and his family were monitored on an ad hoc basis.³⁶

As part of the supervision of the agent, its preparation for performing special tasks, character traits, level of intelligence, operational capabilities, as well as motives of actions were taken into account. Often, officers made calculations taking into account the effort and resources, and the expected results of the agency's work, in order to balance the balance of misunderstandings and disappointments. The training process was to contribute to the creation of proportions favorable to the secret services and the proper use of agents. In order to properly train the agent, an in-depth and comprehensive intelligence reconnaissance was carried out.³⁷ The motives for obtaining were an important element, as they constituted a kind of binder during the period of cooperation. Agents acting with ideological motives, possessing a high degree of intelligence and aware of the purpose were the most valuable sources

³⁴ KOLIJEWICZ, 1936: 8-10.

³⁵ CA MSW, sygn. 293, Instrukcja o przyjmowaniu i obserwacji wywiadowców, opracowana przez Oddział II SG, z 6 I 1921 r., k. 5–6.

³⁶ KOLIJEWICZ, 1936: 8-10.

³⁷ KOLIJEWICZ, 1936: 8-10.

of information. Agents who cooperated with the intention of profit, revenge or love of adventure were approached very carefully, and efforts were made to control their activities on an ongoing basis, especially in the initial period of cooperation. Officers were careful in providing agents only with the information necessary for their operation. Particular attention was paid to people acting for material reasons, because experience showed that they were often frauds or even two-faced agents.³⁸ There were also agents – provocateurs, who were in the service of foreign intelligence and tried to cooperate with the Polish secret services.³⁹ The management of the Second Department has repeatedly emphasized the need for local offices to report information about the recruited collaborators in order to avoid the adverse effects of provocateurs, double or worthless agents.⁴⁰

Intelligence officers tried to use several agents for one case.⁴¹ Each of them acted on their own and should not know other collaborators. In this way, the quality of the agents' work and the degree of their loyalty were assessed. This method was used periodically or continuously, depending on the importance of the project. It made it possible to comprehensively recognize specific issues, and also prevented provocation. The agent was required to have

“[...] truthfulness, punctuality, broad initiative in the activities performed, knowledge of people, caution, reticence, cunning, self-control and presence of mind.” In personal relations, he should be very careful. His rule should be believe no one and avoid any arguments and quarrels [...] An agent should have a permanent paid job in order not to arouse suspicions, not to lose trust among friends. After engaging in secret activities, he should not change his previous lifestyle and profession in any way [...] If he uses a different name and has documents on them, he should remember the dates contained in them, he should stay in the place that is mentioned in the document, as the place of residence [...], all signs on his underwear etc. should agree with the initial letters of his assumed surname and first name [...] It is necessary that each agent is thoroughly acquainted with the applicable registration regulations and the technique of dealing with them [...].”⁴²

Specialist training of agents was of great importance. It made it easier for them to obtain the necessary information, allowed them to draw appropriate conclusions from the observations, and make accurate assessments of the identified phenomena. A well-trained agent distinguished between military formations at the peace level and formations at the military level, accurately assessed their strength, the composition

³⁸ CA MSW, sygn. 293, t. 253, Instrukcja dla pouczenia wywiadowców, opracowana przez Oddział Informacyjny DOG w Krakowie [b.r.w.], k. 52–54.

³⁹ PEIPER, 1931.

⁴⁰ CA MSW, sygn. 293, Pismo Oddziału II SG do ekspozytur terenowych, z 22 X 1928 r., k. 569.

⁴¹ CA MSW, sygn. 1556, Technika wywiadu wewnętrznego, [b.m.r.w.], s. 8–9.

⁴² CA MSW, sygn. 1556, Technika wywiadu wewnętrznego, [b.m.r.w.], s. 8–9.

of individual tactical and administrative units, weapons, equipment, and also recognized types of weapons, uniforms, unit numbers, military badges, etc.⁴³ The associate was also required to properly process the information obtained. It was not an easy task, as he had to accurately present the results of his work. As a rule, he did not draw conclusions from his own observations.⁴⁴

The intelligence information was carefully analyzed by comparing it with the messages received from other collaborators. More than once the principle was followed that if a particular message came from three unknown agents, then it could be assessed as certain. The motives for action and the mental state of the informant who could consciously or unconsciously present news in a biased manner were also analyzed. In addition to determining the degree of credibility of the information, it was important to assess the usefulness and validity. In order to carry it out properly, the posts of secret services had to cooperate closely with each other.⁴⁵

