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ADDRESSING LOSS AND NOSTALGIA: TWO CUBAN DIASPORIC NOVELS OF THE NINETIES

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Abstract

My study analyzes two texts that are essential for understanding the Cuban literary diaspora in the 1990s. By looking at the representation of the migrant experience in both Jesús Díaz's novel *La piel y la máscara* (1996) and *Inventario secreto de La Habana* (2004) by Abilio Estévez, I examine their significance for the corpus of diasporic literature that has been central to Cuban society for the past sixty years. My article addresses not only the way in which these works are contextualized as part of a diasporic literature tradition, but also how loss and nostalgia play an influential role in shaping the identity of the migrant subject.

Key words

Cuban literature, diaspora studies, transnational literature, Cuban diaspora

Introduction

In his seminal study on migration, James Clifford establishes the first theoretical elements for contemporary studies on diaspora. Clifford analyzes how modern, diasporic communities construct a physical and symbolic space that is inspirational and significant for these individuals living in a nation different from that of their origin. Clifford questions the types of narratives that such a cultural tension produces, and, more precisely, he assumes the parameters used by the theorist, William Safran, to establish what defines a diasporic community. For Safran, a diaspora constitutes a community of individuals from the same nation or originating territory and dispersed in at least two localities around the world. In addition, this community should produce and maintain a living memory of their country of origin, hold a discourse that expresses the difficulty of integrating into their new society, and promote the idea of a possible return to the country left behind (qtd. in Clifford 1997, 244–47). The study of diasporic cultural and communicative productions is essential for contemporary humanist studies because, as Rosa Tsagarousianou and Jessica Retis explain, “in an increasingly globalized world, the mediascapes that enable interaction across distance are crucial in shaping transnational, national and local politics, cultures, and identities” (2019, 4).

Recent studies on Cuban literature in the diaspora have applied the general framework established by Clifford and Safran, which assumes the existence of an active diasporic community, formed by Cuban émigrés. Such is the case with Beatriz Rodríguez-Mourelo’s book (*Encounters in Exile,* 2006) about themes used in Cuban literature produced outside of Cuba during the nineties, and Raúl Rosales Herrera’s book (*Fictional First–Person Discourses in Cuban Diaspora Novels*, 2011) about novels from the eighties and nineties and the way in which an exile identity is created through the use of a narrative, which focuses on the experiences of the self as an emigrated subject. My work assumes the general coordinates that Clifford and Safran suggest, distinguishing the existence and activities of diasporic communities and also the type of characterization and periodization usually used in literary and cultural studies and in the social sciences, to refer to the migratory waves originating from Cuba after the establishment of Fidel Castro’s regime in 1959.

Jesús Díaz’s and Abilio Estévez's autobiographical novels belong to a genealogy that includes several authors from the Cuban diaspora, who also attempted the genre of self-representation. As scholars, such as Iraida H. López, have argued, the end of the eighties and the beginning of the nineties is a rich period for autobiographical works of great importance for the history of Cuban exile literature and Cuban-American literature. Among these renowned books are Heberto Padilla's *La mala memoria* (1989), Reinaldo Arena's world-known *Antes que Anochezca* (1992), and Gustavo Pérez Firmat's *Next Year in Cuba* (1995). On the other hand, it is also during the 1990s that literary studies link the autobiographical genre with and Cuban diaspora literature, such as Isabel Alvarez Borland's *Cuban-American Literature of Exile: From Person to Persona* in 1998, and Stephen J. Clark's *Autobiografía y revolución en Cuba* in 1999 (López 2015, 19-32).

There is consensus among scholars that Cuban emigration be analyzed through specific migratory “waves”, determined by those periods in which the Cuban government allowed its citizens to leave the country and move, primarily, to the United States (see Duany 2017). During the first two migratory waves (1959-1962 and 1965-1973), more than half a million people abandoned the country. The wave known as the “Mariel Exodus” brought close to 125,000 Cubans to Florida between the months of April and September of 1980.With the wave known as the “Balsero Crisis” (August to September 1994) 30,900 Cubans fled due to a profound economic and social crisis catalyzed by the end of the European Socialist Bloc’s economic subsidies to the Cuban government after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Finally, the fifth migratory wave began in May 1995 and continues until the present day. During this so-called

"Post-Soviet migration", hundreds of thousands of Cubans left the country after Cuban authorities loosened migratory restrictions.

The two novels that I analyze in this article were written by Cuban authors that led the fifth migratory wave. Loss and nostalgia are central themes in both of these stories. Additionally, both texts are good examples of the textual construction of a diasporic identity. *La piel y la máscara* (1996) by Jesús Díaz (Havana, 1941 – Madrid, 2002) and *Inventario secreto de La Habana* (2004) by Abilio Estévez (Havana, 1954) both make the reader emotionally complicit. The authors want the reader to go through the diasporic rite of passage by reading their literature. Even though both novels are written from the first-person perspective and include an abundant number of autobiographical elements, the way in which they share emotional territory with the reader is remarkable. This significant and traumatic space is constructed from memories of life in Cuba before they were replaced by the painful context of exile.

Specific components of the Cuban literary canon have been questioned over the years by a few scholars from Cuba, who have studied the Cuban literary production in the diaspora. Thus, Ambrosio Fornet still considers it necessary to embrace a "fruitful dialogue between the two parts of the nation–that which resides on the island and that which makes up the diaspora" (Fornet 2009, 255) in order to establish a definitive history of Cuban literature. Nostalgia has been analyzed as one of the ethos of Cuban-American literature. Raúl Rubio has systematically studied what he calls the "discourse(s) of nostalgia" within the cultural production of the Cuban community in the United States. Rubio argues that there are Cuban "nostalgic texts" that "evolve in response to the dislocations of the historical exoduses and diasporas occurring after the Cuban Revolution of 1959" (Rubio 2006, 13). In this same context, Dalia Kandiyoti has analyzed the commodification and consumption of nostalgia as a key element to sell "Cuba America" as an "exile identity" (Kandiyoti 2006, 81). For Kandiyoti, nostalgia as a theme would be commercialized when "racially or ethnically identified subjects commodify their own identities" (Kandiyoti 2006, 81). However, Kandiyoti concludes that there are nostalgic practices performed by the diasporic subject that are not "dependent primarily on marketable, politicized repetitions of idealized histories" (Kandiyoti 2006, 86) but are part of the need for these subjectivities to feel and to experience that they belong to a cultural and ethnic community[1].

Jesús Díaz's literary work is one of the best representations of the progressive alienation of an artist choosing to confront the censorship of Cuban cultural

[1] For a detailed reflection on Cuban literature produced outside the island and its traits as a "diaspora rhetoric", I suggest reading Iraida H. López's excellent book *Impossible Returns: Narratives of the Cuban Diaspora* (2015). López profusely comments on what she calls "the poetics of returns", namely the textual, literary variations of "volver" (to return) to the physical or emotional homeland as a recurrent motif displayed by many Cuban diaspora's authors (López 2015, 1-33).

institutions. This is despite the fact that, prior to his exile, Díaz had cooperated with the government during the first three decades of the Cuban revolution. Abilio Estévez, on the other hand, creates a nostalgic revision of the history of the Cuban capital. Estévez not only revisits Havana's glorious and sensual past, which serves as an alternate to the sanitized version certified by the Cuban government, but also affectively relates the Cuban capital to several European milieus that are linked to narratives of exile in various ways. By creating those transnational connections, Estévez transmutes Havana into a transitional locality that will forever be associated with a community of Havanans that are now spread throughout the world.

1. Two Narratives from the 1990s Cuban Emigration

The novel, *La piel y la máscara*, recounts the paradigmatic journey of many Cuban intellectuals who, like the author, began their professional career supporting and collaborating with Castro's regime but ended up exiled as part of the 1990s' migratory wave. The main character of this novel is Oso, a film director who functions as an alter ego to the book's author, Jesús Díaz. Similar to what happened to Díaz during his creative life in Cuba, Oso suffers political censorship due to his cinematographic work. He is also heavily controlled and surveilled by the Cuban secret police. It is for these reasons that Oso chooses exile. For him, intellectual labor is not a mere individual right but rather an active exercise of citizenry. Exile is not a tragic, unforeseen accident but a political and radical choice born after his many attempts to exercise his creative work freely in Cuba, against the totalitarian machinery of those in power.

Before leaving Cuba behind, Oso is afraid that life in exile would not allow him to produce his artistic work because he assumes that he would need to prioritize his economic autonomy in a country where he will be a political refugee. On the other hand, *Inventario secreto de La Habana* sets the emotional stage for Abilio Estévez's memories of exile and transnational wandering. Unlike Oso, Estévez's narrator feels that he is part of a larger exiled group. He commiserates with all who, like him and against their will, end up separated from their families and communities. Thus, he describes the airport in Havana, where the families go to say goodbye to their loved-ones, who were forced one way or the other to leave the country:

> Travelers and families invariably say goodbye with a tragic tone, as if one of them was leaving for a bloody battle or directly for death. Similar farewells to those that you could see in any situation of war. […] Death is not always exactly death. Sometimes it is called separation, distance, absence (Estévez 2004, 71).

In *Inventario secreto de La Habana*, the narrator considers the consequences of the abundant amount of emigration generated by the Cuban political dictatorship an irreparable social and emotional catastrophe. Estévez and Díaz's novels represent the Cuban emigration of the last six decades as a collective trauma; they actively attack any assumption of legitimacy and ethical integrity attributed to the Cuban government's political program. Both books offer the phenomenon of resounding disillusionment caused by the Cuban socialist project. Thus, Estévez's narrator makes temporal anticipation a metaphysical condition. In his view, the citizens of Havana reside in an immobile time, one that neither ends nor allows them to imagine a future of changes for Cuban society:

> In Havana one waits. What? Everything. Nothing. Whatever. The true occupation is waiting. I'm not sure about the other type of waiting, the waiting that presents itself around the world. But the waiting that I know, the one in Havana, has a strong component of resignation. There is something in waiting that nullifies the will. [...] It nullifies obstinacy, tenacity, interest in transforming one's destiny, or whatever one calls that and what is found in the future, or in no other place outside of my hopes [...] (Estévez 2004, 74).

The ideal reader of these Cuban emigration narratives from the 1990s belongs not only to the community of Cuban emigrants who migrated earlier to the United States, a community that can afford and identify with cultural images created by nostalgia and loss, but also the transnational and global Cuban migratory culture that started right after Castro took power. These narratives from the 1990s are helping to both reveal and to give weight to the cultural and emotional impact on Cuban citizens around the globe. Exile, loss, and nostalgia are intrinsic components of contemporary as well as past generations of Cuban subjects. In these works, exile is a haunting reality that serves as a traumatic background to the story. It is an essential element for the development of both plots, and it is an unmistakable part of many of the dialogues and ideas discussed by the main characters. For the Cuban émigré community – and especially for the hundreds of writers, artists, and intellectuals that left the island during the 1990s, after the social and economic cataclysm that followed the withdrawal of support from the Socialist Bloc, these works guarantee the creation of an archive of the painful memories of Cuban enforced migration. Additionally, as a consequence, this archive stands in opposition to the manipulative discourse held by Cuban officials. Literature functions as an indelible alternative to the censoring that the Cuban cultural institutions do to the heterogeneous and powerful Cuban culture created outside of the island.

Unlike the editorial journey of works produced because of the first migratory waves (1959-1989), the first editions of *La piel y la máscara* and *Inventario secreto de La Habana* were printed by prestigious Spanish publishing houses. The influential creative status that both Abilio Estévez and Jesús Díaz had since the time they were still residing in Cuba is evident and shows that they had already achieved literary recognition in their homeland prior to deciding to live abroad. For this reason, both books feature protagonists unable to imagine being forced to renounce to their creative careers. At the same time, they both reach the conclusion that, in order to write free from censorship and other political restrictions, they would have to migrate. Migration was the only way out – the ultimate way to react as an intellectual committed to his ideals.

