

Raimonds RublovskisORCID: 0009-0004-1094-1274
rublovskis@tvnet.lvBaltic International Academy
Latvia

Impact of Ukraine War on NATO Development. NATO Vision 2030

Wpływ wojny w Ukrainie na rozwój NATO.
Wizja NATO 2030

DOI: 10.34739/doc.2023.20.04

Abstract: The aim of the article is to analyze potential scenarios for the outcome of the armed conflict in Ukraine and its political and military consequences for NATO, taking into account the political and military decisions associated with the NATO Summit in Madrid in 2022, the new NATO Strategic Concept (NSC) of 2022, and the NATO 2030 Agenda. The outcome of the conflict in Ukraine will unequivocally determine the political, institutional, and military capacity of the NATO Alliance. Furthermore, non-Western political and military integration platforms such as CSTO, BRICS, and SCO will enhance the level of political, economic, and military cooperation among their member states. Therefore, the strategic perspective of a possible decline in the political, economic, and military capabilities of the United States and NATO, and an increase in the political, economic, and military capabilities of BRICS and SCO, becomes plausible. Agenda 2030 presents strategic development proposals for NATO, including deeper political and military consultations among the Allies, strengthening deterrence and defense capabilities, upholding the rules-based international order, enhancing resilience, maintaining technological superiority, continuing the NATO Open Door Policy, increasing training and capacity-building efforts, addressing and adapting to climate change, investing in NATO's financial capabilities, and allocating resources to the defense budgets of member states within the Alliance. A political challenge that remains is the political coherence of the Alliance regarding NATO's Open Door Policy, including Ukraine's accession as a member state, as well as political, economic, and military cooperation between the Russian Federation and China.

Keywords: Ukraine, war, NATO, development, Vision 2030

Abstrakt: Celem artykułu jest analiza możliwych scenariuszy wyniku konfliktu zbrojnego na Ukrainie oraz konsekwencji politycznych i militarnych dla NATO, przy uwzględnieniu decyzji politycznych i militarnych związanych ze Szczytem NATO w Madrycie w 2022 roku, nową Koncepcją Strategiczną NATO (NSC) z 2022 roku i Agendą NATO 2030. Wynik konfliktu na Ukrainie jednoznacznie określi

zdolność polityczną, instytucjonalną i militarną Sojuszu NATO. Ponadto niezachodnie platformy integracji politycznej i militarnych, takie jak CSTO, BRICS, SCO zwiększą poziom współpracy politycznej, gospodarczej i militarnej ich państw członkowskich. Dlatego strategiczna perspektywa możliwego spadku zdolności politycznych, gospodarczych i militarnych Stanów Zjednoczonych i NATO oraz wzrostu zdolności politycznych, gospodarczych i militarnych BRICS i SCO stają się prawdopodobne. Agenda 2030 przedstawia strategiczne propozycje rozwoju NATO – pogłębione konsultacje polityczne i wojskowe między Sojusznikami, wzmocnienie zdolności odstraszania i obrony, utrzymanie opartego na zasadach międzynarodowego porządku, zwiększenie odporności, utrzymanie przewagi technologicznej, kontynuowanie Polityki Otwartych Drzwi NATO, zwiększenie szkoleń i budowanie zdolności, walka i dostosowanie się do zmian klimatycznych, inwestowanie w zdolności finansowe NATO oraz alokacja zasobów na budżety obronne państw członkowskich Sojuszu. Wyzwaniem politycznym pozostaje: spójność polityczna Sojuszu w kwestii Polityki Otwartych Drzwi NATO, w tym przystąpienia Ukrainy jako państwa członkowskiego oraz współpraca w dziedzinie politycznej, gospodarczej i militarnej między Federacją Rosyjską a Chinami.

Słowa kluczowe: Ukraina, wojna, NATO, rozwój, Wizja 2030

Introduction

The aim of this paper is to analyze political and military consequences of the military conflict in Ukraine on further development of NATO Alliance, core objectives and tasks of the Alliance, as well as, political and security challenges which would hamper development, effectiveness and efficiency of the Alliance. The hypothesis of the paper is following: the war in Ukraine has created fundamental institutional and development challenges for the Alliance which are outlined in NATO Madrid Summit Declaration, NATO Strategic Concept (NSC), and NATO Agenda 2030.

By invading Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has made clash of competing visions a brutal and deadly reality¹. Moreover, in border geopolitical sense, the war in Ukraine marks the return of contestation over spheres of influence in world politics². Therefore, it is obvious that the outcome of the war in Ukraine will bring fundamental changes in global and regional security environment and, subsequently, it will have fundamental political and military impact on NATO and European Union. More-

¹ *Munich Security Conference Report 2023*, <https://securityconference.org/en/publications/munich-security-report-2023/> (access date: 27.02.2023).

