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## Holy War and a Place in Paradise? Development of the East Roman Holy War from the 4<sup>th</sup> until the 11<sup>th</sup> century

<https://doi.org/10.34739/his.2020.09.04>

**Abstract:** *The article analyses the development of the holy war in East Rome from its beginning until the 11<sup>th</sup> century. The article takes the stance that it is meaningless what the official religious doctrine was when the soldiers themselves believed and followed the doctrine of holy war which promised a place in heaven for all fallen soldiers.*

**Key words:** Holy War, Christianity, Icons, Iconoclasm, Paganism, Jihad, Valhalla, Elysian Fields, Rome, Roman Army, Byzantium, Byzantine Army, *Strategikon*, Leo the Wise

### Introduction

The article “Holy War and a Place in Paradise? Development of the East Roman Holy War from the 4<sup>th</sup> until the 11<sup>th</sup> century” concentrates its attention on the practical military aspects of the holy war rather than on the religious doctrinal aspects of it so that it: 1) Analyzes the development of the East Roman concept of holy war from the fourth century until the eleventh while keeping in mind the Greco-Roman inheritance; 2) Provides an analysis of the origins of the different influences that played a part in the evolving concept of the East Roman holy war (e.g. how the imperial needs, Christian religious doctrine, and the Muslim Jihad influenced the East Roman religious practices); 3) Assesses what was the East Roman view of the Islamic Jihad and what parts of the Islamic Jihad the East Roman military authorities wanted to copy; 4) Compares and contrasts the East Roman concept of the holy war with the other major versions of holy war (Germanic, Jihad, Crusades). The length of the time-period under scrutiny means that the analysis seeks to present only the principal features for each period.

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## The Concept of Holy War in this Study

In this study I will use the conclusions of both Tia M. Kolbaba and Paul Meinrad Strässle regarding the use of holy war in East Rome as the basis for the new concept of holy war. Both of them note that the Romans motivated their soldiers with religion and that the Romans considered all of their offensive and defensive wars legitimate and just wars fought by God's chosen people at the behest of the emperor, the God's Vicar on earth<sup>1</sup>. I take this a step further and classify all wars in which the authorities employed religion, any religion, as one of the means to convince the soldiers to fight to belong to the category of holy war. This study therefore adopts the point of view that the actual use of religion to motivate soldiers was of far greater practical importance than the theoretical ponderings of the learned clergymen, which means that we should actually classify most of the wars ever fought as holy wars. This study therefore argues that it is a mistake to approach warfare from the point of view of the Church theology. The right way to approach the use of religion in war is to analyze it from the point of view of how the military leadership used religion to further the military goals. This could be in harmony with theology or not.

The above does not mean that other sources of motivation would not have been present. It is clear that in any army that included large numbers of persons that there would have been equally large numbers of views and motivations among the soldiers, officers and generals some of which could even be in conflict with each other. Since the late Roman and East Roman armies consisted mostly of professional or semi-professional soldiers and included also foreigners amongst their ranks it is clear that one cannot expect all of them to have shared the same culture, religion or view of the world. The main motivations to fight in any circumstances for the professional or semi-professional East Roman soldiers consisted of: salary, prospect of booty and other rewards, code of honor among males and soldiers, comradeship with brothers-in-arms within the same unit, and military discipline/law with rewards and punishments. Those who were not mercenaries, but native or foreign professionals with families, could also fight for their families and fatherland, and possibly also for their way of life, culture and religion against the 'other', the enemy. It was the job of any good general to invoke as many of the possible sources of motivation (or even invent ones) whenever he engaged an enemy in combat regardless of whether this enemy was foreign or Roman<sup>2</sup>. It was the job of the men put in charge to present their cause of war as just and favored by the God or gods. It was an altogether different matter whether the men bought these justifications and exhortations. It depended upon the situation and individual.

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<sup>1</sup> KOLBABA 1998: 202-206; STRÄSSLE 2004: 119-123.

<sup>2</sup> These conventions are usefully presented in most of the ancient military treatises. See e.g. *Aeneas Tacticus*, *Asclepiodotus*, *Onasander*; *Frontinus*; *The Taktika of Leo VI*.

## The Greco-Roman 'Holy War'

The key to understanding East Roman concept of holy war is to understand that the East Romans were the inheritors of the Classical culture and that it also influenced directly the way how Christianity developed. Christianity adopted many of its religious holidays and practices and philosophical concepts directly from the Greco-Roman culture in order to ease the transition from the pagan past into the Christian future. It was also because of this that many of the Christian churches were located on the ancient places of worship. Therefore, it comes as no great surprise that the pagan past also affected the way how Christianity was incorporated into the army.

Like for most of the armed forces of the world, religion and religious ceremonies formed an integral part of life for the Roman armed forces. At the core of this was the belief dating from the very beginning of the Roman Empire that official religious observance by the civilian officials and members of the military ensured divine goodwill and military success – in other words all wars were divinely sanctioned if the signs and omens for this were good but with the caveat that it was expected that these signs could be manipulated as needed. Consequently, all legions and warships included religious personnel whose duty it was to make predictions and take omens regarding the outcome, and all units had military standards which were considered sacred. During the Republican era these predictions could be manipulated for both political reasons, but during the Principate and late Roman periods the predictions were mainly manipulated by the officers in order to secure the loyalty of the troops. The best evidence of this comes from the collections of stratagems, which instructed the commanders to resort to various kinds of tricks to motivate their soldiers to do their bidding. All military campaigns started and ended with the making of sacrifices to the gods. During the Republican era the Roman commanders could also sacrifice themselves for the victory of their armies. This same tradition continued also during the Imperial period in a slightly altered form so that some rare individual soldiers could sacrifice their lives in mad attacks at the enemy. It is also claimed that some of the emperors sacrificed their lives for the victory of the Romans. Even though there existed moralists, most of whom were Stoics and who condemned unjust wars and cruelty, most of the Romans considered all wars waged by their emperors and armies regardless of the underlying reasons (economic, territorial, personal prestige or honor of the emperor or army, defensive action, offensive war, raiding, punishment, terrorizing the enemy etc.) as just and divinely sanctioned as long as those ended in victory that increased the prestige of the Roman Empire and its arms and emperor<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> LE BOHEC 2000: 236-252; LE BOHEC 2014: 103-118; STOLL 2007: 451-476; CAMPBELL 2002: 127-136.