In both books, the theme of exile is treated as something that impacts the Cuban population explicitly. There are references to other diasporas and societies receiving migrants. In both books, travelling – the migratory experience – happens as an organic part of life for citizens of these other nations. It is an inherent aspect of modern life despite the accompanying feelings of loss and cultural longing. In some passages, the protagonists of Estévez's and Díaz's novels affectively identify themselves with other émigrés, especially those coming from ex-communist countries, and consider themselves as "equals" cohabitating in the context of diaspora. In *Inventario*, Estévez extends his narration to a biographic and affective trajectory that leads two men, one Cuban and the other Polish, to be emotionally available for each other during a sentimental encounter in Germany. The Cuban, however, regards himself as less able to aesthetically enjoy the sources of "high culture" provided by his new migratory environment – Germany. The narrator of *Inventario* sees himself as ontologically limited, unable to fully rejoice in the intellectual pleasures that exile makes available for him. It is as if this emotional gap, caused by traumatic displacement, is incurable and has consequences for all of the human condition, including his ability to enjoy the best that a new culture has to offer:

> I only related to a young Polish man who came to see me. [...] He was very young, he had beautiful eyes, as dark with nostalgia as they were mischievous [...] We communicated with gestures, with glances, and with a rather harsh French. I never knew how Walter had ended up here from Gdansk, in whose shipyards he had worked (although I'm sure he must have explained it to me). Instead, I got to know his love [...] for German culture. In this city (he used to say to me in his strange Polish French) the greatest German poets, Hegel and Hölderlin, were born. [...] And I, however, ungrateful and absent, no matter how hard I tried to find an emotion, I remained indifferent to their stories and it did not matter to me that Hölderlin had walked his delirium there. Trying to move, I found only a vigorous sense of loneliness, a strong dose of boredom, the recurring feeling that I was out of place everywhere (Estévez 2004, 332-33).

Both Jesús Díaz and Abilio Estévez share thematic traits with other novels by significant authors of Cuban diasporic literature from the 1990s, such as Daina Chaviano and Zoé Valdés. One of these traits is the element of a sex as a monetary transaction, the commodification of the body as a form of survival and only considered due to the strain of economic scarcity. As John R. Gillis has indicated, the act of remembering allows for a group, relative to time and space, to get a sense of identity and equality, "what is remembered is defined by the assumed identity" (Gillis 1994, 3). These diasporic works not only contribute to the consolidation of an identity for the community outside of the country but also changed the definition of the Cuban nation itself through the creation of spaces of memory for creators and readers alike.

Cuban migratory literature from the 1990s seeks to rewrite the Cuban collective history, manipulated and distorted by government censorship. In the case of Jesús Díaz's novel, *La piel y la máscara*, literary fiction is used to denounce the psychological and creative damage caused by the political censorship while filming *Lejanía*, which Díaz directed in 1985. What Díaz seeks is not vindication for the film but rather to generate a memory of the infinite variations in which the Cuban authorities censured the work of artists and subjected them to surveillance and control by the State. Abilio Estévez's book, *Inventario secreto de La Habana*, creates, in part, a retelling of the author's arrival in exile and the emotional challenges it entails. However, it is also both a recollection of the memories of several generations of the Estévez family in Cuba and a literary reconstruction of the Cuban capital, from its splendid historic past to the shattered and heavily politized present dominated by Castroism.

In both Díaz's and Estévez's books, Havana has enormous importance and satisfies the emotional demands of the Cuban diasporic community. As indicated by Araceli San Martín Moreno and José Luis Muñoz de Baena Simón, the city becomes a theme for global readers in the 1990s:

> There is also a Havana that seems to complete a function of catharsis for those in exile. That Havana has been elaborated through memories, fragments of memories, and with personal topics that pertain to the Cuban imaginary collective. That imagined Havana owes itself, in great part, to the loss of natural readers of the authors and the necessity to *invent* an adequate object for their nostalgia (Rosales Herrera 2011, 134).

Jesús Díaz and Abilio Estévez execute what Rosales Herrera – referring to other Cuban authors of the diaspora – calls "performative acts of memory" (Rosales Herrera 2011, 135). These have a nostalgic element and feature Cuba/Havana as a ubiquitous presence in the backdrop of these dramatic works. For Rosales Herrera, this type of literary device and the recurring reminiscing about a place is a consequence of the existential insecurity that relocation to a new country implies:

> For many Cuban émigré writers, this dynamic reveals itself through a pronounced focus, even a certain fixation, on the native territorial space of Cuba and its historical past, rather than on the exilic reality in which these writers find themselves at the present moment of composition. Yet, paradoxically, it is present reality, and the fear of loss associated with it, that largely commands and exacerbates a focus on Cuban national space (Rosales Herrera 2011, 133).

Both Díaz and Estévez enjoyed great influence in the Cuban intellectual society before going into exile to guarantee their creative and personal survival. As happens with many writers from the Cuban literary diaspora, they share a sense of responsibility for what the model for a post-dictatorial Cuba should be. For James Clifford, having this connection to the nation's destiny constitutes one of the essential conditions required for a sense of community in the diaspora (Clifford 1997).

La piel y la máscara exemplarily shows the type of self-examination associated with Cuban intellectuals who left the island during the nineties. Díaz's novel demonstrates the transition of a Cuban intellectual that actively participated in the political system for the first few decades of the revolution but later embraced exile after becoming disenchanted with the socialist, authoritarian and all-controlling regime. When living outside his native country, the intellectual feels the need to critique his past, and this is precisely the kind of soul searching that generates the novel, *La piel y la máscara*. This is a choral, polyphonic work in which different actors who participated in a film offers a first-person perspective on what happens during the creative process, their personal approach to the history of the film, and how they perform their assigned roles. It is up to the reader to compose the overall story by connecting the various individual perspectives to construct a final version of the story, one which might be closest to what really happened during the filming of *Lejanía* – a reality to which no one would have access if it were not for the characters' subjective retellings.

The novel gives autobiographical elements an allegorical dimension. Díaz uses fiction to document the way in which, years before while filming *Lejanía* in Havana, the State invaded his creative process through the use of censorship and repressive power. The film recounts the story of an exiled Cuban mother living in the United States returning to Havana in the eighties, along with the first group of exiles allowed to enter the country after two decades of being banned from Cuban soil. After all these years had passed, she wants to see and catch up with her children, with whom she did not have prior contact and whom she had abandoned by fleeing the island even though her children were forbidden from leaving the country. This mother returns to Cuba with her niece who left as a small child and is now Cuban-American. The actors of the movie/protagonists of the novel find themselves living in 1990s Cuba – a society in economic and moral ruin, intensified by the end of Soviet assistance.

The director of the film and protagonist of the novel, Oso, embodies an idealist loyal to the Cuban regime during the first few decades of socialism. Díaz's book is paradigmatic in its demonstration of the different political incarnations of an intellectual. In other words, it shows him going from a committed supporter of the State to someone with no faith in the Cuban system. Going through these political stages is a painful process that concludes with a physical escape, dissociation from the Cuban geographical space to search for a future in a democratic country. Focusing on the figure of Oso, the author's alter ego, the novel serves as an update to the "political intimacies" of a lettered man who moves from being a sympathizer and collaborator with the Castro regime to become a fugitive and conscious critic of the repressive political model he left behind. Visions of emigration do not escape this double perspective. What motivates the migrant characters, embodied by the mother and her Cuban-American niece, to revisit the island is an attempt to heal the wounds of nostalgia and to recover lost family ties, dissolved by the geographical and emotional distance between the Cuban emigrants and the family and friends they left behind in Cuba. The characters returning from abroad have been crafting an idealized image of the Cuban community still on the island. However, once they arrive in Cuba, they are shocked to realize that their Cuban family members are surprisingly broken, damaged by material misery, and the kinship ties have been diminished by silence, resentment and the trauma caused by family migration.

In Díaz's novel, there is an ethical need to reveal why he had previously acquiesced to the ideology of the Cuban political power, and how, in the present, this ideology would make one an accomplice in the systematic destruction of any chance to build a more inclusive and democratic nation and society. This is how Oso comments on his artistic endeavors as a film director, assuming that the most urgent contribution to his country is that his film, which denounces the dystopia of the Castro regime, can be carried out despite censorship and political repression:

> It was [the film], among other things, about farewell to a revolution whose successes, already remote, I had vehemently applauded, whose brutalities, excesses and follies I had guiltily kept silent and before which I did not want to appear as a judge, but as a witness, as someone speaking from the vast and difficult territory of the irremediable (Díaz 1996, 23).

The theme of exile is part of what Oso uses to achieve success in his work. He emotionally manipulates the actors so that, when the characters they play have to remember their lives in Cuba before emigrating, Oso can capitalize on their nostalgia for the benefit of his own artistic creation. It does not matter how tragic the genealogy of the Cuban exile might be, with its terrible record on family separation and the high risk of death from leaving in physically dangerous or less conventional ways. This sad memory, related to the Cuban tradition of exile, does not impede Oso from using the nostalgic feelings associated with exile to get the actors under his power to use traumatic pain and emotions for inspiration during the filming of the final scenes of his film. In this way, the effects linked to exile add aesthetic density to his intellectual creation. This is how Iris's character reacts when she sees a place that reminds her of her son who drowned at sea while trying to flee on a raft:

> – "There Omar broke a tooth!" She will shout and only then will she realize that she has evoked the unnamable.
> A deaf silence will show his mistake and then the sea will be seen in the distance and a wave will break on the coast, as now, and we will approach the green mystery and the foam that has covered the image like a dream where the magic phrase will stand out, "a film by", under which I will inscribe my name forever (Díaz 1996, 27).

Oso exploits an emotion well known by thousands of Cuban families and reuses it in a way that turns the actor's well of tears into an aesthetic object that becomes his artistic creation. Díaz's novel attempts to give voice to all the actors in the drama and characters in the book, including a character who is an infiltrated agent of the Cuban secret police. By so doing, he simulates a polyphony that provides a diverse number of individual opinions and perspectives that real Cuban society does not have. Diaz would propose a democratic civil exchange that precedes the kind of civic engagement that Cuban citizens should be allowed to perform. It should not be strange, then, that one of the characters, the actress Ofelia, who plays the mother that abandoned her children when she left the country, shares a vision of exile that focuses on the existential damages and the democratic limitations that the Cuban population has, including the ones who have been able to migrate:

> No, the reproaches did not lead to anything. Why, for example, did the revolution not let them all go, if that was its wish? Why would Iris [the fictional character who returns to Cuba to regain contact with her children] have had to be able to silently endure the destruction of her world in order to preserve her sons, when she could go away with her husband and girl and live as one likes in Miami? Confused, I asked myself the forbidden question. What would I have done in your case? Ten years ago, when it was her turn to decide, I would have stayed in Cuba. For today, however, I would leave without hesitation for a single second, as I intended to do when I had the least opportunity (Díaz 1996, 15).

In the book's present, the best alternative to the immutability of the Cuban authoritarian State is abandoning the country. When Ofelia reconsiders her country's past, the ghost of the dead *balsero* is made visible. In the film that Díaz's novel documents, one of the two sons abandoned by their mother dies by drowning in the sea while attempting to leave Cuba on an improvised raft[2]. His brother, the one that survived by staying in Cuba, destroys all traces of his *balsero* brother. There is neither material nor narrative testimony of his late brother. The novel reveals the disturbing Cainite silence that symbolizes the divide in the Cuban population for people who support or are against those who emigrate to another country, the *Cubans who left us* vs. the *Cubans who stayed*. This is what the actor who plays the role of the brother who stayed in Cuba thinks of his character's act of betrayal against his dead brother:

> It was not credible to me that Omar had taken his things on that excursion where he found death, I wondered where his photos were and I had a sudden revelation. Orestes had burned them along with Omar's clothes, books, and records with the wild joy of one who burns the body of his own brother; but he had not been able to burn his shadow, now interposed like a wall of guilt between my mother and me (Díaz 1996, 107).

[2] "Balsa", in Spanish.

Through his novel, Díaz exposes a collective shame: the way in which the Cuban socjety – until the migratory wave of the 1990s – tried to ignore and erase the memory of emigrants from previous generations, mostly those who left after the rise of the communist regime. Despite this and the fact that the official history tries to silence the history of Cuban emigrants, the ghosts of the *balseros* who died while crossing the Florida strait on their way to Miami continue to return once and again to force characters to accept this trauma as an essential part in the modern history of Cuban society.