² E. Ashford, *The Persistence of Great-Power Politics. What the War in Ukraine Has Revealed About Geopolitical Rivalry*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/persistence-great-power-politics> (access date: 20.02.2023).

over, it will determine whether international rules-based international order survives³. NATO Alliance will face increasing global and regional competition with other, non-Western security and integration platforms, such as BRICS and SCO. Moreover, China and Russian Federation will increasingly challenge the United States and other members of the Alliance politically and militarily. Strategic objective of China and Russian Federation is to diminish political, economic and military capabilities and coherence of the West, including decrease of effectiveness, efficiency and internal cohesion of NATO Alliance. On the other hand, both-China and Russian Federation is further cooperating on bi-lateral relationships and strengthening non-Western security and integration platforms- CSTO, SCO and BRICS. NATO has approved and delivered political planning documents which will determine its development until 2030 – NATO Agenda 2030, decisions of NATO Madrid Summit in June 2022, approval of new NATO Strategic Concept (NSC). All these documents will strategically determine political and military shape of the Alliance, taking into account previously mentioned challenges for the United States and NATO. One would conclude that, firstly, result of war in Ukraine- the largest and deadliest military conflict in Europe since the end of World War II- will fundamentally shape global and regional security environment. Secondly, it will fundamentally impact and shape political and institutional coherence of the Alliance, especially, future decisions of NATO Open Door policy and possible invitation for Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova to join the Alliance. Thirdly, it will determine effectiveness of integration process within BRICS and SCO as counterweight to NATO, AUKUS and other Western political and military integration efforts. Taking into account previously mentioned considerations and conclusions – possibility of gradual decrease of political, economic, institutional and military power of the United States, NATO and European Union, and possibility of further integration, expansion and development of BRICS, SCO and CSTO is plausible.

³ S. Menon, *A World Between Orders*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/india/world-between-orders-shivshankar-menon> (access date: 29.03.2023).

Global and Regional Security Environment after the First Year of War in Ukraine

“Ukraine has united the world”, declared Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in a speech on the first anniversary of the start of the war with Russia. If only that were true. The war has certainly united the West, but it has left the world divided⁴. And this increasingly widening gap between the West and the Rest put pressure on existing- the United States led- global and regional security architecture which is increasingly challenged by China, Russian Federation and other emerging actors resulting into increased regional conflicts and security challenges. Since milestone speech of Russian President Vladimir Putin in Munich Security Conference (MSC) in 2007, increased political, economic and military tensions among the United States/NATO, China and Russian Federation have resulted into number of regional military conflicts, such as Georgia in 2008, Syria in 2011, Ukraine since 2013, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020, Belarus in 2020-2021, catastrophic American withdrawal from Afghanistan in August of 2021, and many others. Moreover, fundamentally different security threat perception and assessment among the United States, China and Russian Federation have led to fundamental challenges in the areas of conventional arms control (CAC), control of nuclear weapons, and CBRN.

However, the beginning of the 21st century has accelerated development and scope of simultaneous security threats and challenges, such as competing ideologies, further radicalization of a societies due to political, ideological, economic and security challenges, weak institutional capabilities of international and regional organizations, threats to social order, public safety and security, negative impact of uncontrolled migration, rise of terrorism, development of organized crime networks, illegal drug and human trafficking, cyber threats, CBRN threats, development and use of new technologies- all abovementioned security threats are just a few which have been seriously impacting global, regional and national

⁴ D. Miliband, *The World beyond Ukraine. The Survival of the West and the Demands of the Rest*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/world-beyond-ukraine-russia-west> (access date: 24.04.2023).

security⁵. Considering fundamentally different approaches of various states, global and regional security organizations to address these threats effectively, it will be difficult to develop and deliver common and sustained approach.

Moreover, the beginning of military conflict in Ukraine in February 24 2022 has brought considerable changes of approach of the United States and NATO on assessment of global strategic security environment, persistent and emerging security threats and challenges. NATO Strategic Concept 2022 outlines strategic outlook on emerging security environment after outbreak of military conflict in Ukraine. It is clear that Euro-Atlantic area is not in peace; therefore Alliance cannot discount the possibility of an attack against Allies' sovereignty and territorial integrity. Strategic competition, pervasive instability, recurrent shocks define our broader security environment. The threats we face are global and interconnected⁶. Furthermore, the United States intelligence community assesses that the United States and their NATO Allies will confront complex and pivotal international security environment dominated by two critical strategic challenges that intersects with each other existing trends to intensify their national security implications. First, great powers, rising regional powers, as well as an evolving array of non-state actors, will vie for dominance in the global order, as well as compete to set the emerging conditions and the... rules that will shape that order for decades to come. Strategic competition between the United States and its allies, China and Russia over what kind of world will emerge makes the next few years critical to determining who and what will shape narrative perhaps most immediately in the context of Russia's actions in Ukraine which threaten to escalate into broader conflict between Russia and the West. Second, shared challenges, including climate change, and human and health security, are converging as the planet emerges from the COVID-19 pandemic and confronts economic issues spurred by both – energy and food insecurity. Rapidly emerging and evolving technologies continue to have the potential to disrupt traditional business and society with both- positive and

⁵ J. Lukass, R. Rublovskis, *Threats for Unrban Security in the 21st Century and Holistic Security Strategy. Riga Case*, "Security Dialogues" 2019, No. 1-2, p. 102.