Just like most modern soldiers the individual Roman soldiers also needed some sort of consolation in the face of possible death. Their perception of the divine obviously depended on their place of origin so that some of them (mainly the so-called *numeri*) worshipped their native gods while some others had started to worship exotic divinities (e.g. Sol, Baal, Isis, Serapis, Mithra, Christian God with Jesus etc.). However, most of these local divinities had become associated with the Roman pantheon of gods so that one can say with great justification that the Roman army as a whole worshipped in the same manner. For those of the soldiers who believed in such the reward for the heroic soldiers was eternal life in the fields of Elysium which can be considered to have been a paradise for men. The Romans divided their gods into military and non-military gods. The former consisted of Jupiter, Juno, Minerva, Janus, Venus (equaled Victory), Mars, Lares, and demi-god Hercules. These were the most often worshipped gods. The civilian gods worshipped by the soldiers included Apollo, Diana, Aesculapius, Bona Dea (Hygia/Salus), Neptune, and Ceres. In addition to the gods, the Romans also revered deified abstractions like *Victoria* (Victory), *Bonus Eventus* (Good Result), *Fortuna/Tyche* (Good Fortune/Destiny), *Disciplina* (Discipline), *Virtus* (Male Virility/Virtue), *Pietas* (Piety) and *Honos* (Honor). The third category consisted of the protectors called *genii*, which can be equated with the saints and guardian angels of Christianity. These included *genii* attached to some locations like buildings or camps, and *genii* attached to groups of men like military units. In order to improve their chances of survival the superstitious Roman soldiers would typically attempt to pray as many of these together as possible or in some distressing situation they could even give a vow to make an offer to some or several of these if they would just survive just like the Christians would do later<sup>4</sup>.

The extant narrative histories and military treatises (the collections of stratagems) show us how the Roman general exploited the supernatural in cynical manner to convince the soldiers to obey their commands. These methods can be categorized roughly as follows:

- 1) Observance of religious customs and rites to convince the soldiers that the gods had been bribed to be on their side through religious sacrifices. The religious calendar included auspicious and non-auspicious dates for fighting, but these rules could be broken if the commander had a strong personality that commanded the respect of the soldiers. The best example of this is Lucullus.
- 2) The use of religious fortune-tellers (readers of future, entrails, weather, soothsayers, astrologers etc.) to promise victory, if there was a need to fight, or to warn the soldiers that the omens were not auspicious if there was a need to convince the overly eager soldiers to postpone the fighting to a later date<sup>5</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup> LE BOHEC 2000: 236-252; LE BOHEC 2014: 103-118; CAMPBELL 2002: 127-136.

<sup>5</sup> E.g. Frontinus, *Stratagems* 1.11-12.

- 3) Invention of a deity or omen (natural phenomena; reading of the future from the stars, entrails, birds etc.) if there was a need to convince the superstitious soldiers to fight<sup>6</sup>.
- 4) The use of scientific means or other means to convince the soldiers that a natural phenomenon like an eclipse of the sun or moon, or earthquake, or falling into ground etc. did not have any religious meaning<sup>7</sup>.
- 5) Exploited the religious customs of others for their own benefit<sup>8</sup>.

### **The Christian Empire c.312-491**

The adoption of Christianity by Constantine I the Great (306-337) has usually been seen as a break with the past, but the reality is more complex. The form of Christianity adopted by Constantine for his armed forces follows closely the same patterns as can be witnessed in the past. Firstly, he clearly explained some natural phenomena in the sky to be signs from God in order to improve the morale of his army. Secondly, he claimed to have seen dreams which foretold victory. Thirdly, he claimed that the sign he saw in the sky just before the battle of the Milvian Bridge in 312 promised victory. Fourthly, the Chi-Rho sign used in his battle standard *Labarum* had similar supernatural powers as had previously been given to pagan standards. The adoption of the Chi-Rho as a symbol of his Christianity suggests premeditation in which Constantine wanted to unite both Christians and pagans under the same banner. Had he really wanted to use an unequivocally Christian symbol he would have used the cross or Tau-Rho/Staurogram. Constantine's greatest invention, however, was to act as a protector of all Christians regardless of where they were<sup>9</sup>. At first he used this as one of his excuses to interfere in the politics of the eastern half of the Empire, and after he had united both halves, he used it as his excuse to interfere in the internal politics of his neighbors. The spreading of Christianity and the protection of Christians became Constantine's and his successors' principal foreign policy objective. The concept of proselytizing undoubtedly played a role in this decision even if it was also militarily useful. As head of the Christian community the emperor was effectively the head of all Christian states, which included for example Armenia and Georgia. This can be seen as the only real break with the past. In the other fields of religious practice Constantine's religious-military policies followed the traditions. The mixing of Christian religious practices like Christian sermons with older military routines was meant to make it easier for the soldiers to convert. A good example of this is

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<sup>6</sup> E.g. Frontinus, *Stratagemis* 1.11-12; Polyaeus 8.22; SYVÄNNE 2020: 96-98, 103, 109-110, 112, 114.

<sup>7</sup> E.g. Frontinus, *Stratagemis* 1.11-12.

<sup>8</sup> E.g. Polyaeus 8.23.4.

<sup>9</sup> Also noted by WHITBY 1998: 194-195. Whitby quite rightly notes that this encouraged the non-Christians to persecute Christians in their areas as potential trouble-makers.

Theodosius I's use of the hermit John of Lycopolis to predict successful outcome for his military campaigns in 388 and 394. The Christians also needed their soothsayers<sup>10</sup>.

Vegetius' *Epitoma rei Militaris* (written before 450, but later than 378) includes a very important clue to the unification of Christianity with the imperial powers among the military. According to Vegetius (2.5), the soldiers swore in their military oath that they did all things zealously which the emperor commanded, and never deserted, and never refused to die for the Roman republic. When the soldiers swore this military oath, they did this in the name of God and Christ and Holy Spirit, and in the name of His Majesty because the emperor was to be served right after the God by all humans. All people, the soldiers included, were required to display their faithful devotion and constant service to the emperor as if God was bodily present. Vegetius states further that the man served God when he faithfully loved the man who reigned with the authority of God. This basically equates service of the emperor with the service of God, and is actually conceptually not that different from the earlier pagan worship of the emperors and their representation, the statues<sup>11</sup>. This also means that all measures ordered by the emperor could be considered to be holy commands from God, and it means that whenever the soldier killed enemies of the emperor he was serving God and whenever he died in service he was to be considered as a soldier of the heavenly Christian army who died on behalf of the emperor and God. The existence of this same ideology for the later periods of East Roman history is confirmed by Tia M. Kolbaba and Paul Meinrad Strässle<sup>12</sup>.

The apostasy of Julian (361-363) gives us an important glimpse into the psyche of the Christian and pagan soldiers. As a theurgist (an esoteric form of paganism) Julian believed that his Gallic troops who were pagans were prepared for the war, but the former troops of Constantius II (337-361), who were mostly Christians, were not. He believed that it would be possible to win the Persians only if all of his soldiers

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<sup>10</sup> See SYVÄNNE 2015a: 250-392 (esp. 250-299, 318-9, 332-333); SYVÄNNE 2017: 243, 262.