In *La piel y la máscara*, thanks to the character Omar's absence, the history of disappeared emigrants and of the deaths and losses generated by emigration in irregular conditions are made apparent. While Omar becomes a symbol, his memory embraced, and his character existing without omission or silence, it can be assumed that this historical and emotional restoration has to assign blame and go through some sort of collective trauma. For that reason, Iris, the character that allegorizes a macabre version of the nation/motherland, who left her children abandoned in Cuba while she moved to Miami, commits suicide. Only from this radical closure of the social wound produced by people pushed into exile can there be some kind of beginning among those citizens who – battered and traumatized in Havana – survive to rebuild the Cuban society of the future. The symbol of the lettered man, the character of Oso, is not included among the community members who should reconstruct the country after the symbolic sacrifice of the mother/motherland. Oso is more preoccupied with creating a powerful testimony of the social horror that he witnessed and in which he is included as a victim of authoritarian power.

If, for a writer like Jesús Díaz, the deep crisis in Cuban society can only gain redemption through the acceptance of a traumatic past that he tries to recognize and highlight, in a book like Abilio Estévez's *Inventario secreto de La Habana*, emigration implies emulating other traditions of international displacement. The narrator of *Inventario* finds himself living in Barcelona as a recent arrival in exile. Part of this experience is told not so much in relation to factual descriptions of the protagonist's journey of economic survival but through stories created by the narrator's psyche, ruminations of his subjectivity. The protagonist's mental wandering correlates to the process of adaptation to his new condition of geographic and emotional wandering:

> You think you know what kind of loneliness could be the most intense. You arrive, for example, in the city of Stuttgart [...] and you discover that nobody is waiting for you. You don't know much English, much less German. You don't have a phone you can turn to. [...] In the subway from Manhattan to Queens... . You have never gotten lost in a city, just that, in this case, we are not talking about a city but New York. You walk and walk, looking for your direction, and the more you want to get closer, the further you go, the more you get lost, just like in dreams (Estévez 2004, 297-98).

For the narrator, life in exile has a condition of a pseudo-reality, where events do not have the same impact as those events and experiences that occurred during his life in Cuba. One of the new elements that Estévez's book brings to the diasporic narratives of the 1990s resides in its cosmopolitan openness. In this way, both Cuban émigrés and readers located in the island can have access to a global experience that citizens of other migrant societies already know and, perhaps, enjoy. However, his celebration of the immigrant experience is only surface level. The protagonist of *Inventario*'s new journey through highly multicultural spaces cause him to become psychologically dispersed, making him forget the purpose of life. This psychological dispersion opens the door to an existential relativism that annihilates what destiny might have in store for those who are lucky enough to have a chance at making their own lives without having to abandon their native country. It is for this reason that memory, the ability to reminisce, starts functioning as a compensatory mechanism against the existential void of his life as an emigrant. The emigrant's lack of cultural roots is compensated by the intimate writing of memories, the history of his family and the reconstruction of the fabulous past of Havana–now irreparably lost.

Jonathan C. Dettman reads *Inventario secreto* as Estévez's scriptural gesture to "reveal Havana's immanent Utopian dimension" (Dettman 2012, 85), as a form of resistance against the Cuban government's transformation of Havana into a kind of gigantic museum for the enjoyment of foreign tourists. For Dettman, Estévez opposes this commercialization of the city through a "memorializing praxis" (Dettman 2012, 85) that mixes fiction and memoir with the actual physicality of the city. On a testimonial level, Estévez intersperses a generational story of his Cuban family with remembrances of Havana's illustrious and astonishing past – all of which occur before the Cuban revolution. Telling the story of his family allows the narrator to demonstrate how the city's past splendor was a consequence of the success and well-being of its inhabitants. If the city is a catastrophe in the present, it is because all that was worth celebrating was annihilated by the Cuban communist regime. Although Havana was visited by illustrious artists and scientists in the past, in the historical present of the city, there are mainly allusions to the *balseros* desperate to escape and the need to avoid authoritarianism and poverty by fleeing the country altogether:

> The sea, the marvelous, warm sea of Havana [...] is at the same time a sea of fear and also of distant promises, or to put it another way, that of escape. The paths of absence, that can also be of death, inevitably pass through the sea. Some friends tell me of how their families, during the Spanish Civil War, left Barcelona walking, arriving at Port Bou, and from there they went to France (Estévez 2004, 19).

As in Díaz's novel, the precarious options available to those wanting to emigrate from Cuba provide a tragic dimension to the story. Moreover, emigration from the island ceases to be a sign of Cuba's political and social exceptionality, rather it has become evidence of a social imbalance serious enough to inflict major damage on other countries' social tissue. By relating the displacement of Cubans who deny the prevailing system to the exiles of the Spanish Civil War, the narrator could be suggesting a potential outcome for Cuba's destiny, one in which the trauma of forced emigration can be alleviated, as evidenced by the present geopolitical environment in which the narrator currently lives. On one occasion, when the narrator is at a bar in Mallorca, he could not avoid looking at two young people being affectionate with one another. While the female customer has physical traits that make him think of her to be a local, the waiter at the bar and the object of the woman's flirtation seems to be originally from North Africa. The narrator wonders and fantasize about the intimate story of that other emigrant he observes from a distance:

> Is it possible that he crossed the strait [of Gibraltar] on an improvised raft ["*patera*"]? Speaking of rafts, of balsas, implies speaking of many things, perhaps among them that jump out are hope, danger, and death. I think that possibly I had not had a clear understanding of a similar risk until those days in 1994 when the sea of Havana was populated with rafts ["*balsas*"] (Estévez 2004, 40).

Estévez's narrator admits how, in a tradition with as many examples of maritime runaways as the Cuban one, he identifies with the exodus of the *balseros* in 1994. Even more explicitly than Díaz's novel, Estévez's book incorporates the "Balsero Crisis" as the defining moment by which only those citizens who did not really have economic means or strength of character remained in Cuba and avoided (or just postponed) joining the diaspora. But even so, those Cuban citizens who decided to remain in the island had plenty of reasons for wanting to leave:

> Those [citizens] that stayed on the beach, believers or not, fell to their knees on the sand. They said their goodbyes and cried. The night began to fall on the *Rincón de Guanabo*.[3] The *balsas* were lost in the night, in that immense enigma that is the sea at night. [...] Those that were not old enough, or did not have courage, decision or opportunity to leave, stayed on the shore a long time, until the night was upon them (Estévez 2004, 69).

In both Díaz and Estévez's works, there is an ethical drive that pushes them to decipher national politics with an almost metaphysical sense ("we, wandering Cubans..." Estévez goes on to say at one point). For them, this prophetic role is embraced as part of the moral duties of intellectuals who were forced to emigrate. They are also concerned about the integrity and political future of the Cuban nation – about which they have a pessimistic view. In this sense, the predictions these storytellers make can be grim. Estévez, for example, refers to an emigrant community broken by some dark resentment, unwilling to rebuild itself despite the fact that

[3] Beach to the east of Havana.

Cuban emigrants share a very strong cultural identity. This example shows his comments on a failed meeting with a Cuban trumpeter in Germany and how there is no possibility of reproducing an effective and functional national community abroad. Paradoxically, it is from a Polish emigrant from whom the narrator receives a compassionate gesture, when the Polish character makes it clear that he understands the quarrels and misunderstandings between migrants who share the same national origin, even within the migratory enclaves that the Cuban population was able to reach:

> I believe that then I heard the trumpet. [...] And what surprised me was the melody, the familiar melody that brought me to another time, to another place, to happiness, and a far-off place (the happier the more distant; the more longed for the more remote). Happiness and a place that I knew were idyllic and for the same reason false, and that in any case I knew more attractive than the real ones (Estévez 2004, 335).

It is through artistic (the music) and affective (the type of sentimentality that the melody awakens) means that the narrator identifies another "equal"/Cuban in the migratory space. Estévez's novel warns its readers that it might be too late for the Cuban society (with a massive population scattered throughout the global diaspora) to rebuild the Cuban national sense of unity. The current Cuban diaspora is determined by the need for individual survival, an existential urgency well known by all emigrants, which prevents a harmonious relationship between Cuban emigrants who meet abroad for the first time:

> He stopped playing [the trumpet]. He looked at us. [...] "*Buenas noches*," I said in Spanish. He didn't respond. "I'm also from Havana," I added and instantly I understood the falsity and ridiculousness of the situation, and, worst of all, I realized that I had made the biggest mistake. Something in his attitude told me. I can't explain it. Violence broke out between us. [...] The trumpeter frowned. He spat with contempt. He turned to the river.
> [...]
> My Polish friend, with his appearance of a forest ranger, a farmer from Reymont, accompanied me with his complicit silence that at times was resolved by a supportive pat on my back. I thought that, for some mysterious reason, he, who was born in Gdansk, so far from Havana, had managed to understand (Estévez 2004, 336-40).

Conclusion

Both Jesús Díaz and Abilio Estévez's novels agree that literature must provide spaces of memory that document the need and relevance of reshaping Cuban cultural identity, which implies the inclusion of cultural productions created by the diasporic community. The writers from Cuba's post-Soviet migratory wave use the literary field as an epistemological tool for rewriting the nation's historical past against the manipulated version drafted by the Cuban officials, to "clarify" passages of Cuban reality and history – such as the traumatic outcome of citizens forced into exile – that have not been publicly accepted by cultural institutions on the island. This assumed civic duty present in Cuban exile literature incorporates the testimonies and the experiences of loss and nostalgia that are distinguishable traits of the migrant narrative. They are books that, through the context of exodus, are guaranteed to be disseminated and shared by a national community that perceives itself as globally relocated, ideologically heterogeneous, and cohesive due to diasporic practices, for which literature serves as one of its main contributors.

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CONCEPTUALISATIONS OF ANGER IN ENGLISH IDIOMS. AN ANALYSIS BASED ON THE EXTENDED CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR THEORY

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Abstract
The article combines the approach to idiom classification according to Langlotz (2006) and the recently suggested analytical framework for figurative language analysis known under the name of the Extended Conceptual Metaphorical Theory (Kövecses 2020). The aim of the article is to identify some of the conceptual pathways of ANGER idioms in English. The analysis of 37 idioms for expressing ANGER revealed that both metaphorical (e.g. *go through/hit the roof*) and metonymic (e.g. *make someone's hackles rise*) motivations play a crucial role in the transparency of the idiomatic meaning. It was also concluded that three image schemas in particular play a crucial role in metaphorical idioms for expressing the concept of ANGER in English: ACTIVITY IS MOTION, INTENSITY OF ACTIVITY IS HEAT and ANGER IS HEAT. However, contrary to the HEAT element, which is particularly salient in linguistic metaphors for expressing ANGER (e.g. *kindle the wrath*), it is the MOTION element which plays the crucial role in the conceptualizations of ANGER in idioms in English (e.g. *go through/hit the roof, flip the lid, fly off the handle*).

Key words
figurative language, idioms, motivation, Conceptual Metaphor Theory, Extended Conceptual Metaphor Theory, metaphor, metonymy

Introduction

The Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) has brought a fresh look at the role figurative language plays in human communication. Freeing figurative devices such as metaphor and metonymy from the monopoly of literary studies, the early proponents of the CMT maintained that "metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 3). Since its birth in the early 1980s, the CMT has branched into several directions. Both the theoretical basis and the scope of possible applications have widened. Among the most notable and influential additions to the original CMT are: Relevance Theory (e.g. Gibbs and Tendahl 2006), Conceptual Blending Theory (e.g. Fauconnier and Turner 2002) and Extended Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Kövecses 2020).The so-called Extended Conceptual Metaphor Theory (ECMT), placed at the end of this non-exhaustive list, can be considered as one of the most recent of these additions. Indeed, as its title already suggests, it considers itself a direct descendant of the original CMT of the 1980s. It builds directly on its notions, enlarging and elaborating its original theoretical framework. The latest version of this framework is presented with much detail in the recently published monograph *Extended Conceptual Metaphor Theory* (Kövecses 2020). However, the monograph is, in fact, a culmination of ideas and procedures, presented in a number of earlier articles (e.g. Kövecses 1995; Kövecses 2015; Kövecses 2017). Given the relative novelty of the proposed theoretical framework of figurative language analysis, not much empirical work has been done which would make use of it, confirming its advantages and revealing its drawbacks. The presented analysis is meant as an initial case study to test the mentioned theoretical framework in order to prove its suitability for the analysis of metaphorical idioms. The results of the study will be later incorporated into a much larger project, involving a greater number of EMOTION idioms in English.