⁶ *Munich Security...*

negative outcomes while creating unprecedented vulnerabilities and attack surfaces, making it increasingly challenging to predict the impact of such challenges on the global landscape. These two strategic challenges will intersect and interact in unpredictable ways that could challenge our ability to respond⁷.

Ideological confrontation between the United States, their NATO Allies and other global and regional powers will further increase possibility of military conflict between the parties. It is presumed in NSC 2022 that authoritarian actors challenge NATO's interests, values and democratic way of life. They are investing in sophisticated conventional, nuclear and missile capabilities, with little transparency or regard for international norms and commitments. Strategic competitors test the resilience and seek to exploit the openness, interconnectedness, digitalization of NATO nations. They interfere in our democratic processes and institutions and target the security of our citizens through hybrid tactics, both directly and through proxies. They conduct malicious activities in cyberspace and space, promote disinformation campaigns, instrumentalise migration, manipulate energy supplies and employ economic coercion. These actors are also at forefront of deliberate effort to undermine multilateral norms and institutions and promote authoritarian models of governance⁸.

Taking into account abovementioned analysis of global and regional security environment, one would argue that The United States and NATO will increasingly face security threat from further political, economic and military cooperation between Russian Federation and China both – bilaterally and through international cooperation and integration platforms of SCO and BRICS. Moreover, Iran and other considerable regional powers will increasingly integrate into previously mentioned political platforms. Therefore, Russian Federation and China will increasingly challenge the United States-led Western political and military global security order. One can conclude that status of Russian Federation and China in official documents of NATO Alliance has changed fundamentally.

⁷ Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community*, Washington 2023, p. 4.

⁸ *NATO Strategic Concept 2022*, p. 3, www.nato.int/strategic-concept-2022 (access date: 10.02.2023).

In NATO Strategic Concept (NSC) 2010, which was adopted in NATO Lisbon Summit in 2010, China is not mentioned whatsoever whereas relationships between NATO and Russian Federation is described as “NATO-Russia cooperation is of strategic importance as it contributes to creating common space of peace, stability and security. NATO poses no threat to Russia. On the contrary: we want to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, and we will act accordingly, with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia, enhance the political consultations and practical cooperation in areas of shared interest”⁹.

On the contrary, NATO Strategic Concept (NSC) 2022 states that “The Russian Federation is the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in Euro-Atlantic area. It seeks to establish spheres of influence and direct control through coercion, subversion, aggression and annexation. It uses conventional, cyber and hybrid means against us and our partners”¹⁰. Moreover, escalation of the conflict in Ukraine to the military confrontation between Russia and the West carries the greater risk, which the world has not faced in decades¹¹, but the US intelligence community had not been prepared for the China threat¹². On the other hand, there had been views which considerably underestimated status of internal Chinese challenges and perceived political weakness of political leadership of the country¹³.

However, the world has clearly changed. China has very different and assertive leadership. It has more than tripled the size of its economy since 2008 and now has stronger capabilities to pursue adversarial policies¹⁴. Taking into account previously men-

⁹ NATO *Strategic Concept 2010*, p. 5, www.nato.int/strategic-concept-2010 (access date: 10.02.2023).

¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

¹¹ Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *Annual Threat...*, p. 12.

¹² A. Schiff, *The US Intelligence Community Is Not Prepared for the China Threat. A Fundamental Realignment is Needed to Counter Beijing*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-09-30/us-intelligence-community-not-prepared-china-threat> (access date: 05.04.2023).

¹³ Ch. K. Johnson, *XI the Survivor. How Washington Overestimates Chinese Weakness*, <https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/xi-survivor-how-washington-overestimates-chinese-weakness> (access date: 25.03.2023).