The conspiracy was an important element of the intelligence activities. Great importance was attached to the creation of an appropriate legend for the agent. This was done through a carefully selected procedure in which no gap was left for unforeseen circumstances. Building the legend was a complex matter.⁴⁶ During this process, the agent's knowledge in various fields, knowledge of people, certain regions of the country, and many other factors were taken into account. In the legend, the agent's place of birth, education, profession, place of residence, and therefore all personal data, were changed. The legend had to be plausible and easy to remember with all the details, since the agent had to be well prepared to defend it, even under the conditions of a thorough investigation. He had to skillfully play his role. He was required to be able to find himself in any situation 'incarnating' in a specific personality. Even the agent's clothing was important, as it facilitated the execution of secret missions to some extent. Efforts were made to make the disguise rather common and not make the agent stand out from the crowd.⁴⁷

The activities of intelligence agents were controlled. It was assumed that even the best agents and the information they provided should be constantly checked.⁴⁸ Attempts were made to precisely define the period of the associates' stay in Germany. During this time, they were monitored to assess their loyalty. The principle was

⁴³ CA MSW, sygn. 293, t. 253, Instrukcja dla pouczenia wywiadowców opracowana przez Oddział Informacyjny Dowództwa Okręgu Generalnego w Krakowie, [b.r.w.], s. 3–4.

⁴⁴ CA MSW, sygn. 293, t. 253, Instrukcja dla ofensywnej służby wywiadowczej, opracowana przez Oddział Informacyjny SG w Krakowie, [b.r.w.], s. 8–9; CA MSW, sygn. 293, t. 253, Instrukcja dla pouczenia wywiadowców opracowana przez Oddział Informacyjny Dowództwa Okręgu Generalnego w Krakowie, [b.r.w.], s. 4.

⁴⁵ CA MSW, sygn. 293, t. 253, Tymczasowe przepisy o prowadzeniu służby wywiadowczej w Wojsku Polskim., [b.r.w.], k. 44–49.

⁴⁶ STEPEK and CHODKIEWICZ, 1925: 59-60.

⁴⁷ FEDUNISZYN, 1924: 24-33.

⁴⁸ CA MSW, sygn. 291, t. 328, Plan i wytyczne pracy Ekspozytury nr 3 w Bydgoszczy, z 16 I 1935 r., k. 2–3.

that agents did not know too many secret service officers and were therefore directed by one person. In principle, colleagues were only paid after certain materials were provided. There were cases where the German intelligence directed its associates to Polish posts to make appropriate reconnaissance.⁴⁹

The protection of Polish intelligence in Germany was also dealt with by offensive counterintelligence, which had a reconnaissance of Abwehr activity. Traditionally, special attention was paid to learning about the organization, working methods and technical means used by the German authorities. Polish counterintelligence services looked for contacts there, using specific activities to obtain the necessary information.

Conclusions

For the reborn Poland in 1918, the recognition of the threat posed by Germany was of exceptional importance. The Weimar Republic, and later the Third Reich, did not accept the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles and sought its revision. In the early 1920s, the intelligence reconnaissance of Germany was not sufficient. The Polish side obtained only fragmentary information about the German armed forces. The conditions for the operation of Polish intelligence in Weimar Germany were not favorable.

In the second half of the 1920s, the management of Division II of the Border Guard already had a good diagnosis of the threat posed by Germany. Particularly noteworthy is the valuable information obtained by the captain, and later major Jerzy Sosnowski, head of the Berlin intelligence facility, on the expansion of the German armed forces and preparations for war.

The organizational changes carried out in the structures of the secret services were accompanied by the improvement of operating methods and the introduction of new technical means. Field agencies and officers' posts carried out reconnaissance in Germany as part of shallow intelligence and obtained valuable information as far as possible. The results of intelligence activity depended on many factors. The effective use of agents contributed to better recognition of the western neighbor. The process of their selection, preparation to perform specific tasks, ongoing training and control was improved.

⁴⁹ CA MSW, sygn. 291, t. 328, Plan i wytyczne pracy Ekspozytury nr 3 w Bydgoszczy, z 16 I 1935 r., k. 4–6.

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