The aim of the article is to establish the conceptual pathways for the conceptualisations of ANGER in a group of selected English idioms, using the theoretical framework suggested by Kövecses (2020). Although the concept of ANGER has already received considerable attention by different linguists (e.g. Matsuki 1995; Mikolajczuk 1998; Gevaert 2002; Maalej 2004), the actual conceptual mappings such as ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER were mostly based on linguistic metaphors such as *the intestines are boiling*, *anger seethes inside the body* or *anger boils the bottom of the stomach* (Kövecses 2010, 200). A comprehensive analysis of conceptual mappings in a thematically homogeneous group of idiomatic expressions has not been presented so far. Such analysis would, hopefully, yield the following results:

- Different types of motivation in ANGER idioms will be explored.
- Conceptual mappings for a group of thematically related idioms will be established. These mappings will then be compared to/contrasted with the corresponding conceptual mappings, obtained from similar analyses of linguistic metaphors on the same topic.
- The theoretical framework for the establishment of conceptual mappings, suggested by Kövecses (2020) will be tested on previously unused material.

The article can be roughly divided into two parts. The first part presents the compositional approach to idioms, which presupposes the internal motivation of idiomatic expressions, and hence their transparency. Also, the main tenets of the ECMT, proposed mainly by Kövecses (2020), will be explained. Differences between the original CMT and the ECMT related to the analytical procedure of figurative language analysis will be highlighted. Finally, the methodological steps of the analysis will be listed. The second part is formed by the actual analysis of 37 idiomatic expressions, extracted from the *Oxford Idiom Dictionary* (2004) and thematically related by the target concept of ANGER. The conclusion of the article is focused not only on the summary of the results of the analysis, but also on the problems and challenges encountered in the course of the analysis.

1. Compositional View of Idioms

Idioms do not form a homogeneous group of linguistic expressions; it is therefore rather tricky to provide a universally applicable definition of idioms. Moreover, the character of the definition is influenced by the perspective adopted by the researcher. Broadly speaking, there are two perspectives of idioms: non-compositional and compositional. The non-compositional view of idioms is historically older; the compositional view is currently espoused by a considerable number of linguists and also forms one of the basic assumptions of the present paper.

Adherents of the non-compositional view maintain that: "the essential feature of an idiom is that its full meaning, and more generally the meaning of any sentence containing an idiomatic stretch, is not a compositional function of the meanings of the idiom's elementary parts" (Katz and Postal 1963, 275). Among the main adherents of the non-compositional view belong generative linguistics, led by Chomsky (e.g. 1980). The compositional view of idioms, on the other hand, maintains that: "some relationship between an idiom's component parts and its stipulated meaning can be discerned" (Cacciari and Tabossi 1993, 17). However, idiom compositionality is a matter of degree. Different linguists propose different classifications of compositional idioms, each based on a different characteristic. For example, Nunberg et al. (1994) divide idioms into broad groups: idiomatically combining expressions (i.e. ICEs) and idiomatic phrases (i.e. IdPs). ICEs (e.g. *take advantage of*) are conventional expressions whose meanings "are distributed among their parts" (Nunberg et al. 1994, 491). In the case of IdPs (e.g. *kick the bucket*), the meaning of the idiom is not distributed among its components. Probably one of the most elaborate contemporary classifications has been proposed by Langlotz (2006).

Langlotz (2006) offers an elaborate classification of idioms, which is fully in line with the cognitive linguistic approach. His aim is to "chart the complex cognitive universe that is encapsulated by idiomatic constructions" (95). His design is based on three characteristics:

- Compositionality, in this case, is defined as "the direct literal contribution of a constituent to the idiomatic meaning" (Langlotz 2006, 111), as in *to shoot a glance*, where the verb *to shoot* is to be interpreted literally.
- Motivation refers to the transparency of the idiomatic meaning. The meaning of an idiom is to be considered transparent if it is possible to make sense of the projections evoked by the idiom.Generally, two types of motivation are being recognized: global motivation refers to overall interplay of the literal meanings of the idiom constituents, while constituental motivation refers to one or more of the idiom constituents having an extra figurative meaning in itself, thus influencing the final interpretation of the idiom. Thus, *rock the boat* is globally motivated because all constituents are to be interpreted figuratively in this particular idiom. However, their meanings are strictly literal. On the other hand, *swallow the bitter* pill displays constituental motivation because the verb "has the lexicalised figurative sense 'accept patiently'" (Langlotz 2006, 113). The figurative sense of the verb is in use also in non-idiomatic constructions.
- Isomorphism means that there is "a one-to-one correspondence between the parts and the semantic value of a compound meaning as a whole" (Geeraerts 1995, 60). For example, in *rock the boat*, "rock" equals "spoil" and "the boat" equals "a comfortable situation".

In relation to the aim of the presented article, the motivation parameter is considered to be crucial. It is the idiom motivation which can be analysed, among other, in terms of the underlying metaphorical mappings. Or, in other words, the motivation for the meaning of an idiom can be very often explained with the help of these metaphorical mappings. Following Langlotz (2006), there are three possible ways to label an idiom according to the motivation parameter: motivated displaying global motivation, motivated displaying constituental motivation and unmotivated..

2. Extended Conceptual Metaphor Theory according to Kövecses (2020)

As has already been foreshadowed in the introductory part of the article, the main source of inspiration as well as of the methodological framework for the analysis can be to a considerable extent attributed to the recently published monograph *Extended Conceptual Metaphor Theory* (2020) by Zoltán Kövecses. It is for this reason that the main tenets of this modern approach to figurative language are presented first. However, a variety of additional sources were needed to conduct the actual analysis.

The main focus of both the original CMT and the new ECMT is figurative language, or, more concretely, conceptual metaphor. However, the notion of the conceptual metaphor itself has been refined not only in the ECMT, but also in other linguistic theories dedicated to the role of figurative language in human communication. Roughly speaking, the notion of conceptual metaphor has been regarded very broadly in the original CMT. A conceptual metaphor was considered to be the result of any conceptual mapping between a source domain and a target domain: "Conceptual metaphors are systematic mappings across conceptual domains: one, domain of experience, the source domain, is mapped onto another domain, the target domain." (Yu 1995, 14). According to Lakoff (1993), "the locus of metaphor is not in language at all, but in the way we conceptualize one mental domain in terms of another" (202). However, no difference was being made between different kinds of these mappings, and, hence, between different kinds of the underlying conceptual metaphors. In later accounts of conceptual metaphor, different bases of conceptual mappings have been identified. For example, Grady (1997) distinguishes between correlation-based, resemblance-based and generic-to-specific metaphors. While the correlation metaphors, such as LOVE IS A JOURNEY, are based on correlations in people's experience (Grady 1997, 13), the resemblance metaphors, such as ACHILLES IS A LION, is based on a shared feature of two different entities (Grady 1997, 223). The so-called generic-to-specific metaphors then refer to cases where the course entity is at the same time a specific part of the more general target entity, such as RISK-TAKING IS GAMBLING (Grady 1997, 225). Additionally, the scope of metaphor research has widened, including not only linguistic metaphors in its analyses, but shifting its attention to e.g. visual metaphors as well (Cienki and Müller 2008; Forceville 2008; Forceville and Urios-Aparisi 2009).

The second important distinction, this time directly related to the new theoretical framework presented above, is the number of levels at which the conceptual mappings take place. While the CMT identified only one level of this kind, the domain level (as in the source domain and the target domain), the ECMT maintains that conceptual mappings are happening at four levels: the level of image schemas, the level of domains, the level of frames and the level of mental spaces. The conceptualisation process, or, in other words, the process of concretisation of abstract entities, is gradual, starting with the least schematic conceptualisation and finishing with the most concrete one. A brief characterisation of each of the levels is given below:

- Image schemas can be described as very basic conceptual structures that determine the meaning of people's experiences. For example, the concept of JOURNEY presupposes a more schematic structure of MOTION.
- Domain is, according to Langacker (1987), a "coherent area of conceptualization" (488) which determines the characterization of linguistic units. Domains are unequivocally conceptually richer than image schemas.
- Frames are even richer than domains, elaborating some of their specific aspects.
- Mental spaces then copy the structure of frames and determine the choice of the actual aspects which will be elaborated in a particular context.

Obviously, the approach makes the identification of conceptual mappings more subtle and less subjective. For example, the linguistic metaphor "to digest an idea" is based on the conceptual metaphor MIND IS A BODY. The concept of BODY is based on the very general image schema of (STRUCTURED) OBJECT. At the domain level, different parts of the body can be used to generate different linguistic metaphors. At the frame level, the chosen body part, DIGESTIVE SYSTEM in this case, is further elaborated, resulting in the above-mentioned linguistic metaphor. The nuances of the actual use of the expression are then subsumed under the mental spaces level.

3. Material

The material for the analysis comprises 37 idiomatic expressions, extracted from the *Oxford Idiom Dictionary* (2004). The dictionary is provided with a theme-based index of idioms. Therefore, a manual extraction, involving the scanning-through of the whole dictionary was not needed. However, it was considered useful to list the pre-selected idioms in a table, providing both their meaning, as presented in the *Oxford Idiom Dictionary* (2004), and various additional notes, mostly related to the regional restrictions of their use or various explanatory comments on their individual components. Interestingly, in the case of several idioms in the following list, possible sources of their motivation are mentioned as well. Marginally, possible variations of some of the idioms are mentioned, too.

4. Method

The method of the presented research project is based on the above-mentioned theoretical frameworks. The preparatory phase starts with a compilation of the initial list of ANGER idioms, based on the *Oxford Idioms Dictionary* (2004). The complete list of the analysed idioms is presented in the table below.

Table 1: ANGER idioms (*Oxford Idiom Dictionary*, 2004)

Idiom	Meaning
1. a **red** rag to a bull	an object, utterance, or act which is certain to provoke or anger someone
2. **bent** out of shape	angry or agitated
3. blow a **gasket**	suffer a leak in a gasket of an engine/lose your temper
4. **blow** your top	lose your temper
5. breathe **fire**	be fiercely angry

6. **count** to ten	count to ten under your breath in order to prevent yourself from reacting angrily to something.
7. do/lose your **nana**	lose your temper
8. do your **nut**	be extremely angry or agitated
9. **fit** to be tied	very angry
10. **flip** your lid	suddenly go mad or lose your self-control
11. **fly** off the handle	lose your temper suddenly and unexpectedly
12. **froth/foam** at the mouth	be very angry
13. get off your **bike**	become annoyed
14. get on someone's **quince**	irritate or exasperate someone
15. get on someone's **wick**	annoy someone
16. get your **dander** up	lose your temper, become angry
17. give someone the hairy **eyeball**	stare at someone in a disapproving or angry way, especially with your eyelids partially lowered.
18. give someone the **pip**	make someone irritated or depressed
19. go **crook**	lose your temper, become angry/become ill
20. go **non-linear**	become very excited or angry, especially about a particular obsession
21. go **spare**	become extremely angry or distraught.
22. go through/hit the **roof**	(of prices or figures) reach extreme or unexpected heights; become exorbitant/suddenly become very angry
23. have/get a **cob** on	be annoyed or in a bad mood
24. have a **cow**	become angry, excited, or agitated
25. have **steam** coming out of your ears	be extremely angry or irritated
26. have/get your **monkey** up	be angry
27. **hot** under the collar	angry, resentful, or embarrassed
28. keep your **shirt** on	don't lose your temper, stay calm
29. lose your **rag**	lose your temper