¹⁴ H.M. Paulson Jr, *America’s China Policy Is Not Working. The Dangers of Broad Decoupling*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/americas-china-policy-not-working> (access date: 25.3.2023).

tioned fact that NATO Strategic Concept 2010 did not mention China, one can notice fundamental changes in attitude towards China in NATO Strategic Concept 2022. China's ambitions and coercive policies challenge NATO's interests, security and values. People's Republic of China employs broad range of political, economic and military tools to increase its global footprint and project power. The PRC's malicious hybrid and cyber operations and its confrontational rhetoric and disinformation target Allies and harm Allied security¹⁵. China's strategic objective is to make China the preeminent power in East Asia and a major power on the world stage¹⁶. Therefore, China will increasingly combine its growing military power with its economic, technological and diplomatic influence to strengthen China's political and military reach. Increasing conventional military capabilities, development of WMD and space capabilities, cyber and other technologies will threaten the United States and its Allies¹⁷. As Chinese President Xi Jinping stated in the 20th Congress of China Communist Party, October 16, 2022 external attempts to suppress and contain China may escalate at any time¹⁸.

Therefore, from NATO perspective current and evolving global and regional security threats and challenges primarily stem from Russian Federation and China. Moreover, potential of increased political, economic and military cooperation between two powers is seen as rapidly evolving threat to the United States and NATO Alliance. In February 2022, just three weeks before the beginning of the military confrontation in Ukraine, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin announced new strategic partnership that would have no limits¹⁹. Many observers perceived that China had backed Russian military action in Ukraine or, at best, willfully ignored it.²⁰ Therefore, EU High Representative Josep Bor-

¹⁵ *NATO Strategic Concept 2022...*, p. 5.

¹⁶ Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *Annual Threat...*, p. 6.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

¹⁸ *Munich Security Conference...*, p. 17.

¹⁹ S. Power, *How Democracy Can Win. Right Way to Counter Autocracy*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/samantha-power-how-democracy-can-win-counter-autocracy> (access date: 25.3.2023).

²⁰ P. M. Kim, *The Limits of No-Limit Partnership. China and Russia Can't be Split but They Can Be Thwarted*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/limits-of-a-no-limits-partnership-china-russia> (access date: 25.3.2023).

reill stated in Munich Security Conference 2023 that Russian-Chinese attempt to fundamentally increase their cooperation is culmination of a long-standing campaign. It is an act of defiance. It is a clear revisionist manifesto. It is manifesto to review the world order²¹.

Abovementioned security environment and evolving security challenges and threats for NATO stemming from increased attempts of Russian Federation and China to challenge current global and regional security provisions will be extremely important for small countries in the Eastern Flank of NATO Alliance. Taking into account that most of countries of Central and Eastern Europe, constituting NATO's Eastern Flank, are small in terms of size of territory, size of population, size and capabilities of their military forces- increasing political and military tensions between the United States, NATO and Russian Federation, China- could pose direct and existential threat to their independence and very existence. Therefore, national security threats stemming from fundamentally worsening security environment, will primarily target small states because small states are heavily dependent for their own security and defense arrangements upon politically powerful and militarily capable global actor or upon a security and defense organization where such an actor plays prominent role²². However, the United States which is considered as global politically powerful and military capable actor has substantial foreign and security policy challenges²³. In this light, the key issue to determine whether or not state is small, it is necessary to address key security and defense issues and take into account the fact that external factors shape a small state security mentality²⁴. Taking also into account the fact that military power has returned as the key element of state foreign and security policy since the beginning of the 21st century, it is obvious need for debellicated societies of Europe²⁵ to increase level of resources allocated to state defense thus strengthening NATO.

²¹ *Munich Security...*, p. 17.

²² R. Rublovskis, M. Šešlegyte, R. Kailjurand, *Defence and Security for the Small*, Reykjavik 2013, p. 14.

²³ K. Schake, *Biden's Foreign Policy is the Mess. The White House has Failed to Match Means and Ends*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/biden-foreign-policy-mess> (access date: 25.03.2023).

²⁴ R. Vayryanen, *Small States: Persisting Despite Doubts. The National Security of Small States in the Changing World*, London 1997, p. 98.

²⁵ S.C. Gray, *Another Bloody Century. Future Warfare*, London 2005, p. 95.

Political and Military Impact on NATO after the First Year of Ukraine War

George Kennan issued his warning already in 1948 that no Russian government would ever accept Ukrainian independence. Foreseeing a deadlock struggle between Moscow and Kyiv, Kennan made detailed suggestions at the time about how the United States should deal with a conflict that pitted an independent Ukraine against Russia. He returned to this subject half a century later. Kennan, then in his 90s, cautioned that the eastward expansion of NATO would doom democracy in Russia and ignite another Cold War²⁶. One would confirm that George Kennan's point of view has prevailed and current military conflict in Ukraine is the result of previously mentioned facts.