<sup>11</sup> STOLL (2007: 473) also notes the legacy of pagan practices in the oath. Of particular note is also the fact that the so-called father of Just War Tradition, Saint Augustine of Hippo (13 Nov. 354 – 28 Aug. 430), shared the view of Vegetius. According to Augustine, all authority derived from God which meant that all wars were waged directly or indirectly by God, and that everything that the ruler did had a divine purpose or mandate. What is notable about this view is that Augustine did not reconcile this with his view that all wars Christians waged had to be just wars fought in response to some evil committed by evil-makers (i.e. wars had to be defensive wars) for the purpose of bringing about a peace. The reason for this was that all violence was sinful so that wars were only 'necessary evil' resulting from the fact that humans were sinners. For a good summary of his contradictory views, see e.g. COREY, CHARLES 2012: 53-65. This is a good example of the fact that Christianity has never fully reconciled the different contradictory views contained within the Bible. However and despite the similarities between Vegetius and Augustine, there was still a clear difference between the two men. For Vegetius just like other men whose primary concern were military matters, all wars waged in the name of the emperor were always just and holy regardless of the cause, while for the clergymen like Saint Augustine who tried to reconcile the different contradictions within Christianity, even the just wars waged by the emperors, and hence by the God, were still only necessary evils which could be justified only if those were fought in self-defence to achieve peace.

<sup>12</sup> KOLBABA 1998: 203, 210, 219; STRÄSSLE 2004: 119-20, 123.

believed in the old gods. Consequently, he attempted to convert the Christian soldiers through persuasion, and when this failed through bribery and trickery. Julian paid a donative to all those who threw incense on the fire, and thereby managed to make the Christian soldiers perform a pagan sacrifice without them understanding the meaning. When the Christian soldiers were told of the significance of the deed, they rioted because they feared that they had lost their souls. Those Christians who realized the trick simply refused to sacrifice<sup>13</sup>. The significance of this episode is that the Christian soldiers believed in the power of ceremonies. In other words, the soldiers who would die in combat would attain eternal life only thanks to their observance of Christian practices and refusal to observe pagan ones. It was because of this that Constantine had introduced the Christian pre-battle ceremonies to replace the old pagan ones.

According to the *Strategikon*, the soldiers prayed, recited religious chants and shouts in unison regularly both in peace and wartime. The Romans also used heralds to encourage the men. Similarly, the so-called sixth century *Anonymi Byzantina Rhetorica militaris* instructed the commanders to encourage their men to fight on behalf of their faith, country and fellow Christians. In short, the ceremonies mattered for the Christians and non-Christians alike because the soldiers needed routines and the psychological comfort provided by religion and routines. At the root of any religious ceremony is the belief that one obtains the help of God or gods by the observance of these ceremonies<sup>14</sup>.

The new Christian Empire of Constantine was bellicose and this aggressive policy continued as long as the Romans possessed enough offensive power. Christopher Walter has aptly noted that the: “Byzantine behavior in war against neighboring peoples, Persians, Arabs, and Slavs, latter-day Canaanites and Philistines, was modeled on Old rather than New Testament precedents”<sup>15</sup>. In other words, the East Romans saw their wars as wars between the Chosen People (in this case the Romans and not the Jews) and their enemies. The enemies were not given any mercy. The main contribution of the New Testament to the East Roman behavior was to equate the struggle between the Chosen People and their enemies as a struggle between the forces of good and evil so that the good Christians would eventually prevail over the evil. In this struggle against the Dragon/Satan the Christians were helped by God’s heavenly army which was led by the archangel Michael. This heavenly army in its turn was augmented by the numbers of Christian saints and martyrs so that all fallen Christian soldiers (or civilians) who were ranked as martyrs could expect to join the ranks of the heavenly army in the final struggle at the end of the time. On the

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<sup>13</sup> Libanius *Oration* 18.167-170; Nazianzus *Oration* 4 *Against Julian* 1.82-84.

<sup>14</sup> *Strategikon*, e.g. 2.18-19, 12.16, 12.24; *Rhetorica Militaris*, 9-13, 37.7; Gilbert Dagron and Haralambie Mihaescu in Phocas (314). Religious ceremonies of the military can be compared with the superstitious habits of sportsmen. Both need the psychological comfort of routines.

<sup>15</sup> WALTER 2016: 11.

earthly field this meant that there were good many Romans who saw every war of aggression and defense as just holy wars. They were not bothered by the pacifistic views of the Christian religious thinkers like the theologian and Saint Basil the Great/Basil of Caesarea (330-379) who saw all violence as sin<sup>16</sup>. The Romans believed that the warrior saints could intervene in these struggles on behalf of the Christian army just like the pagan gods had<sup>17</sup>.

The Germanic religion with its Valhalla for the fallen warriors predates this Christian cult of martyrdom, but despite the presence of Germanic federates in the army there is nothing to suggest that it would have influenced the Christian concept of military martyrdom because it was a further development of the original concept of martyrdom in which the martyrs met their deaths without resistance which in its turn may have been combined with the pagan Elysian Fields<sup>18</sup>.

The Christian doctrine was also adapted to the Greco-Roman culture so that Virgin Mary, various saints and religious relics (True Cross, Holy Lance, Holy Sponge, body parts of saints, etc. became tools of miracles) became abstractions of the earlier pagan gods, *genii* and deified abstractions in Christian form. Virgin Mary, angels, saints, and religious relics etc. had now powers to influence the outcome of events. The soldiers hoped to obtain their help through prayers and ceremonies and by being in physical contact with the relics while doing so. Those areas and cities that did