30. make someone's **hackles** rise	make someone angry or indignant
31. make your **blood** boil	infuriate you
32. put someone's **nose** out of joint	upset or annoy someone
33. **rattle** someone's cage	make someone feel angry or annoyed, usually deliberately
34. **rub** someone (up) the wrong way	irritate or repel someone
35. see **red**	become very angry suddenly
36. **spit** blood	be very angry
37. vent your **spleen**	give free expression to your anger or displeasure

The actual analysis starts with the division of the selected idioms into motivated and unmotivated, according to Langlotz's (2006) approach. Additionally, motivated idioms are further divided into globally motivated and constituentally motivated. The results are again summarized in the table below:

Table 2: Motivation evaluation of ANGER idioms according to Langlotz (2006)

Motivation	**Idioms**
MOTIVATED (GLOBAL MOTIVATION)	• a red rag to a bull • blow a gasket • blow your top • breathe fire • count to ten • flip your lid • fly off the handle • froth/foam at the mouth • give someone a hairy eyeball • go through/hit the roof • hot under the collar • keep your shirt on • lose your rag • lose your temper • make someone's hackles rise • make your blood boil • put someone's nose out of joint • rattle someone's cage • rub someone up the wrong way • see red

	• spit blood • vent your spleen
MOTIVATED (CONSTITUENTAL MOTIVATION)	none
UNMOTIVATED	• fit to be tied • have/get your monkey up
PROBLEMATIC CASES	• bent out of shape (motivated - global motivation/unmotivated) • do/lose your nana (motivated - constituental motivation/unmotivated) • do your nut (motivated - constituental motivation/unmotivated) • get off your bike (motivated - global motivation/unmotivated) • get on someone's quince (motivated - constituental motivation/unmotivated) • get on someone's wick (motivated - constituental motivation/unmotivated) • get your dander up (motivated - constituental motivation/unmotivated) • give someone the pip (motivated - constituental motivation/unmotivated) • go crook (constituental motivation)/unmotivated) • go non-linear (motivated - constituental motivation/unmotivated) • go spare (motivated - constituental motivation/unmotivated) • have/get a cob on (motivated - constituental motivation/unmotivated) • have a cow (motivated - constituental motivation/unmotivated)

According to Langlotz (2006), only motivated idioms can be further analysed in terms of their underlying metaphors. However, the table above reveals that deciding whether an idiom's meaning is motivated or unmotivated may not be a straightforward procedure. In the case of 13 (out of 37) analysed idioms the decision depends on a number of various factors. These idioms are presented in the last row of the table as PROBLEMATIC CASES. This issue will be elaborated on in the following section of the article. The evaluation revealed 3 unmotivated idioms. The total of 22 idioms, labelled unequivocally as metaphorically motivated, became the subject of further analysis based on Kövecses (2020) framework.

The framework revealed a consistent patterning in the case of 11 (out of 22) idioms: *blow a gasket, blow your top, breathe fire, flip your lid, fly off the handle, froth/foam at the mouth, go through/hit the roof, hot under the collar, make your blood boil, spit blood, vent your spleen*. These idioms display a common image-schematic basis; the differentiation then takes place at lower levels of conceptualisation (i.e. domain, frame and mental space level). The following table summarizes the results of the analysis. The details of the procedure will be discussed in the following section of the article.

Table 3: Analysis of ANGER idioms (*Oxford Idiom Dictionary*, 2004) according to Kövecses (2020)

Image schema	• ACTIVITY IS MOTION • INTENSITY OF ACTIVITY IS HEAT • ANGER IS HEAT
Domain	• THE AFFECTED PERSON IS A CONTAINER • THE OBJECT CAUSING ANGER HEATS THE CONTENTS OF THE CONTAINER • THE HEATED CONTENTS OF THE CONTAINER QUICKLY LEAVE THE CONTAINER
Frame	• DIFFERENT KINDS OF CONTAINER • DIFFERENT KINDS OF CONTAINER CONTENTS • DIFFERENT KINDS OF OBJECTS
Mental space	• *blow a gasket* • *blow your top* • *breathe fire* • *flip your lid* • *fly off the handle* • *froth/foam at the mouth* • *go through/hit the roof* • *hot under the collar* • *make your blood boil* • *spit blood* • *vent your spleen*

5. Discussion of results

In the previous section, the analysis of the selected group of idioms was presented. However, it is important to note that the analysis was far from straightforward. A considerable number of problems have occurred in the course of the analysis. As a matter of fact, this was one of the main, yet underlying, aims of the presented research project. As has already been pointed out, although the Extended Conceptual Theory (Kövecses 2020) is now a fully-fledged linguistic framework for figurative language analysis, the number of its applications remains limited due to its relative novelty. It is therefore crucial to identify the possible hitches in actual applications in order to refine the framework as much as possible. Additionally, the idea to apply the framework to idioms as a special kind of figurative expressions has not been fully addressed yet.

5.1. Difficulties in Establishing Conceptual Pathways for ANGER Idioms

As the results presented in the section above show, it is indeed possible to apply the framework, suggested by Kövecses (2020) to idioms. However, considerable pre-processing of the selected material is necessary. First of all, not all idioms classify as metaphorical. Simply put, only motivated idioms can be analysed in terms of their underlying metaphorical mappings, although not always. In the presented analysis of 37 idioms, 22 idioms have been labelled unequivocally as motivated, in accordance with Langlotz's (2006) definition of motivation. It was also concluded that 13 idioms might under certain conditions, which will be discussed further below, classify as motivated. Only 3 idioms were considered unmotivated in the presented analysis. In order to avoid further complications, the initial set of idioms, which became the input of the actual analysis in terms of the Kövecses' (2020) framework, was limited to those labelled unequivocally as motivated. The analysed motivated idioms were: *a red rag to a bull*, *blow a gasket*, *blow your top*, *breathe fire*, *count to ten*, *flip your lid*, *fly off the handle*, *froth/foam at the mouth*, *give someone a hairy eyeball*, *go through/hit the roof*, *hot under the collar*, *keep your shirt on*, *lose your rag*, *lose your temper*, *make someone's hackles rise*, *make your blood boil*, *put someone's nose out of joint*, *rattle someone's cage*, *rub someone up the wrong way*, *see red*, *spit blood*, *vent your spleen*.

The kinds of motivation of these idioms differ. In terms of Langlotz's (2006) terminology, the idioms *a red rag to a bull* and *see red* display an emblematic motivation, or, in other words, the transparency of their meanings is based on certain culture related schemas (i.e to bullfighting in this case).

The idiom *count to ten* might be attributed to a metonymic motivation, where the activity of counting to ten stands for waiting and thus gaining distance from a conflicting situation. Similarly, the idiom *give someone a hairy eyeball* can also be regarded as metonymic, as the action described in the idioms stands for a certain kind of look, typically associated with disapproval or anger. The case seems to be the same with the idioms: *keep your shirt on*, *make someone's hackles rise*, *put someone's nose out of joint*, *rattle somebody's cage* and *rub someone up the wrong way*. The common feature of these idioms is that they denote activities, either of causing someone's anger (*make someone's hackles rise*, *put someone's nose out of joint*, *rattle someone's cage*) or expressing it (*count to ten*, *give someone a hairy eyeball*). At the same time, the idioms describe very specific actions, which can be regarded as standing for more general ones, i.e. those of causing or expressing anger. The underlying motivation of this group of idioms might therefore be labelled as metonymic.

The last type of motivation identified in the analysed set of idioms is metaphorical motivation. In total, 13 idioms were attributed unequivocally metaphorical motivation: *blow a gasket*, *blow your top*, *breathe fire*, *flip your lid*, *fly off the handle*, *froth/foam at the mouth*, *go through/hit the roof*, *hot under the collar*, *lose your rag*, *lose your temper*, *make your blood boil*, *spit blood*, *vent your spleen*. These idioms can be divided into two groups, each based on a different image schema. As determined in the analysis above, 11 out of 13 idioms seem to be based on the combination of the following image schemas: ACTIVITY IS MOTION, INTENSITY OF ACTIVITY IS HEAT, ANGER IS HEAT. The INTENSITY OF ACTIVITY IS HEAT image schema is actually a primary metaphor (Grady 1997), the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS HEAT has already been identified by a number of scholars (e.g. Lakoff 1980; Yu 1995). The ACTIVITY IS MOTION image schema can be seen as a modification of the primary metaphor ACTION IS SELF-PROPELLED MOTION, also identified by Grady (1997). What seems to be new here, is the combination of the MOTION and the HEAT element in relation to the examined concept of ANGER. The actual conceptual mapping, happening at the domain level, can be described as follows: the situation involves three elements, i.e. the person getting angry, the object that causes anger and the action of getting angry/causing anger. The person getting angry can be described by means of the CONTAINER metaphor, or, in other words, the person can be viewed as a container of whatever kind, full of contents of whatever kind as well. Anger in this case is viewed as motion or as an entity making the contents of the container move. When the motion reaches a certain intensity, the contents burst out of the container. The element of MOTION seems to be central to each of the 11 idioms, which seems partly in contrast to the already identified conceptual mappings of metaphorical expressions related to the emotion of anger, which seem to highlight the HEAT element: *kindle the anger/wrath*, *spark anger*, *burn with rage* or *be ablaze* (Charteris-Black 2017). Although the HEAT element is also present in the analysed idioms in the form of the concept of INTENSITY, the conceptual pathways identified in these idioms seem rather to highlight the MOTION element. It can be therefore concluded that the present analysis, based on the Kövecses' (2020) framework, revealed two things: first, that the framework employed probably leads to more subtle and precise conclusions regarding the identification of the conceptual pathways of figurative expressions in general, and second, that idioms can be built on different parts of the image schemas, which they share with their metaphoric counterparts.

5.2. Difficulties in the Evaluation of Idiom Motivation

In this section, difficulties in deciding whether the meaning of an idiom can be considered motivated or not will be discussed. This issue has already been foreshadowed in the previous parts of the article. The idioms which pose problems are: *bent out of shape*, *do/lose your nana*, *do your nut*, *get off your bike*, *get on someone's quince*, *get on someone's wick*, *get your dander up*, *give someone the pip*, *go crook*, *go non-linear*, *go spare*, *have/get a cob on*, *have a cow*.

The common feature of these idioms is that they are regionally bound, or, in other words, that they originate or are in wider use only in certain varieties of English. The original regional affiliation is manifested in the lexis of some of these idioms: *do/lose your nana*, *do your nut*, *get on somebody's quince*, *get on somebody's wick*, *go crook*, *go spare*. For example, given that "nana" is Australian slang term for "head", constituental motivation can be assigned to this idiom. The question remains whether this constituental motivation remains in force when the idiom is used by speakers of other varieties of English. If the slang word "nana" is unknown to them, the idiom might classify as unmotivated. The case might be the same with the other regionally bound idioms of the group listed above (consider e.g. the word "nut" in *do you nut*, "quince" in *get on someone's quince* or "crook" in *go crook*).

The constituental motivation seems therefore to be a fairly complex phenomenon, which is, at least to a certain extent, dependent on the ability of the conceptualizer to decipher the kind of contribution of the individual lexical constituents of the idiom

Conclusion

The presented research was focused on a group of ANGER idioms and their underlying conceptual mappings, using a recently proposed framework of figurative language analysis (Kövecses 2020), which distinguishes four levels of conceptualisation (image schema, domain, frame, mental space) in contrast to the one-level conceptualisation, used in the Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). The aim of the research was to identify the conceptual mappings of the selected idioms with the help of this framework in order to find out whether the framework is suitable for analyses of this kind.

The proposed framework is designed to identify the underlying conceptual pathways of metaphorical expressions, hence first the motivations of the initial set of 37 idioms had to be determined. For this purpose, the definition of motivation according to Langlotz (2006) was employed. It was concluded that the meaning of 22 idioms can be considered motivated without doubt whereas the meaning of 13 idioms can be considered motivated under certain conditions. Only 3 idioms were labelled unequivocally as unmotivated. Based on the above-mentioned proportions, motivation might be regarded as a considerably salient feature of idiomatic expressions. However, although the definition of idioms seems fairly straightforward, the actual evaluation might pose certain problems. In Langlotz's

(2006) terms, it is the constituental motivation, i.e. motivation based the figurative/more marked meaning of one/more of the constituents of an idiom, which might render the meaning of an idiom less transparent for both native and non-native speakers of English. For example, the meanings of *do/lose your nana* or and *go spare* are based on the slang meaning of "nana" and "spare", which, additionally, are strongly regionally bound (in this case to Australian English).