However, NATO Alliance has drawn the first conclusions after outbreak of Ukraine war in February 24, 2022. Before the beginning of the war, Russian Federation presented the United States with the list of demands what it said were necessary to stave off large-scale military conflict in Ukraine. The Russian government asked for formal halt of NATO's eastern enlargement, a permanent freeze of further expansion of the Alliance's military infrastructure- military bases and weapon systems- in the former Soviet territory, and the end of Western military assistance to Ukraine²⁷. This Russian proposal was rejected by the United States and NATO and this finally led to outbreak of military conflict in Ukraine. However, current military conflict in Ukraine has slowly evolved and escalated since the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991, and it was obvious that the conflict itself is about much more than Ukraine and its possible NATO membership. It is about the future of European order crafted after Soviet Union's collapse. During the 1990s, the United States and its allies designed Euro-Atlantic security architecture in which Russia had no clear commitment or stake, and since Russian President Vladimir Putin has come to power, Russia has been

²⁶ F. Costigliola, *Kennan's Warning on Ukraine. Ambition, Insecurity and the Perils of Independence*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/george-kennan-warning-on-ukraine> (27.02.2023).

²⁷ D. Trenin, *What Putin Really Wants in Ukraine? Russia Seeks to Stop NATO Expansion Not to Annex More Territory*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2021-12-28/what-putin-really-wants-ukraine> (access date: 06.02.2023).

challenging that system²⁸. Taking into account previously mentioned statements; it is obvious that the conflict in Ukraine has become fundamental test for unity and coherence of European Union, NATO, internal political coherence within the United States and other member states of EU and NATO. Attempts to find diplomatic solution which would lead to compromise between Russian Federation and Ukraine in the second part of 2021 and the beginning of 2022 have failed in February 24, 2022²⁹.

The beginning of Russian military operation brought fundamental dilemma for decision-making process in European Union and NATO on strategic issues of further enlargement of both organizations, development of new strategies towards Russian Federation and Ukraine, sustainment of Open Door Policy for accession of new member states into both organizations, decisions of enhanced political, economic, financial and military support for Ukraine. One would argue that just before the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine and early stages of that conflict, there were fundamentally different points of view how to respond to the crisis and what decisions should be taken towards Russian Federation and Ukraine. From the very beginning such an environment increased difficulties to take comprehensive and timely political decisions; however, there was an understanding that political, economic and military approach towards conflict in Ukraine has to consolidate quickly. On the one hand, politicians and experts outlined different possible scenarios for outcome of Ukraine conflict ranging from analysis of Russian military victory and subsequent transformation of Europe³⁰, and Ukrainian military victory with subsequent end of current political regime, transformation and possible political disintegration of Russian Federation³¹.

²⁸ A. Stent, *The Putin Doctrine. A Move on Ukraine Has Always Been Part of the Plan*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-01-27/putin-doctrine> (access date: 10.02.2023).

²⁹ C. Belin, *Monsieur Fixit. The Perils of Macron's Shuttle Diplomacy*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/france/monsieur-fixit> (access date: 10.02.2023).

³⁰ L. Fix, M. Kimmage, *What if Putin Wins? Kremlin Controlled Ukraine Would Transform Europe*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-02-18/what-if-russia-wins> (access date: 10.02.2023).

³¹ A. Kendal-Taylor, E. Frantz, *The Beginning of the End for Putin? Dictatorships Stable Until They Aren't*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2022-03-02/beginning-end-putin> (10.02.2023).

Taking into account previously mentioned broad spectrum of opinions before the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine and, subsequently, variety of points of view concerning decision-making process on support of Ukraine and further containment of Russian Federation, one would argue that fundamentally important political and military consequences after the first year of the conflict in Ukraine are following: creation of NATO Agenda 2030, outcome of NATO Summit in Madrid in June 2022, subsequent Declaration of Madrid NATO Summit, and adoption of new NATO Strategic Concept (NSC). These decisions and documents have established consolidated approach on current and emerging global and regional security environment, security threats and challenges stemming from this environment, fundamental objectives and tasks for NATO development within 2030 timeframe. Under such fundamental and radical change of global and regional security environment, based on military consequences of the conflict in Ukraine, the Alliance has adopted considerable political changes towards Russian Federation and China. Firstly, new NATO Strategic Concept (NSC) fundamentally changed approach towards Russian Federation. In NATO Strategic Concept (NSC) 2010, which was adopted in NATO Lisbon Summit in 2010, China is not mentioned whatsoever, whereas relationships between NATO and Russian Federation are described as 'NATO-Russia cooperation is of strategic importance as it contributes to creating a common space of peace, stability and security. NATO poses no threat to Russia. On the contrary: we want to see true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, and we will act accordingly, with the expectation of reciprocity, enhance the political consultations and practical cooperation with Russia in areas of shared cooperation³². On the other hand, NATO Strategic Concept (NSC) 2022 states that The Russian Federation is the most significant and direct threat to Allies' security and to peace and stability in Euro-Atlantic area³³. The new era of competition and security challenges stems also from People's Republic of

³² *NATO Strategic Concept 2010...*

³³ *NATO Strategic Concept 2022...*

China, who challenge NATO's interests, security, and values and seek to undermine rules-based international order³⁴.