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<sup>16</sup> According to the Canon 13 of the Saint Basil the Great, the man who had killed an enemy in battle was to suffer the penalty of two years' exclusion from communion. This shows quite nicely how the theology was in conflict with the actual military practices, but the soldiers were not theologians. For the early Christian views of Holy and Just Wars, see COREY, CHARLES 2012: 23-65. It is clear that the early Christians considered violence and war as sins, but so that when the Christians then found an emperor who supported the Christian cause they were ready to turn the blind eye to the problems this created even if the problem were never entirely forgotten. A good example of this is the view of Lactantius of Bithynia (c.250-c.325), who served as spiritual advisor to none other than Constantine the Great. In his *Divine Institutes* Lactantius considered all slaughter unlawful to quote just one example (6.20): "Thus it will be neither lawful for a just man to engage in warfare, since his warfare is justice itself, nor to accuse any one of a capital charge, because it makes no difference whether you put a man to death by word, or rather by the sword, since it is the act of putting to death itself which is prohibited. Therefore, with regard to this precept of God, there ought to be no exception at all; but that it is always unlawful to put to death a man, whom God willed to be a sacred animal." However, as noted by COREY and CHARLES (2012: 39-40), this pacifism is no longer in evidence in Lactantius' descriptions of the battles fought by Constantine the Great, because in his *On the Deaths of the Persecutors*, the battles of Constantine were divinely sanctioned. This is a very good example of the problem facing the Christian theologians. The religious doctrine considered all shedding of blood sinful, but when it was then done in the name of Christ they were able to reconcile themselves with this by turning the blind eye to the reality – in other words there were two simultaneously contradictory realities in existence. The above footnote 12 shows nicely that the statements such as those made by Lactantius regarding Constantine the Great's wars did not remove the problem, because the official Christian religious doctrine still considered the act of killing sinful and unlawful. It was precisely because of this that Saint Augustine found it necessary to try to reconcile the New Testament with the requirements of the reality by creating the foundations for the Christian Just War in the 5<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>17</sup> WALTER 2003: 9-38 (The quote is from p.11). See also SYVÄNNE 2015a: 250-392; WHITBY 1998: 192-194; KOLBABA 1998: 210; STRÄSSLE 2004: 119-120, 123, 128.

<sup>18</sup> Odin seems to have been a man of flesh and blood who lived in the 3<sup>rd</sup> century and who managed to associate himself with the older Germanic god Woden. See SYVÄNNE 2019b: 216-228.



not possess their own apostles and saints/martyrs (or connection with Jesus) started to acquire those by obtaining some supposed body parts of martyrs/saints (or object that had been in contact with them or Christ or Virgin Mary). In my opinion these can be equated with the pagan *genii*, or *palladia* (statues that housed the soul of the city), or local gods. The local holy men, hermits and bishops could be seen as men who could perform miracles like Apollonius of Tyana and even prophesying like pagan fortune-tellers before them. In fact, miracles stories were invented to strengthen the hold of the church and emperor on the army and populace. It should also be kept in mind that the soldiers were not theologians. They mixed quite freely pagan and Christian practices while most of the churchmen were prepared to look the other way. This can be detected in their veneration of images and amulets<sup>19</sup>. In spite of this, the importance of these images/icons had not yet reached the same importance as they had by the eight century<sup>20</sup>. This has been demonstrated by Leslie Brubaker and John Haldon in their magisterial study. They have shown that there are indeed some scattered references to the veneration of sacred images and icons in the sources for the period before c. 680s, but it is still clear that the icons had not yet assumed their later importance as actual tools of miracles through which the persons could gain direct access to Christ, Virgin Mary or saints/martyrs<sup>21</sup>.

Holum has demonstrated that the Roman rulers exploited the saints and religious images so that under the leadership of Pulcheria and Theodosius II the imperial family associated itself with the Victory of Christ in such a manner that it became united with the old Roman doctrine of Imperial Victory. The de facto ruler Pulcheria improved the morale of the mutinous army before 421-422 war with Persia with a heavy dose of religious propaganda. Pulcheria's religious symbolism did not end with the use of crosses, relics and other similar symbolism. She presented her and

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<sup>19</sup> The most obvious of these were the crosses themselves, which could be seen to ward off demons.

<sup>20</sup> It should be noted, however, that it is possible that this results only from the fact that the theologians started to pay greater attention to these un-Christian practices only thanks to the series of defeats inflicted on the East Romans by the Muslims. It is clear that the attitude of the early Christian fathers, who condemned idol-worship in all its forms, was not the same as the official attitude of the Orthodox and Catholic churches after the ninth century. Similarly, there is no real evidence for the pacifism of some of the early fathers present in the official Roman ideology after Christianity was adopted as the official religion by Constantine the Great. We should not forget that the populace at large is usually quite ignorant of the intricacies of the actual religious doctrine they claim follow, which makes it all too easy for charlatans and religious fanatics to claim to represent the only true version of their religion. And, as noted above, most of the churchmen from Lactantius onwards were ready to turn the blind eye to the promises made to the soldiers while they still retained the view that the shedding of blood was sinful. This is a good example of the ability of humans to retain two completely contradictory views simultaneously. However, the only thing that really matters is the way how religion was used in practice to motivate the soldiers to do whatever their commanders thought necessary.

<sup>21</sup> Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History* 1.13; Evagrius, *Ecclesiastical History* 4.27. Most of the evidence has been collected by BRUBAKER and HALDON (2011: 9-68) and WALTER (2003: 9-38), but with the difference that I connect the evidence slightly differently by comparing and connecting the Christian doctrine with the earlier ancient religious practices in the armed forces. It is quite clear that there is a direct connection between the practices despite what period and later Christian authors claim in their polemics. See WHITBY (1998) for the creation of the miracles of St. Demetrius.

her sisters' vows of virginity as a devotion/self-sacrifice to God and that this self-sacrifice would bring victory to the emperor. This imitated the pagan *devotio* in which the commanding general could devote himself to gods by sacrificing himself in combat. In short, the imperial family gathered all sorts of religious relics, and used religious symbols and ceremonies to encourage their soldiers and populace to fight against the infidel Persians all of which had earlier precedents. The resulting religiously motivated war against Persia in 421-422, which can be likened to a Crusade, was a success. The previously mutinous army did not suffer from any poor morale and performed admirably. However, one of the by-products of the new religious zeal was the persecution of religious minorities which included heretics, pagans, Jews and Zoroastrians<sup>22</sup>.

The principal reason for the evocation of these religious symbols was the relative weakness of the rulers vis-à-vis their top brass. The importance of religion had already risen under Arcadius, who was the first late Roman emperor not to lead armies in person, but the situation became even worse under his successor. When Pulcheria was the de facto power behind the throne during the youth of her brother Theodosius II, the ruling house needed to prove its importance as a source of military victories by connecting itself with Christ.