The motivated idioms were divided into three groups, according to the types of motivation they displayed. The results of this division are: 2 idioms display emblematic motivation (*like a red rag to a bull*, *see red*), 7 idioms display metonymic motivation (*count to ten*, *give someone a hairy eyeball*, *make someone's hackles rise*, *put someone's nose out of joint*, *rattle someone's cage*, *rub someone up the wrong way*), 13 idioms display metaphoric motivation (*blow a gasket*, *blow your top*, *breathe fire*, *flip your lid*, *fly off the handle*, *froth/foam at the mouth*, *go through/hit the roof*, *hot under the collar*, *lose your rag*, *lose your temper*, *make your blood boil*, *spit blood*, *vent your spleen*).

The vast majority of the metaphorical idioms seem to fit a common pattern. The conceptualisation starts at the very schematic image schema level (ACTIVITY IS MOTION, INTENSITY OF ACTIVITY IS HEAT, ANGER IS HEAT), proceeds to the domain level (THE AFFECTED PERSON IS A CONTAINER, THE OBJECT CAUSING ANGER HEATS THE CONTENTS OF THE CONTAINER, THE HEATED CONTENTS OF THE CONTAINER QUICKLY LEAVE THE CONTAINER) and further to the frame level (DIFFERENT TYPES OF CONTAINERS, such as e.g. body or covered container), DIFFERENT TYPES OF CONTAINER CONTENTS, such as e.g. blood or inflammable substance), DIFFERENT KINDS OF OBJECTS). However, neither the subjects nor the contents of the container are lexicalized in English idioms for expressing ANGER. It is the MOTION element which seems to be the most prominent aspect of the conceptualisation (consider verbs such as *blow*, *fly*, *flip*, *foam*, *hit*, *spit* and *vent*).

The presented analysis has been obviously conducted on a limited amount of material. The conclusions based on the idioms extracted from *Oxford Idioms Dictionary* (2004) seem to be fairly unambiguous, however, a more extensive analysis is needed in order to be able to identify the governing pathways of conceptualising ANGER in English idioms. A sketchy comparison with material provided by *NTC's Thematic Dictionary of American Idioms* (1997) partly confirms the above-mentioned conclusions (consider e.g. *blow a fuse*, *blow one's cork*, *blow one's stack*, *blow up*, *hit the ceiling*, *let off steam*, *blow off steam*, *pop one's cork*). However, other idioms seem to foreground the HEAT element (e.g. *burn with a low blue flame*, *have a low boiling point*). It is therefore clear that a more thorough analysis is needed in order to fully establish the conceptual mappings of ANGER idioms in English. However, the presented procedure based on Langlotz (2006) and Kövecses (2020) seems promising to achieve this purpose.

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FACTORS INFLUENCING THE COMPREHENSION OF CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURES BY NATIVE AND NON-NATIVE SPEAKERS OF ENGLISH: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY INSPIRED BY BOUTON'S (1988)

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Abstract

The main goal of the present study has been to examine implicature comprehension in native and foreign/second language speakers of English from different linguistic backgrounds. The project was inspired by an earlier work of Bouton (1988), whose objective was to measure the influence of cultural background on the ability to grasp implied meanings in English, by comparing native and non-native speakers' performance. A modified digital version of the original multiple-choice test (Bouton 1988) was used to collect the data. Gricean (1989) theory of conversational implicature served as a theoretical framework for the study. The quantitative analysis of the data collected from the speakers of 33 languages was compared against the original results and the scope of the analysis was expanded to incorporate the examination of other factors affecting implicature understanding in native and non-native languages. The present results corroborate some of the earlier findings and suggest that language competence and cultural background are crucial factors in understanding implicated meanings.

Key words

conversational implicature, implicature comprehension, L2 pragmatic competence, Grice, intercultural communication, conversational maxims

Introduction

In everyday conversations speakers often prefer to express their thoughts in an indirect way for the purposes of achieving certain communicative effects, as well as out of politeness considerations. Thus, it is often the case that the meaning of what is being communicated by linguistic stimuli in context goes beyond what the words used in a particular sequence conventionally convey. According to a philosopher of language Paul Grice (1975), getting the speaker meaning calls for inference in addition to mere decoding. The meaning obtained via inferential reasoning is known as *implicature*, the cornerstone concept for the present study.

While it used to be assumed that certain mechanisms of implicature production and derivation are universal in nature and are shared by all people regardless of the language they speak, studies by Keenan (1976) and Bouton (1988) have shown that the way implied meaning is conveyed often seems to be defined by certain cultural and linguistic norms of a community. Therefore, in the cases of intercultural communicative exchanges, communicating implicit import might create problems and implicatures could sometimes not get through as intended, which might lead to misunderstandings.

One of the pioneering studies on implicature comprehension by people from various cultural backgrounds was conducted in 1988 by Bouton. The results revealed significant differences in understanding implicatures between native and non-native speakers of English, which was ascribed to the influence of cultural differences. The author, however, did not analyse some other probable factors affecting the ability to comprehend implicated meaning, for instance the impact of L2 proficiency level.

The main goal of the present study (which constitutes a part of the unpublished MA thesis by Kavetska, 2020) has been to examine implicature comprehension by non-native speakers of English from different L1 backgrounds and analyse various factors which influence the understanding of implied meanings. The project was inspired by the earlier work of Bouton (1988): a modified version of the original multiple-choice test was used to collect the data. The scope of the study was expanded by involving participants from many more linguistic backgrounds than in the original research. Additionally, the test was translated into German and administered to a small group of German native speakers to measure the success rate of implicature comprehension in L1 against L2.

1. Theoretical basis of the study

The term *implicature* was coined by Grice (1975) in an attempt to account for the fact that speakers often communicate more than the conventional linguistic meaning of the sentence used. On his construal, speakers are taken to be rational agents trying to make their contributions appropriate to the conversation in which they are engaged (Gricean co-operative principle). Implicatures are generated when conversational maxims (defined as communication standards related to Quality, Quantity, Relevance and Manner, see Grice 1975), are blatantly flouted: recipients then infer the speaker-intended meaning from the general principles (maxims) of communication and co-operation and the non-linguistic features of a given communicative situation (Grice 1989)[1].

Inferential reasoning employed in implicature comprehension is believed to be a universal skill, and pragmatic inferencing in L2 is assumed to proceed essentially in the same way as in L1 (Foster-Cohen 2000). However, a number of studies in second language pragmatics reveal that certain social and cultural factors influence L2 pragmatic competence and frame certain aspects of speakers' communicative behaviour (e.g. Carrell 1979; Taguchi 2005; Taguchi et al. 2013; Roever et al. 2014; Taguchi & Kim 2018). It has also been shown that cultural background impacts implicature processing in L2 (Bouton 1988, 1992). The pioneering investigation into implicature comprehension by non-native speakers of English, which inspired the present research, was conducted by Bouton (1988).

2. Bouton's (1988) study

Bouton's (1988) original observation was that misunderstandings that arise in intercultural communicative contexts are frequently caused by differences in the perception of the world and discourse norms of the participants with different L1 backgrounds. These can lead to a failure in deriving the speaker-intended meaning, especially when an implicature is involved. In his 1988 paper Bouton refers to Keenan's (1976) findings, which motivated his research. Keenan (1976) had observed that in Malagasy society (an ethnic group on Madagascar), participants of a conversation are not expected to adhere to the maxim of Quantity, "make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)" (Grice 1975: 45) and often "provide less information than is required by their conversational partner, even though they have access to the necessary information" (Keenan 1976: 70). For instance, when asked about the whereabouts of one's mother, a Malagasy can reply that she is either at home or at the market, which will be taken by a western audience to implicate that the speaker lacks exact information. However, this implicature is not actually generated by Malagasians, as the expectation of the speaker's being as informative as needed is not a Malagasy norm. Thus, Bouton (1988) reached a conclusion that misunderstandings that arise in intercultural communicative contexts are frequently caused by differences in the perception of social functions and discourse norms of the participants with different L1 backgrounds and set out to examine the extent to which cultural background affects the ability to understand conversational implicatures.

[1] For a more detailed account of implicature theory, see Levinson 1983; Levinson 2000; Thomas 1995; Wharton 2002; Potts 2005; Huang 2014; Zufferey et al. 2019. A different perspective on implicature, which cannot be dealt with here as it goes beyond the scope of the present paper, is offered in relevance theory, see Sperber & Wilson 1986; Jodłowiec 2015; Yus 1999; Padilla-Cruz 2013.

In order to investigate implicatures in cross-cultural communicative contexts, Bouton (1988) designed a multiple-choice implicature comprehension test. In the initial stage of the test development, a series of situations in which an interlocutor conveys a message through a conversational implicature based on flouting one of the Gricean maxims were given to native speakers of American English (NSs) and a group of non-native English speakers (NNSs). Each scenario was followed by a question about the implicature, asking the participants to explain what was meant. The most popular interpretations provided by NSs became the *expected response* in the multiple-choice test, with distractors based on the most frequent NNSs' responses.

Below is an example item from the test, based on the violation of the Relevance maxim:

(1) Two roommates are talking. David has just been talking on the telephone to a woman that he was going to take to see a play.
David: Darn it! Mandy just broke our date for the play. Now I've got two tickets for Saturday night and no one to go with.
Mark: Hey, David. Have you ever met my sister? She's coming down to see me this weekend.
David: No, I don't think so. Why?

What was Mark's reason for mentioning that his sister was coming?
(a) Mark is just thinking ahead to the weekend and can't remember whether David has met his sister or not. *(Literal interpretation)*
(b) There is nothing Mark can do to help his friend, so he is mentioning a problem of his own.
(c) Mark is suggesting that David take Mark's sister to the play. *(Expected interpretation.)*
(d) Mark wants to be sure that David knows that the woman he is with this weekend is his sister and not a new girlfriend.

The test consisting of 33 items was compiled and administered to 436 NNSs, all international students entering a US university, whose competence in English was homogeneous and corresponded roughly to B2 level as measured by the TOEFL test. Six cultural groups were represented: Germans, Spanish/Portuguese, Taiwan Chinese, Mainland Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese. The NS group comprised 28 Americans.

Having conducted the quantitative and qualitative analyses of the data, Bouton (1988) concludes that there are considerable differences in NSs' and NNSs' interpretations of implicatures, as well as variation among the different cultural groups involved. He notes that the extent to which failure in detecting implicated message by NNSs is attributable to cultural background rather than insufficient language proficiency needs further investigation. Another question left unanswered is whether non-American NSs of English (the British, Canadians, Australians, etc.) would all interpret implicatures in the same way, i.e. whether there is "a cultural heritage common to English NSs in various parts of the world" (Bouton 1988: 195). An attempt to resolve these issues, as well as to partially replicate the original study, expanding the scope of analysis by involving a more varied pool of participants and investigating the influence of some other factors on implicature comprehension, were the main incentives for the present research.

3. A cross-cultural study on implicature comprehension: 30 years after Bouton

3.1. Method, data collection and participants

The original multiple-choice instrument had to be modified for the purposes of the present study, partially due to practical reasons, as Bouton's (1988) original test is not accessible in its full version: only 12 original test items could be found in Bouton's work[2]. Five more scenarios (modelled on the retrieved items) were added to balance the distribution of the various types of implicatures. They were: an item involving understated negative evaluation (which will be explained in some detail below), infringing the maxim of Quantity, two items comprising ironic implicatures based on flouting the Quality maxim, one communicative situation involving an implicature arising from flouting the maxim of Manner and one based on flouting Relevance.

The test consisted of 17 items focused on implicatures and 3 extra added as distractors, so altogether there were 20 items to be responded to in addition to an initial section on demographic information: age, gender, L1, the experience of living in an English-speaking country, field of education/occupation. The maximum score was 17.