Secondly, yet another fundamental consequence has occurred and it is directly influenced by the first year of war in Ukraine. Enhancement of the Open Door Policy of the Alliance and subsequent enlargement of NATO is direct consequence of the war. The decision of the Alliance to invite Finland and Sweden to join NATO is fundamental shift for security and defense policy of these two nations, and, subsequently, fundamental change in regional security environment in the Baltic Sea Region and NATO's Eastern Flank. Thirdly, the major consequence of the first year of the war in Ukraine is substantial increase of financial and other resources allocated to state defense. Since 2014, there was a considerable progress on Allied defense spending³⁵.

Previous agreements put 2% of GDP as threshold of defense spending for member states of the Alliance. Some NATO members, especially – Central and Eastern European countries, increased their defense spending well above 2% benchmark since 2014, targeting even 3% of GDP and more within 2024-2027 timeframe. One would conclude that the most important political and military consequences for NATO Alliance after the first year of the war in Ukraine are following: NATO's decisions to significantly strengthen deterrence and defense posture to deny any potential adversary any possible opportunities for aggression³⁶, understanding of current and potential security environment and threat assessment which resulted into fundamental change of policy towards Russian Federation and People's Republic of China. NATO decisions to enhance Open Door Policy, subsequently led to invitation for Finland and Sweden to join the Alliance, thus launching another round of NATO's Enlargement, decisions of the Allies to significantly increase resources allocated to state defense and, finally, development and approval of fundamental NATO documents- NATO Madrid Summit Declaration and NATO Strategic Concept (NSC) 2022.

³⁴ *Madrid Summit Declaration*, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_196951.htm (access date: 10.02.2023).

³⁵ *Madrid Summit...*

³⁶ *NATO Strategic Concept 2022...*

Agenda NATO 2030 and NATO Strategic Concept 2022 – Blueprint for NATO Development and Effectiveness

Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, NATO had developed and approved fundamental documents which will determine political and military effectiveness and efficiency of the Alliance. NATO Agenda 2030, NATO Madrid Summit Declaration and NATO Strategic Concept (NSC) describe global, regional and national security environment, analyze military and other threats and challenges which will threaten the Alliance until 2030, and outline framework of actions and capabilities needed to counter those threats and challenges. The most important challenges which could further endanger global and regional security environment are increasingly dangerous discourse on use of nuclear weapons and internal political and military coherence within the Alliance.

Ever since Russia invaded Ukraine last February, there has been near-constant debate about Russian President Vladimir Putin's nuclear arsenal – and what he might do with it.³⁷ After the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, it seemed like transformational moment for European security. Surely now Europe would finally get its act together on defense. But as the war enters its second year, such a transformation has not materialized. The fault for the ongoing stasis lies with many parties – European states, NATO, the European Union and even the United States – all of who have defaulted to the comfortable practices of the past in the hope of preserving an untenable status quo³⁸.

In order to prepare intellectual and political framework for the adoption of new NATO Strategic Concept, which has been long overdue since the adoption of NSC in 2010, Agenda NATO 2030 has been approved in NATO Summit in Brussels, June 14, 2021. NATO 2030 is an ambitious agenda to ensure that NATO remains ready, strong and united for a new era of increased global competi-

³⁷ K. Ven Bruusgaard, *How Russia Decides to Go Nuclear. Deciphering the Way Moscow Handles Its Ultimate Weapon*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/how-russia-decides-go-nuclear> (access date: 25.03.2023).

³⁸ M. Bergmann, S. Besch, *Why European Defense Still Depends on America. Don't Believe The Hype-The War in Ukraine Has Led to Little Change*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/why-european-defense-still-depends-america> (access date: 25.03.2023).