### **The Emergence of Idol Worship 491-717**

The sixth century saw further developments in the use of Christian images and other means (e.g. use of false documents/relics/miracles, prophesying etc.) to foster will to fight among the populace and soldiers. The likely reason for this is the fall of West Rome, which could be seen as a punishment from God. The process accelerated during and after the reign of Justin II (565-578), who through his foolish policies unleashed an era in which the East Romans were hard-pressed to defend themselves against the multiple threats facing them. The multiple wars in their turn made it more difficult for the imperial authorities to find enough money to pay for the upkeep of their professional armies, which in its turn led the authorities to resort to the use of religion to foment loyalty in the armed forces and populace. The most visible sign of this is the increasing use of *acheiropoieta* or images not made by human hand throughout the sixth century. Three are attested for the sixth century: 1) Mandylion of Edessa with an imprint of Christ's face on a piece of linen, 2) Memphis image; 3) Kamoulianai image in Syria. These can be equated with the pagan *genii*, local gods, *palladia*, or sacred military standards. It is usually assumed that the Kamoulianai-image of God Incarnate (Christ) was the one used by the *magister militum* Philippicus (general-in-charge) to instill courage and loyalty

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<sup>22</sup> HOLUM 1989: 98-228 (esp. 98-99, 100, 125-125, 188); HOLUM 2004; SYVÄNNE 2015b.

in the field army prior to the victorious battle of Solachon against the Persians in 586 mentioned by Theophylact Simocattes (2.3.4-6)<sup>23</sup>.

The importance of religion and images, however, should not be overestimated. When the emperor Maurice (582-602) reduced the pay of the army by a quarter, the soldiers were ready to mutiny at the same time when the new commander Priscus arrived with the news. Priscus attempted to be clever. He took with him the priest of Edessa together with the image-not-made-by-hand and timed his arrival with Easter. On arrival Priscus, however, made the serious mistake of not following the ancient custom of dismounting from his horse to honor the soldiers, which angered the men. Then on the third day the already angered soldiers mutinied when they learnt of the pay-reduction. The soldiers approached the general's tent with drawn swords. The sweaty general ordered the image of God Incarnate to be paraded to pacify the army, but only with the result that the soldiers threw stones at the image. The general had to flee. In sum, the morale of the soldiers could be improved through religious ceremonies and images, but when it was a question of what really mattered, like pay or privileges, the soldiers could not be influenced with these means. It is also clear that the fact that the emperors' claim to be God's representatives on earth did not protect them against usurpers and assassins. They could also claim to act in the name of God to exact just punishment against an emperor who had committed some unjust deed like the lowering of salaries or other unpopular order like a refusal to allow the army to return to its winter quarters after a hard fought summer.<sup>24</sup>.

The use of religion and images to improve the morale of the army and populace reached its first summit under Heraclius (610-641). The main reasons for this were the defeats the East Romans had suffered under Phocas (602-610) and Heraclius himself. It seemed as if the God had abandoned His Chosen People when the Persians, Avars, and others defeated Roman armies, and raided and/or occupied Roman territory. When the Persians conquered Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, Judaea, Egypt and most importantly Jerusalem with its True Cross, the Christians could see this only in apocalyptic terms as a punishment from God. It is all too typical for humans to turn to religion whenever they face a crisis in their life, and this is what the Roman authorities now exploited.

Heraclius and the bishops invoked all possible means to re-instill morale back into the demoralized soldiers and populace. When Heraclius was finally able to start his counter-attack in about 620, he proceeded with care with the full backing of the Patriarch Sergius who allowed him to loan money from the religious establishments. Heraclius then assembled his armed forces, equipped and trained it, and improved its morale by stating that the soldiers should kill the enemy like it was wild game. He also used the image of Christ-not-painted-by-human-hand as his battle

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<sup>23</sup> Most of the evidence has been once again collected by BRUBAKER and HALDON (2011: 9-68).

<sup>24</sup> Theophylact 3.1.1-15.

standard so that the soldiers would believe that their efforts were helped by God. He also pledged to fight with his army to the death. This naturally meant the promise of martyrdom. Next year 621/622, Heraclius was even more explicit. The soldiers were to fight to avenge the wrongs committed by the impious against the Christian God, and that the death in such a war would lead to eternal life. According to Theophanes, he ended his exhortation as follows: “The danger is not without recompense: nay, it leads to the eternal life. Let us stand bravely, and the Lord our God will assist us and destroy the enemy”<sup>25</sup>. When at the end of the campaign season the overly eager army then wanted to continue their war directly against the ruler of Persia and Heraclius rather wanted to avoid the excessive risks and sought to lead his army back to winter quarters, he resorted to a trick which is familiar to us from the ancient military treatises when one wanted to check over-eager soldiers. In this case Heraclius invented a Christian version of the old trick of using soothsayers. Heraclius ordered his army to purify themselves for three days after which he opened up the holy Gospel in which he found a passage that directed him to winter in Albania. In the following year 622/623, Heraclius is said to have encouraged his men with these words: “For when God wills it, one man will rout a thousand. So let us sacrifice ourselves to God for the salvation of our brothers. May we win the crown of martyrdom so that we may be praised in the future and receive our recompense from God”<sup>26</sup>. This recalls the ancient Roman pagan *devotio* to the gods.

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<sup>25</sup> Theophanes AM 6113-6115.

<sup>26</sup> Theophanes AM 6113-6115; STOURAITIS (2011: 44) claims after FLAIG (2007: 295) that Theophanes’ text does not promise martyrdom to the soldiers, but only expresses a wish. I do not agree with this interpretation of the text, but agree with the above translators and others (e.g. KOLBABA 1998: 204) who have interpreted the text as shown here because the content and context implies an existing promise that martyrdom would be attained on death. To have stated otherwise to the soldiers could have spelled trouble. However, even if we would take it in the sense of a wish, as suggested by Stouraitis and Flaig, the implication is the same and even more so when one takes into account the previously quoted sections. In other words, even when Heraclius would have presented a wishful appeal to God that when they would die in combat, they would attain the crown of martyrdom, it is clear that underneath the rhetoric lay the assumption that the soldiers would attain the martyrdom even if it was God who ultimately decided this. One of the commentators of this paper suggested that Theophanes’ statement does not necessarily correspond with the original sentence of Heraclius, but would represent his personal promotion of warrior-martyrdom. This is possible, but it is equally possible that Theophanes has indeed preserved the original words as represented in the official dispatches sent by the emperor to the people of Constantinople during the campaign – the latter raises the possibility that the interpretation of the grammatical side of the quote by Stouraitis and Flaig could be correct after all because it is quite possible that the emperor would have altered his own words for propaganda purposes in such dispatches. However, even if the translation of the sentence remains uncertain, it is still clear that it retains in all cases the implication that eternal life was to be expected for warrior-martyrs, God willing, and when one takes into account the previous quotes it even more so. The same commentator stated that I do not give an answer to I. Stouraitis’ observation (2011: 45) that “neither a cult of soldier-martyrs is evident in Byzantium (in the period of the Comnenoi or previously) nor an echo of a martyr-image of the soldiers killed in all relevant battles can be found in the sources.” I considered this unnecessary because Stouraitis contradicts this statement with his own referrals to such instances on pages 44-5 (examples of athletes of Christ, i.e. soldier martyrs) and because it is well-known that there existed a special category of warrior saints and that there also existed a cult of warrior saints in East Rome. This latter question has been discussed in some detail by C. Walter.