The study was conducted digitally: the link to the test hosted on a Google forms platform was sent directly to each prospective respondent (accessed via the author's personal social network). The potential participants were selected based on their proficiency level: only native speakers of English and those with the command of English at least B2 CEFR level (self-assessed) were asked to take the test. The aim was to get as many cultural backgrounds represented as possible.

161 participants: 139 NNSs, representing 30 different L1 backgrounds and three (self-assessed) proficiency levels – B2, C1, C2; and 22 NSs from different English-speaking countries took part in the test as volunteers. Most of the respondents were international students based in Germany in the academic year 2019-2020. The ages ranged between 18 and 36 years, and the respondents came from various educational and occupational fields, from Electrical Engineering to Philosophy. Additionally, a group of 26 German native speakers took the German version of the test (see 3.2.3) in order to compare their scores in L2 and native language.

Here is a page from the test:

[2] The original text published in *World Englishness* does not include the full test battery and, to the best of my knowledge, it is not available in any other printed source. The author is no longer alive, so I could not access the original multiple-choice instrument.

Fig. 1: The design of the webpage containing the implicature comprehension test


1
Susan and Mei-ling are roommates and are getting ready to go to class together.

Mei-ling: Is it very cold out this morning?
Susan: It's August.

What is Susan saying? * 1 point

- It'll be nice and warm today. Don't worry.
- Yes, even though it's August, it's very cold out.
- It's so warm for this time of year that it seems like August.
- Yes, we're sure having crazy weather, aren't we?

It was estimated that the questionnaire would take approximately 15 minutes to fill out. An internet-based format made it possible to create a visually appealing test layout, as well as fast and easy test distribution. Digital record of the responses also meant that the quantitative analysis could be conducted relatively easily. On the downside, since the test was anonymous and there was no need for the subjects to send their responses back to me individually, several persons seem to have chosen the options at random, possibly without reading the questions, as their scores looked unrealistically low. These scores were disregarded as unreliable.

In order to establish possible cross-cultural differences in interpreting implicatures, the participants were grouped into 7 cultural clusters:

Table 1: Cultural groups based on participants' L1

Cultural group	№ of participants	L1 language
Slavic	55	Russian, Ukrainian, Polish, Czech, Slovak, Slovene, Bulgarian, Macedonian
Chinese	7	Chinese, Mandarin, Cantonese
Desi	19	Hindi, Punjabi, Urdu, Malayalam, Tamil, and Assamese
German	21	German
Roman	24	Spanish, Catalonian, Italian, Portuguese, Romanian, and French
NSs	22	British, American, New Zealand and Australian Englishes
Others	13	Albanian, Hebrew, Norwegian, Turkish, Swedish, Dutch – too few in number for a distinct group to be created

3.2. Data analysis and discussion of the results

3.2.1. NNSs' vs NSs' performance

On average, the NNSs scored lower, with the mean success rate of 76%, than NSs (84%), although the difference is much smaller than in Bouton's (1988) study, where the proportions of successful answers were 62% and 85%, respectively.

The difference between Bouton's (1988) and present results can be attributed to the fact that, unlike in Bouton's study, where the NNSs' level was B2, the majority of my participants assessed their level in English as C1 (58 respondents) or C2 (71 respondents). Only 28 respondents in the present study marked their level in English as B2. The average test scores of the participants with different English proficiency levels are represented in the table below.

Table 2: The average results (raw and as a percentage) on the implicature understanding test for native and non-native speakers of English with different proficiency levels in Bouton's and present studies

Level	Present results: Average score (out of 17)	Bouton's results: Average score (out of 33)	Present results: % of correct answers	Bouton's results: % of correct answers
B2	12.39	20.75	72.89	62.8
C1	13.22	---	77.79	---
C2	13.60	---	80.03	---
NSs	14.38	28.25	84.56	85.6

The obtained results suggest that L2 proficiency level does influence the ability to comprehend an implicated message, with a threshold at C1 level, where the difference between native and non-native speakers' ability to interpret implicatures becomes negligible. This is consistent with Taguchi's at al. (2013) and Roever's (2005) conclusions. As Zufferey et al. (2019: 203) hypothesise, the problems of lower-level English users with identifying implicated meanings may sometimes stem from the fact that, unable to see the significance of a certain explicit content in context, they assume that their L2 competence is insufficient, so they give up and do not engage in the inferential reasoning needed to get the implicature.

Additionally, many of the present study respondents reported having lived in an English-speaking country, whereas Bouton's NNSs had only entered the USwhen his research was conducted. Although this issue needs further investigation, the present data align with Bouton's later findings (1992) that the experience of living in an English-speaking country and frequent contact with NSs improve the ability to interpret implicatures.

3.2.2. The most challenging implicatures for different cultural groups

The percentage distribution of successful (i.e. *expected*) responses across the different cultural groups is presented below. The scores were grouped based on the maxim flouted, with some subtypes revealing interesting interpretation tendencies selected for further analysis.

Table 3: The proportions of successful answers to the items involving different types of conversational implicatures across seven cultural clusters [%]

Implicature type	Germ	Slav	Desi	Chin	Rom	Other	NSs	Overall
1. Quantity	82.76	75.41	30.00	71.43	69.23	57.14	79.17	**69.61**
1.1. Understated negative evaluation	68.97	63.93	43.33	57.14	61.64	57.14	65.28	**61.51**
2. Quality	100.0	98.36	75.00	100.0	92.31	100.0	100.0	**95.58**
2.1. Irony	87.36	79.78	51.67	71.43	79.49	76.19	76.39	**76.80**
3. Manner	82.76	78.69	72.50	85.71	78.85	85.71	91.67	**81.77**
4. Relevance	90.80	85.79	68.33	76.19	82.69	79.76	91.67	**84.16**
4.1. Pope Q	100.0	90.16	65.00	71.43	96.15	100.0	100.0	**91.16**
Overall test score	**86.41**	**80.42**	**59.41**	**73.95**	**78.51**	**76.89**	**84.56**	

In general, implicatures based on flouting the Quantity maxim caused most problems (31% of misinterpretations across the whole sample). In this category, recovering implicatures involving “understated negative evaluation” (1.1 in the table) proved to be the most challenging, even for NSs. This type of implicature arises in situations when somebody is asked for their opinion about something, and the person avoids direct criticism by commenting on the features that are totally insignificant for the evaluated object. Failing to provide the requested information implicates a negative opinion. Following Bouton’s (1988) approach, it is classified here as related to the maxim of Quantity, even though it can be viewed as infringing Relevance just as well.

An example scenario used in a test item follows:

(2) Two women are at a fashionable party. They are wearing beautiful long dresses and expensive dress shoes.
Chloe: Wow, Jane. I love your shoes! They’re wonderful. What do you think of mine?
Jane: They look comfortable.

Two more communicative situations used in the test relied on this kind of processing. Below is the most challenging item in the test with the distribution of answers chosen across all groups.

(3) Two teachers are talking about a student's term paper.
Mr Ranger: Have you read Mark's term paper on modern pirates?
Mr Ryan: Yes. I read it last night.
Mr Ranger: What did you think of Mark's term paper?
Mr Ryan: I thought it was well typed.
How did Mr. Ryan like Mark's term paper?

Table 4: The percentages of participants in different cultural groups opting for different interpretations of the understated criticism test item [%]

	Germ	Slav	Desi	Chin	Rom	Other	NSs
(a) He liked the paper: he thought it was good.	13.79	19.67	25.00	0.00	15.38	50.00	16.67
(b) He thought it was certainly well typed.	20.69	4.92	35.00	0.00	11.54	0.07	16.67
(c) He thought it was a good paper; he did like the form, though not the content.	27.59	42.62	25.00	42.86	42.31	14.29	29.17
>> (d) He didn't like it.	37.93	32.79	15.00	57.14	30.77	35.71	45.83

As can be seen, one of the most popular distractors to be chosen was (c), in which, although acknowledging that Mr. Ryan did not like the content of the student's term paper, the respondents assumed that he nevertheless liked the paper, evidently failing to discern the criticism. It is worth noting that the percentage of respondents opting for the (downright inappropriate) literal interpretation in the two items was the highest among the Desi group, who had major problems also with getting irony.

Another communicative scenario in this category was based on a famous Gricean example of the reference letter for a philosophy position candidate, whose regular attendance in class and good command of English are listed as the applicant's outstanding qualities, manifestly implicating that he is not suitable for a job in academia. Overall, about 59% of the NNSs and 60% of the NSs did well on the items involving understated negative evaluation in the present study. In contrast, just above 75% of the NSs and only 53% of the NNSs got the expected interpretation in Bouton's study (1988: 189). The low success rate can be explained by taking into account that, possibly, these implicatures call not only for a good grasp of pragmatic norms, but also rely on specific knowledge of the academic culture. In other words, the recipients might simply not know what makes a good term paper and what information reference letters should provide. In order to check this conjecture, the answers given by the respondents with the background in philosophy (17 participants) were compared against the responses given by all the other participants. The results clearly suggest a connection between studying philosophy and being able to grasp indirect criticism in the Gricean scenario. Importantly, no major discrepancies were established between the answers of those who studied philosophyand other respondents' answers on all the remaining test items, which excludes the probability of attributing higher rates of the successful answers on the items in question to the higher overall score and better implicature-reading capacity of philosophy majors.

Table 5: Success rates for the items involving understated negative evaluation, with scenarios related to knowledge of the academic context

	Item № 4	Item № 11
Respondents with philosophy background	64.71%	94.12%
Respondents from all the other fields	31.10%	67.07%

The next in the lowest success rate ranking is the ironic implicature (a subtype of the Quality maxim flouting), with 73% of NSs and 76% of NNSs reaching the expected interpretation. The fact that the success rate on these items was rather poor both for NSs and NNSs might indicate that certain instances of implicit import are challenging for comprehension per se. Processing irony, in particular, poses a cognitive challenge to language users, as it heavily depends on context and involves several layers of inference and theory of mind reconstruction (Noveck 2018), so the (relatively) low results obtained for NSs and NNSs are not unexpected. Notably, the German group's awareness of irony appears to be higher than average. After all, comedy is said to be a staple of the German culture, with satire and irony contributing in an important way to creating German identity in the 20th century (Twark 2007).

The most accessible type of conversational implicature for the majority of participants was the pope question, a culture-specific violation of the maxim of Relation (Taguchi 2013). This is a kind of formulaic implicature which arises when instead of providing a relevant answer to a given question, the speaker produces a question that asks about an obvious fact (like, "Is the Pope catholic?").Although most respondents did not have issues with the test items involving this type of implicature, it is noticeable that the Chinese (71% of successful responses) and Desi (65%) groups scored lower than others on the item involving the classic pope question. This reinforces the previously established findings (Roever 2004) that this type of indirect message is highly formulaic and calls for culture-specific knowledge. It is not surprising, then, that the respondents from non-Christian cultures had difficulty deriving the intended implicated meaning of the question “Is pope catholic?”. This provides obvious evidence that the use of implicature can lead to communication breakdown in intercultural exchanges.

As far as cross-cultural differences are concerned, the present results show that the Desi group has strikingly low scores, especially on the items involving irony and understated negative evaluation, with only 49% of success rate in understanding implied irony. Within this cultural group, the percentage of respondents opting for the literal interpretation across all test items was the highest. English is the second native language for these people (as it is the official language in their countries of origin), which suggests that the difficulties are not related to L2 proficiency but arise due to other problems. It might be suggested that the kind of indirectness that implicatures employ contrasts with communication norms of candidness important for these speech communities. Perhaps people from this culture tend to be more straightforward in conveying messages and are not “ironically inclined” (Wilson, in Noveck 2018: 172), which is consistent with my observations from personal interactions with the speakers of Indian languages.

By contrast, the Germans come first in the NNSs ranking and their high scores motivated a further investigation whether the results would be different if the test was taken in a native language. In a follow-up pilot study, the test was translated into German and administered to 26 native speakers of German (the sample differed from the one taking part in the main study).