tion and more unpredictable threats, including terrorism, cyber-attacks, disruptive technologies, climate change, and Russia and China's challenges to rules-based international order³⁹. The Agenda outlined fundamental strategic proposals in order to achieve abovementioned objectives in 2030. Those strategic proposals are following: 1. Deeper political consultation and coordination on issues of arms control, climate change, security, emerging disruptive technologies, terrorism, economic sustainability and stability issues, 2. Strengthened deterrence and defense- agreement to bolster Allied deterrence and defense capabilities and commitment to maintain appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defense capabilities, including NATO-agreed guideline to spend 2% of GDP on defense needs, 3. Improved resilience – NATO Allies will take a broader and more coordinated approach to resilience. Development of resilience objectives in order to guide nationally-tailored resilience goals. NATO would better advice and assess national resilience efforts in support of NATO collective defense, 4. Preserve NATO's technological edge due to the fact that NATO Allies can no longer take their technological edge for granted. NATO Allies need to boost trans-Atlantic cooperation on critical technologies. 5. Uphold the Rules-based international order – Allies will enhance cooperation with like – minded partners and international organizations and forge new engagements including Africa, Latin America, and Asia. NATO will also maintain Open Door Policy for countries which aspire for NATO membership. In order to remain successful and ensure security and stability in Euro-Atlantic area-NATO needs to adopt global approach to tackle global challenges. 6. Boost training and capacity building- NATO will support efforts to build capacity of the partners of the Alliance in areas of counter-terrorism, stabilization, countering hybrid threats, crisis management, peace-keeping and defense sector reforms, 7. Combat and adapt to climate change-NATO become an actor in climate domain, 8. Development of the next NATO Strategic Concept (NSC) in NATO Madrid Summit in 2022, 9. Investing in NATO – Allies will ensure that the Alliance will have right resources-both through

³⁹ *NATO 2030 agenda*, www.nato.int/nato2030 (access date: 23.01.2023).

national defense expenditure and NATO common funding in order to deliver NATO 2030 goals⁴⁰.

Based on abovementioned strategic proposals of the Agenda 2030 and the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine, NATO Madrid Summit Declaration and new NATO Strategic Concept (NSC) 2022 shaped tasks and objectives of the Alliance until 2030. NATO Strategic Concept is overarching document which will determine development of the Alliance via address of current and emerging security threats and challenges. NSC 2022 describes the overarching security environment in which the Alliance operates states NATO purpose and core tasks, set strategic direction for its political and military implementation. Current and emerging security threats and challenges within global and regional security environment will determine following tasks and objectives for the Alliance: 1. NATO is determined to safeguard the freedom and security of the Allies. Its key purpose and greatest responsibility is to ensure collective defense against all threats from all directions, 2. The transatlantic bond between the United States and Europe is indispensable for security of the Allies, 3. NATO will remain the unique, essential and indispensable transatlantic forum for consultation, coordination and action on all matters related to individual and collective security. The Alliance will be strengthened based on indivisible security, solidarity, and ironclad commitment to defend each other, 4. NATO will continue to fulfill three core tasks: deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security, 5. NATO will enhance individual and collective resilience and technological edge. These efforts are critical to fulfill the Alliance's core tasks⁴¹.

Previously mentioned threats and challenges stemming from current and emerging global and regional security environment will consolidate NATO commitment to address these threats and challenges effectively. The Agenda 2030 and NATO Strategic Concept is blueprint for development of the Alliance to provide all necessary resources, infrastructure, capabilities and forces to deliver fully on NATO's core tasks and implement decisions⁴².

⁴⁰ Ibidem.

⁴¹ *NATO Strategic Concept 2022...*, p. 3.

⁴² Ibidem, p. 11.

Conclusion

The beginning of the war in Ukraine has created unprecedented security challenges for Europe. Never since 1945, has Europe witnessed conventional military conflict on such a level of intensity. Moreover, this conflict has already involved global and regional actors beyond borders of NATO and EU – China, India, Brazil and other emerging regional powers. Taking into account rapidly increasing political, economic and military influence of these countries, it is obvious that NATO and European Union will have to take into consideration point of view of these actors. Current and emerging security threats and challenges stemming from security environment around Ukraine have created profound impact on NATO Alliance. On one hand, the war in Ukraine have triggered further development of the Alliance, attempts to improve internal coherence, and increase of institutional effectiveness and efficiency of NATO Alliance. On the other hand, there have been increasing signs of fatigue of some member states of NATO over war in Ukraine and, subsequent differences in opinions how to proceed with further political and military support of Ukraine. Difference of opinions potentially could lead to decrease of political, economic, financial and military support for Ukraine and, subsequently, to decrease political unity and coherence within NATO and European Union. However, decisions of strengthening the Eastern Flank of the Alliance and Open Door Policy had been confirmed by NATO Summit in Madrid in summer of 2022. At the same time, in 2022 NATO had been able to increase political and military support for Ukraine substantially via Ramstein Format; however, in 2023 level of support could decrease due to challenges of NATO member states to sustain production of military hardware which would comply with increasing needs of Ukraine.

In order to respond effectively to current and emerging security threats and challenges, the Alliance has designed number of strategic documents and declarations which have to ensure that NATO will remain strong, united and effective organization able to reach its political and military objectives. NATO Agenda 2030, NATO Madrid Summit Declaration, and NATO Strategic Concept (NSC) 2022 have described global and regional security environ-

ment, current and emerging security threats and challenges which stem from abovementioned security environment. In order to remain ready, effective and efficient to address and counter current and emerging security threats, NATO has developed and approved several overarching documents- NATO Agenda 2030, NATO Strategic Concept (NSC) 2022, which have designed necessary strategic proposals for development of the Alliance until 2030, and necessary actions in order to ensure that NATO will remain effective and efficient. The hypothesis of the paper has been verified- the war in Ukraine has created fundamental institutional and development challenges for NATO Alliance.