The above instances make it quite obvious that Heraclius was waging a holy war against the ‘wild game’ – the infidels – who were to be killed mercilessly because they had insulted the Christian God, and that the reward for the martyrs would be the eternal life. The same examples also prove that Heraclius resorted to the same sort of tricks/stratagems as had been employed before by the pagan and Christian commanders. The Crusade nature of this war has been needlessly suspected by several eminent historians on the grounds that there were also other non-religious reasons for the war and because it was the emperor (and his panegyrist) and not the religious authorities that legitimized the killing of the infidel enemies and promised eternal life to those who were killed in such a just war<sup>27</sup>. This is hair-splitting. It does not really matter who promises what or that there were the other motivations for the war. What matters is the actual reality, which in this case followed the well-trodden path familiar to us from antiquity in which the commanding general was expected to invent religious omens or similar for the purpose of making his soldiers obey his commands<sup>28</sup>. In ancient or modern context, it does not really matter what the ‘True Islam’ (or Christianity for that matter) is from the point of view of theology. What matters is how it is interpreted by the people who use the religion for whatever purpose, which in the example was the emperor, God’s representative on earth<sup>29</sup>.

Heraclius’ reign saw also another important innovation, which was also sanctioned by Patriarch Sergius. When the city of Constantinople was besieged simultaneously by the Avars and Persians in 626, the defenders paraded the icon of Theotokos (Virgin Mary) before the defenders in an act of devotion to obtain the help of God and Virgin Mary, and then afterwards gave principal credit for the victory to Theotokos. In other words, the authorities in charge of the defense, which included Patriarch Sergius, claimed that they could access Virgin Mary through her icon<sup>30</sup>. Theophanes’ text (AM 6117) suggest that it was at the same time or after this that Heraclius himself adopted the same policy and claimed to obtain help from God with the mediation of Theotokos.

It is in this highly religious atmosphere in which the new religion of Islam took its shape. There were clearly many ideas afloat at the time and it is not surprising that Islam encouraged its followers to spread their faith through military means of Jihad.

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<sup>27</sup> Walter KAEGLI (2003: 126) summarizes the opinion of those who do not accept this war as a Crusade and includes a list of studies devoted to the subject. In other words, I agree with those historians (e.g. WHITBY 1998: 195; REGAN 2001) who think this war as a Crusade, but I do not think that it would have been the first. Constantine the Great’s wars can be considered such.

<sup>28</sup> Frontinus (1.11.13) summarizes the sentiment nicely: “This sort of stratagem is to be used not merely in cases when we deem those whom we apply it simple-minded, but much more when the ruse invented is such as might be thought to have been suggested by the gods.”

<sup>29</sup> As regards the supposed religious nature of the later Crusades, this is a fantasy. All of the different major leaders of the Crusade (including the Pope) had different political motives besides the religious one. The analysis of KOLBABA (1998: 211-221) demonstrates this succinctly.

<sup>30</sup> Evidence collected in KAEGLI (2003: 134-139).

This is not the place to analyze how the concept may have evolved<sup>31</sup>. What matters is that its outcome was bellicose. Despite the fact that the Muslim warriors were always motivated by other factors like promise of booty and victory through their belief and fighting, the new key concept was the promise that those who fell in combat on behalf of their religion would obtain a place in paradise, which was also officially sanctioned by all religious authorities unlike in East Rome<sup>32</sup>. The Muslims could see their faith repaid with victories even if it is clear that in practice the Muslims were not only helped by their religious motivation, but also by their superb military leadership at a time when their enemies were divided and very poorly led<sup>33</sup>.

The great military successes of the Muslims caused a collapse of morale among the East Roman defenders, which was actually aggravated by faith. The defeats could be seen as a punishment of God. By the early eighth century the religious crisis was such that the defenders of Pergamon resorted to human sacrifice when it was besieged by the Arabs in c.716. In this atmosphere it is not surprising that the East Romans started to venerate icons as never before as an easy source of consolation that was readily available to all. Brubaker and Haldon date the start of large scale veneration to the period after 680. They speculate that the Quinisext Council of 680 may have had a role in it or alternatively that it was a reflection of the changed conditions in which the Church attempted control the way in which the icons were used. They also suggest that the main reason for the emergence of icons as objects of veneration resulted from the crisis of faith resulting from the Muslim conquests. Not unnaturally the crisis also brought to the surface old superstitions in a new Christian

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<sup>31</sup> It has always been recognized in western research that it is probable that Christianity, Judaism, and native Arabic beliefs influenced the way in which Islam developed, but it is still all too often forgotten that from the point of view of historical analysis one should also use the foreign hostile sources in the analysis of the development of the doctrine of Jihad in Islam. Otherwise, one approaches the problem only through the accepted avenues of thinking among the faithful Muslims which do not challenge the evidence the way historians usually do. For example, the hostile versions suggest that Jewish rabbis and an Arian monk may have influenced the thinking of the Prophet and when one remembers that the Arians consisted usually of Germanic peoples it is possible that the Arian monk in question would have been influenced by the Germanic religion and not only by Christianity. These hostile sources include e.g. Theophanes AM 6122. However, I leave this matter for historians of religion and theologians to study. This is meant solely as a methodological note and not a result of any analysis. It is entirely plausible that the concept of Jihad evolved as stated in those studies that approach the problem through the accepted avenues of thinking among the Muslim scholars, but at the same time it should be noted that the concept of abrogation is problematic from the point of view of historical analysis because it seems to forget that some of the sentences and clauses can belong together so that these state the same thing from different angles. However, from the point of view of actual reality vs. 'religious doctrine' none of this matters. What matters is how each group defines its own views in practice and for what purpose. For example, it is clear that modern Muslim fanatics have idealized the early Caliphate so that they forget numerous civil wars and the readiness of some caliphs even to pay tribute to the East Romans in the latter half of the 7<sup>th</sup> century. In truth there never was any such unity of faith and common cause as these persons believe. The Muslims were just as divided then as they are today.

<sup>32</sup> E.g. Ṭabarī's texts (e.g. I 2109, I 2154, I 2168, I 2170) almost always refer to the divisions of spoils after a victory, which is highly suggestive that it was one of the principal sources of motivation.