References

- Ashford E., *The Persistence of Great Power Politics. What the War in Ukraine has Revealed About Geopolitical Rivalry*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/persistence-great-power-politics> (access date: 20.02.2023).
- Belin C., *Monsieur Fixit. The Perils of Macron's Shuttle Diplomacy*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/france/monsieur-fixit> (access date: 10.02.2023).
- Bergmann M., Besch S., *Why European Defense Still Depends on America. Don't Believe the Hype-The War in Ukraine Has Led to Little Change*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/why-european-defense-still-depends-america> (access date: 25.03.2023).
- Costigliola F., *Kennan's Warning on Ukraine. Ambition, Insecurity, and Perils of Independence*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/george-kennan-warning-on-ukraine> (27.02.2023).
- Fix L., Kimmage M., *What if Russia Wins? A Kremlin-Controlled Ukraine Would Transform Europe*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-02-18/what-if-russia-wins> (access date:10.02.2023).
- Gray C.S., *Another Bloody Century. Future Warfare*, London 2005
- Johnson Ch.K., *Xi the Survivor. How Washington Overestimates Chinese Weakness*, <https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/xi-survivor-how-washington-overestimates-chinese-weakness> (access date: 25.03.2023).
- Kendall-Taylor A., Frantz E., *The Beginning of the End for Putin? Dictatorships Look Stable-Until They Aren't*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2022-03-02/beginning-end-putin> (10.02.2023).

- Kim P.M., *The Limits of No-Limit Partnership. China and Russia Can't be Split but They Can Be Thwarted*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/limits-of-a-no-limits-partnership-china-russia> (access date: 25.3.2023).
- Lukas J., Rublovskis R., *Threats for Urban Security in the 21st Century and Holistic Security Strategy. Riga Case*, "Security Dialogues", 2019, No 1-2.
- Madrid Summit Declaration*, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_196951.htm (access date: 10.02.2023).
- Menon S., *A World Between Orders*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/india/world-between-orders-shivshankar-menon> (access date: 29.03.2023).
- Miliband D., *The World Beyond Ukraine. The Survival of the West and the Demands of the Rest*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/world-beyond-ukraine-russia-west> (access date: 24.04.2023).
- Munich Security Conference Report 2023*, <https://securityconference.org/en/publications/munich-security-report-2023/> (access date: 27.02.2023).
- NATO 2030 agenda*, 2021, www.nato.int/nato2030 (access date: 23.01.2023).
- NATO Strategic Concept 2010*, www.nato.int/strategic-concept-2010 (access date: 10.02.2023).
- NATO Strategic Concept 2022*, www.nato.int/strategic-concept-2022 (access date: 10.02.2023).
- Office of Director of National Intelligence, *Annual Threat Assessment of U.S. Intelligence Community*, Washington 2023.
- Paulson S., *America's China Policy Is Not Working. The Dangers of Broad Decoupling*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/americas-china-policy-not-working> (access date: 25.3.2023).
- Power S., *How Democracy Can Win. Right Way to Counter Autocracy*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/samantha-power-how-democracy-can-win-counter-autocracy> (access date: 25.3.2023).
- Rublovskis R., Šešelgyte M., Kaljurand L., *The Challenges of Small State in the 21st Century Global Security and Defence Environment: Latvia's Case. Defence and Security for the Small*, Reykjavik 2013.
- Schake K., *Biden's Foreign Policy is the Mess. The White House Has Failed to Match Means and Ends*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/biden-foreign-policy-mess> (access date: 25.03.2023).
- Schiff A., *The US Intelligence Community is not Prepared for China Threat. A Fundamental Realignment is Needed to Counter Beijing*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-09-30/us-intelligence-community-not-prepared-china-threat> (access date: 05.04.2023).

- Stent A., *The Putin Doctrine. A Move on Ukraine Has Always Been Part of the Plan*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-01-27/putin-doctrine> (access date: 10.02.2023).
- Trenin D., *What Putin Really Wants in Ukraine? Russia Seeks to Stop NATO Expansion, Not to Annex More Territory*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2021-12-28/what-putin-really-wants-ukraine> (access date: 06.02.2023).
- Vayryanen R., *Small States: Persisting Despite the Doubts. The National Security of Small States in the Changing World*, London 1997.
- Ven Bruusgaard K., *How Russia Decides to Go Nuclear. Deciphering the Way Moscow Handles Its Ultimate Weapon*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/how-russia-decides-go-nuclear> (access date: 25.03.2023).