<sup>33</sup> See e.g. SYVÄNNE, 2019a.

form. Theophanes mentions that in 654 just prior to the battle of the masts the emperor Constans II (641-668) consulted an interpreter of dreams. Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus' (913-959) military treatise even suggests that the emperor was to take with him on a military campaign not only military and naval treatises and works of history, but also the liturgy of the Church, an oneirocritical book, and a book of chances and occurrences. This suggests two possibilities. Firstly, it is possible that some of the emperors had become utterly superstitious and thought it possible to obtain oracles from the God through such means. Secondly, it is possible that some, if not most of the emperors, continued the ancient practice of using the supernatural for the purpose of making the soldiers and populace obey them. I would suggest that both are true. Some emperors seem to have been superstitious/religious while others were more cynical in their approach<sup>34</sup>.

The loss of territory created a situation in which East Romans could call all of their military offensives to be just defensive wars meant to re-conquer the territories lost to the barbarian infidels. The loss of territories resulted also in a new invention by Justinian II (685-695, 705-711) in 691 which combined both Christian faith and ancient precedents. He raised a new army of 30,000 whom he named 'the Chosen People'. After this, he broke the peace treaty with the Arabs and invaded. 'The Chosen People' of Romans were now advancing to retake Israel. This ploy recalled similar pagan usage of the so-called phalanx of Alexander the Great against the Parthians/Persians under Nero, Caracalla, and Alexander Severus. The campaign, however, failed when the Slavic soldiers deserted to the Arabs<sup>35</sup>.

### **The Iconoclasts 717-842**

The religious crisis reached its boiling point during the reign of Isaurian/Syrian Leo III (717-741). It was a time when there was a Syrian who claimed to be Messiah of the Jews in 720/721 and when a Jewish "magician" (a rabbi?) convinced the caliph to destroy the holy icons in Christian churches. The last-mentioned was a humiliation to the emperor Leo and purist Christians who agreed with the Jews and Muslims that the veneration of icons was idolatry. The Syrian emperor and his Syrian advisor Beser, a refugee from the caliphate, and most of their supporters among the military appear to have favored the literal reading of the Bible and to have considered the defeats as punishment from God. This means that there existed considerable number of soldiers who preferred the more bigoted and literal reading of the Bible and expected that it would be possible to defeat the enemy through this. The Syrian connection enabled the iconophiles to accuse the iconoclasts as heretics who copied the Muslim practices,

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<sup>34</sup> Theophanes AM 6146, AM 6208; *Three Treatises on Imperial Military Expeditions*, C. Text 196-204; BRUBAKER, HALDON 2011: 9-68.

<sup>35</sup> Theophanes AM 6184.

and in fact the adoption of the new coin *miliaresion*, which was modeled after the dirham, does suggest the possibility that the emperor and his advisors could have been influenced by their neighbors. The first to suffer, however, were the Jews who were forcibly baptized in 722. The revision of a part of the law code to reflect a more literal reading of the Bible (abortion forbidden, executions restricted, death penalty for homosexuality etc.) followed in 726. In the same year Leo ordered the removal of some of the icons, but even this modest move proved highly unpopular. The most vocal opponents were the Pope, other members of the clergy, common people, and some of the military units who revolted, but further measures followed as a result of which many images were either destroyed or painted over or confiscated. Leo's son Constantine V (741-775) went even further and was therefore later considered to have been a precursor of Satan by the Orthodox. After him followed a respite, but a second period of imperial iconoclasm followed and lasted from 813 until 842. The extent of the iconoclasm is a subject of controversy among the historians, but it still seems inescapable that it meant a short-lived break with the ancient practices during which the literal reading of the Bible with its Judeo-Christian elements was a more powerful force of motivation for most of the soldiers. However, the fact that the so-called Orthodox faith with its veneration of icons eventually won the contest proves that the older beliefs were far more powerful factors than the views imposed from the top by the emperors. After all, it was the Church that eventually adopted the worship of icons as Orthodox faith even when the clergy had originally condemned it as idolatry<sup>36</sup>.

The veneration of icons, however, could also result in problems when the military authorities really believed in them. A good later example of this is the behavior demonstrated by the emperor Romanus III (1028-1034) during and before his first campaign against the "Saracens". He wanted to imitate the deeds of the famous emperors and did not heed the advice of his generals. When Romanus' campaign then ended in a fiasco while he managed to flee, he thought that he had been saved by the Icon of Virgin Mary. It was apparently as a result of this that he started building and renovating churches devoted to the worship of Virgin Mary while neglecting the upkeep of the army<sup>37</sup>.

### **The Orthodox 'Byzantine' Empire 841-1118**

As regards this period, Ioannis Stouraitis presents a long list of arguments against Byzantine concept of holy war mainly on the basis of Leo's *Taktika*. He uses the *Constitution 20* and *Epilogue* to prove that for Leo the pre-Christian concept of just warfare was the only way to obtain God's favor for the cause of the war. This concept

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<sup>36</sup> Theophanes AM 6213-6215. The different views are represented and well summarised by Brubaker and Haldon. I would also recommend Warren TREADGOLD's good summary of the iconoclast period (1997: 346-447, 552-566).

<sup>37</sup> Psellus 3.9.



encompassed the defense of Roman territory, which for the East Romans also encompassed the reconquest of lost Roman territories. This fails to take into account the contradictory statements of Leo elsewhere and the fact that good commanders were always required to encourage the soldiers with as many arguments as possible and these could also include outright lies. Unlike Kolbaba and Strässle, Stouraitis also does not accept the religious pre-battle exhortations and use of religious symbolism to have been examples of ‘Byzantine’ use of holy war because these speeches and religious symbolism were always used regardless of whether the enemy was Christian or infidel. This fails to take into account the fact that holy wars have always been fought also against co-religionists and heretics. Outside Byzantium/Rome good examples of this are the Albigensian Crusades and the various wars between Sunni and Shia Muslims. Stouraitis is also incorrect to claim that the “Byzantines” could not conceive God or religion wanting and commanding and causing wars but only to support just wars. The principal problem with this is that it assumes that there would not have been any other causes of war present in the so-called religiously motivated holy wars. All wars have been caused by humans for various reasons and religion is just one of the means that humans use to motivate their followers. Secondly, there are the statements of Leo<sup>38</sup>.

In truth, Leo (*The Taktika of Leo*) promoted holy war and expected his commanders to promise eternal life to those who fell in combat against any enemy but in particular against the infidel Saracens:

Now then, O general, before all else, we enjoin upon you that on the day of battle your army should be free from sin<sup>39</sup>. The night before, the priests are to offer fervent prayers of intercession. Every one should be sanctified and so, by words and deeds, they should be convinced that they have the help of God<sup>40</sup>. On this note they are to advance into battle bright and enthusiastic. [14.1; Translation by G.T. Dennis]

After the battle, O general, you are obliged to see to the comfort of the soldiers wounded in action, as well as to provide proper burial for those who have fallen. Constantly pronounce them blessed because they have not preferred their own lives over their faith and their brothers. This is a religious act and it greatly helps the morale of the living. [14.31; Translation by G.T. Dennis]

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<sup>38</sup> STOURAITIS 2011; KOLBABA 1998: 206-10; STRÄSSLE 2004: 123-4.

<sup>39</sup> i.e. the soldiers were free of sin before the battle and when the killing of enemies on behalf of God was not a sin, they would attain eternal life if they died in battle.

<sup>40</sup> a cynical comment in line with ancient Roman practices.

If we are well armed and drawn up in formation, with God fighting along beside us, we charge against them bravely<sup>41</sup> and in good spirits on behalf of the salvation of our souls<sup>42</sup>, and we carry on the struggle without hesitation on behalf of God himself<sup>43</sup>, our kinsmen, and our brothers the other Christians, then we place our hopes in God<sup>44</sup>. We shall not fail to achieve, rather, we shall certainly achieve the glory of victory over them. [18.127; Translation by G.T. Dennis]

In sum, Leo clearly thought that the fallen Christian soldiers would attain eternal life if they died in battle. This is not really that different from the Muslim beliefs. However, it is still clear that Leo thought the Muslim God to be God of war and bloodshed, while for him the Christian God was a God of love and peace. This is true from the point of view Christian theology, but obviously hypocritical if one takes into account the reality. The real difference for Leo lay in the general attitude to war. The Muslims did not need muster lists, but joined the warriors of faith out of their own free will because each man was satisfied with the prospect of booty and did not fear to die for their nation. On top of that, those who could not join the expeditions supported the war effort by arming the warriors out of their own pockets. This was their religious duty. Leo wanted the Romans to adopt these same practices – but it became true only in the Latin west after c.1096<sup>45</sup>.

This suggests that the principal difference between the East Romans and Muslims lay in the way how their society was organized. The East Romans were the inheritors of the Roman military system, which was based on the use of the professional army paid by the taxpayers. This meant that the populace at large expected their armed forces to protect them in return for the taxes. In contrast to this, the Muslim society was built in the expectation that everyone would need to fight for their religion. The likely origins of this concept lay in the tribal society in which all males (and women too when necessary) were required to fight for their tribe.

The same Roman ideas appear to have persisted until the reign of Nicephorus II Phocas (963-969) who was deeply religious and ascetic man, and who followed the teachings of monk Athanasius and used the Cross-Standard as his war-standard. He conceived an idea to establish a law that all soldiers who died in war were to be considered martyrs so that only soldiers could be considered martyrs<sup>46</sup>. This was opposed by the patriarch and bishops, who stated that the canon of Basil the Great

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<sup>41</sup> against Saracens.

<sup>42</sup> i.e. fighting against the Saracens meant absolution of sins.

<sup>43</sup> i.e. the Romans were fighting on behalf of God.

<sup>44</sup> note that fighting simultaneously for God, kinsmen and Christians are not mutually exclusive.

<sup>45</sup> Leo 18 especially with 18.122-123. KOLBABA (1998: 208-210) agrees with this view, namely that for example when the East Romans suffered defeats, their population did not spontaneously rally to fight against the enemies. The reason for this difference was obviously the existence of professional army.

<sup>46</sup> E.g. Skylitzes 14.18.

required all men who had killed to do two years' penance. Phocas punished the Church with various measures most of which were financial in nature, but in the absence of evidence to the contrary it seems probable that he did not change the actual practice among the army because the older military treatises, which included Leo's *Taktika*, remained in circulation<sup>47</sup>.

In short, the emperors, generals and military chaplains were free to promise eternal life to the soldiers while the Church did not officially sanction it. This is actually proven by the fact that Anna Komnena and other 'Byzantine' historians did not condemn the emergence of the new Christian holy warriors, the Crusaders, to liberate the Holy Land<sup>48</sup>. After all, Alexios I (1081-1118) had asked the Pope to help him against the infidels. They condemned only the political goals of the Crusaders which were detrimental to the East Roman Empire and the emergence of warrior priests<sup>49</sup>. This is not surprising. The westerners shared the same Christian culture<sup>50</sup>, and in light of the similar East Roman periodic bouts of religious persecutions, it is not surprising that one of the earliest objects of the bigoted Crusaders were the Jews who offered all too easy a target for the killing and looting.

### **Some Tentative Conclusions**

The above account should have made it abundantly clear that the ancient pagan practices had a direct influence on the way how the East Roman military practiced its religion. It has also demonstrated the underlying conflict between the pacific nature of some theologians and churchmen, which resulted from the accurate reading of the New Testament, and the aggressive nature of the emperors and soldiers whose practices were based on the Old Testament and old pagan military practices and military ethos. In fact, the latter considered all wars as just holy wars in which the fallen warriors would attain eternal life. This division persists even today. Christianity has never really solved the problem of the peaceful message of the New Testament and the needs of the military so that all sides always claim that God is on their side.

The evidence suggests that the other forms of holy war, Germanic, Muslim and Crusading had no influence whatsoever on the East Roman concept of holy war beyond the influence of the deep religious crisis caused by the initial Muslim

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<sup>47</sup> This proves that despite being a deeply religious man, Phocas was still a pragmatic. Had Phocas forced the Church to adopt his view he could have caused a civil war. See also DAIN 1967; SYVÄNNE 2013.

<sup>48</sup> Evidence summarized by STOURAITIS (2011) and KOLBABA (1998: 211-21), but Stouraitis does not accept the concept of holy war for the 'Byzantines' because he understands it differently, while Kolbaba uses the very same material to prove that the 'Byzantines' had a concept of holy war during the very same period of time.

<sup>49</sup> KOLBABA (1998: 211-221). It was hypocritical for the easterners to claim that eastern priests were men of peace, because some of the eastern bishops were famous for their successful defence of their cities, which means that even in this case there is a double-standard for eastern and western 'priests'.

<sup>50</sup> Pope Leo IV promised eternal life as early as 853 to those who fell fighting for faith and fatherland of Christians.

conquests<sup>51</sup>. The ancient heritage was far more powerful than any religious input from the outside.

### Acknowledgment

The improvements in the argumentation of this article owe a lot to the comments of two anonymous reviewers, neither whom, however, should be held responsible for any possible mistakes that remain.

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<sup>51</sup> The only modern society which has been deeply influenced by the Germanic concepts was the Nazi Germany, but Jihad and Orthodox holy war are still alive and well. The various sectarian Sunni and Shia groups still fight against each other. Russia has evoked the old Orthodox holy war concepts for their armed forces and populace, and use even religious relics in like manner (e.g. the relic of St. George borrowed from Mt. Athos). As far as the use of religion in warfare is concerned, there is nothing new under the sun.

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