Table 6: Percentages of successful responses to test items containing different types of implicatures within the two groups of German-speaking participants who took the test in English and German [%]

Implicature type	Germans who took the English test	Germans who took the German version of the test
1. Quantity	82.76	38.4
1.1. Understated negative evaluation	68.97	75.0
2. Quality	100.0	100.0
2.1. Irony	87.36	66.6
3. Manner	82.76	98.0
4. Relevance	90.80	85.2
4.1. Pope Q	100.0	100.0
Overall test score	86.41	78.4

The findings are a bit surprising as the respondents who took the test in the native language scored unexpectedly worse than those who took the test in English (with the exception of recovering the Manner implicatures). However, this may be attributed to the fact that the participants from two groups came from very diverse backgrounds. This might tentatively indicate that there are more factors to be considered when calculating a hearer's ability to comprehend implicatures, and further research is needed.

3.2.3. The influence of living in an English-speaking country

The analysis of the scores of the respondents with and without the experience of living in an English-speaking country also did not show many strong dependencies. This might be attributed to the fact that the majority of the participants, living in an international environment, use English as the lingua franca on a daily basis, and are in frequent contact with native English speakers. The only category of implicature which was identified by non-native speakers who lived in an English-speaking country with a much higher success rate than by those who did not have such an experience was understated negative evaluation. It seems that certain types of indirect meaning comprehension can be acquired via the contact with the target language culture and native speakers.

Table 7: The average proportion of successful responses given to the items containing understated negative evaluation by non-native speakers of English with and without the experience of living in an English-speaking country

	Score for UNE items (%)
Respondents who lived in an English-speaking country	68
Respondents who never lived in an English-speaking country	49

Conclusion

Generally, the analysis of the data collected in the internet-based multiple-choice implicature comprehension test in 2019-2020 confirms Bouton's (1988) earlier diagnosis that speakers from different cultural backgrounds, especially those from the so-called "remote cultures", tend to interpret implicatures in English differently. The present results also indicate that target language proficiency may be an important factor affecting L2 implicature comprehension, with the performance of NNSs at C1 and C2 levels of English proficiency resembling very closely that of NSs. This provides a tentative answer to Bouton's question about the impact of L2 competence on implicature comprehension, but of course further research embracing a larger number of NNSs with native-like proficiency is required. As far as the processing difficulty for different types of implicature is concerned, understated negative evaluation proved to be the most challenging for all the respondents, both in the original and the present study. This might be attributed to the inherent complexity of this type of indirect message in general, and the fact that in the scenarios used in the test, the interpretation relied on specific type of background knowledge that recipients might simply lack. More neutral scenarios, with implicature generation not dependent on familiarity with specific circumstances (like the academic milieu), should be used in the test, as it is emphasised below.

Unfortunately, a small number of NSs participants, i.e. L1 users of British, American, Australian, and New Zealand English, does not allow for any viable conclusions on possible differences across the groups, but it can be noted that no substantial variation in the responses was found. The homogeneity of interpretations within the NSs group (tentatively) indicates that native English speakers from different parts of the world do seem to share "a common cultural heritage" (Bouton 1988: 195).

The present study suffers from some limitations, the major of which has to do with the small number of representatives from different cultural backgrounds. Future research should mainly focus on speakers from non-western cultures and on the types of implicature identified as most demanding. In addition, the scope of the analysis could be widened in the future: for instance, it might be interesting to compare the responses of the participants involved in different fields of study to investigate whether the students of, say, Linguistics and Literature departments are better at understanding implicated message than the students of Engineering.

Other limitations are related to Bouton's multiple-choice test design, as well as the scenarios chosen for the test. As had been argued by Zufferey et al. (2019), different types of conversational implicatures are represented in the test disproportionally, i.e. some categories contained more items than others. It is also worth noting that, as pointed out above, the situational scenarios should demand as little specific knowledge as possible, since, for instance, the classical pope question and Grice's academic cases may not be equally accessible to everyone. Last but not least, implicature production processes in L2 speakers remain unaddressed and they also need to be researched.

Importantly, examining implicature comprehension in L2 has some valuable practical applications for SLA researchers and language teachers. The insight into the challenges that comprehension of certain types of conversational implicature poses provides an important indication as to what the language teacher should particularly focus on in EFL/ESL instruction in order to help language learners overcome potential hurdles that the use of implicatures poses in communication with native speakers of English, as well as in the situations of international communication in which English is used as the Lingua Franca. Certain kinds of implicature that persons from particular cultural backgrounds are unfamiliar with can be taught directly in the classroom just as other areas of language competence.

The established connection between cultural background and the ability to arrive at the speaker-intended implicated meaning the way native speakers do suggests that teaching target cultural aspects should necessarily be incorporated in the language teaching syllabus (Bouton 1994).

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THE UNCANNY: DEVELOPMENT AND PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE

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Abstract

In 1919 Sigmund Freud raised the interest in the uncanny by claiming in his essay "Das Unheimliche" that something can be familiar and unfamiliar at the same time. Since the emergence of the concept in the 20th century, many scholars have presented their own definition of the uncanny. The concept originates from the German *unheimlich* but the meaning reaches far beyond its dictionary definition. As Masschelein suggests, the word itself "is untranslatable qua form and content" (Masschelein 2011, 7) and as long as the uncanny cannot be understood literally, the ambiguity of the term can lead to a multitude of interpretations. The aim of this paper is to explore how the perception of the uncanny has been changing through the years in connection with the Freudian definition. The paper offers an overview of various interpretations of the concept starting from 1906 until today. The juxtaposition of the most significant views on the uncanny shows how the concept has gradually formed a basis for various fields of study such as literature and art. The paper presents future perspectives of the uncanny where it no longer refers only to the motif of the double or supernatural elements but it also tackles the problems of body transformations and politics.

Key words

Derrida, Cixous, the uncanny, Sigmund Freud, Ernst Jentsch, Mori, Todorov

Introduction

Sigmund Freud laid the groundwork for the perception of the uncanny as a concept. The publication of his pivotal essay "The Uncanny" in 1919 contributed to the classification of the term as an aesthetic category (Masschelein 2011, 3). Freud aroused theorists' interest in this subject and in the course of time many of them have attempted to present their own understanding of the word *uncanny*. Eventually, some of them came to the conclusion that the expression "is untranslatable qua form and content" and "the same feeling can be expressed by words such as 'creepy', 'eerie'[and] 'weird'" (Masschelein 2011, 7). The ambiguity of the term and the dualistic nature of the uncanny provide an opportunity for arbitrary interpretations of the concept, the understanding of which has been changing throughout the years. Hence, the ideas represented by the uncanny have become a starting point for the theory of deconstructionism, feminism, the question of sexual identity and the uncanny valley. This article offers a systematic overview of the beginnings of the concept, the developments and the possibilities for the future research.

1. The Beginnings of the Uncanny: Ernst Jentsch and Sigmund Freud

Crucial to identifying the uncanny as a concept in philosophical and theoretical discourse is the essay "On the Psychology of the Uncanny" published in 1906 (Masschelein 2011, 3). Ernst Jentsch refers in his paper to the German word *unheimlich*, indicating "that someone to whom something 'uncanny' happens is not quite 'at home' or 'at ease' in the situation concerned, that the thing is or at least seems to be foreign to him" (Jentsch 2008, 217). He introduces the theory of intellectual uncertainty in order to explain how certain feelings, such as "mistrust, unease and even hostility", are responsible for evoking the effect of the uncanny in connection with "the new and the unusual" (Jentsch 2008, 218). As a result, he provides numerous examples to support his statement. According to Jentsch, "an extremely uncomfortable feeling" (Jentsch 2008, 220) can be achieved due to disguises and masks because of people's incapability of "becoming accustomed" (Jentsch 2008, 220). Even if people know that they are deceived by their imagination, they usually cannot overcome this strong feeling of uncertainty. A similar situation occurs when people are unable to identify whether, a given object is animate or inanimate, which leaves an imprint on their consciousness (Jentsch 2008, 220-221).

Jentsch's commentary on the nature of objects constitutes a significant part of his essay. According to him, things such as wax figures or machines resemble animate objects simply because of their strong resemblance to human beings. Due to technological advances they can produce sounds, do household chores, serve other people and entertain them. The machines' ability to imitate human beings provokes the feeling of uncanniness, the effect of which can be intensified by their human-like appearance (Jentsch 2008, 222-223). Jentsch points out that the authors often use this strategy in their literary texts to make readers uncertain if they deal with a living being or rather with an object. One such example that Jentsch introduces is "The Sandman" by E.T.A Hoffmann where "the doubtful tension [...] is made serviceable by the virtuosic manipulation of the author for the purposes of artistic investigation" (Jentsch 2008, 224). The fantasy has a powerful impact on readers' imagination to the extent that "a lonely lake" turns out to be "the gigantic eye of a monster and the outline of a cloud [...] becomes a threatening Satanic face" (Jentsch 2008, 224). The tendency to imagine potentially hazardous phenomena is triggered by darkness or the state of intoxication. Literary figures can hallucinate under the influence of psychoactive substances and due to their vivid imagination they can converse with imaginary objects. Jentsch claims that it is a common practise among storytellers as they use this device to "push the play with the reader's psychical helplessness" (Jentsch 2008, 225). The reader usually discovers at the end of the story that the whole experience of uncanny nature is just the protagonist's vision caused by hallucination (Jentsch 2008, 224-225). Indeed, literature has a strong impact on the imagination, but Jentsch suggests that people generally have an innate predisposition to perceive objects as living beings: "The child of nature populates his environment with demons; small children speak in all seriousness to a chair, to their spoon, to an old rag and so on, [...]. Even in highly cultivated Greece, a dryad still lived in every tree" (Jentsch 2008, 225). They become victims of their imagination because they feel constantly threatened by something they are unable to explain. This tendency, however, seems to decline with age as people's ability to think reasonably increases (Jentsch 2008, 225). Coming to the end of the essay, Jentsch once more emphasizes the significant role of intellectual uncertainty in the emergence of uncanny feelings. According to the author, a state of mind where there is no place for doubts is necessary to receive "a psychical shelter" that can help "in the struggle for existence" (Jentsch 2008, 227).

Freud directly responds to many of those remarks in his "The Uncanny", commenting however that Jentsch's essay is "a fertile but not exhaustive paper" (Freud 1919, 1). In fact, ideas introduced by Jentsch form the basis for Freud's later study on the uncanny but eventually he decides to use the "theme of the 'Sand-Man' who tears out children's eyes" (Barnaby 2015, 980 after Freud 1919, 5). It constitutes a significant shift from Jentsch's key concept of intellectual uncertainty to a short story written by E.T.A. Hoffmann, which was only briefly mentioned in Jentsch's essay on the uncanny (Barnaby 2015, 979-980). Freud's analysis of the fear of losing one's eyes directly leads to the discussion of castration and Oedipus complex: "A study of dreams, phantasies and myths has taught us that a morbid anxiety connected with the eyes and with going blind is often enough a substitute for the dread of castration" (Freud 1919, 7). Freud adds novelty to the concept by seeking answers to such questions as "why does Hoffmann bring the anxiety about eyes into such intimate connection with the father's death?" or "why does the Sand-Man appear each time in order to interfere with love?" (Freud 1919, 8). Freud noticed the close relationship between the unconsciousness and sexuality, which became a prototype for the psychoanalytic order of the symbolic. According to Nobus, the selection of this particular theme might suggest that Freud perceives discourse on the uncanny as a competition between him and Jentsch in order to become the only scholar who invented the concept (Nobus 1993a: 62-63 after Masschelein 2011, 18-19).

Freud refers at the beginning of "The Uncanny" to the origins of the word *unheimlich*, emphasizing the role of its antonym in the understanding of the concept. It is worth mentioning that he was the first person to do so, as Jentsch did not focus on the linguistic side of the word. He provides a detailed analysis preceded by the following definitions of the word *Heimlich*, which according to *Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache* means: "belonging to the house or the family", "friendly, intimate, homelike", "tame, companionable to man" with reference to animals and "concealed, kept from sight, so that others do not get to know about it, withheld from others" (Freud 1919, 2-3). The latter representation of the word constitutes the core of Freud's understanding of the uncanny. The following extract shows that both words can in fact be used interchangeably: "'Unheimlich' is the name for everything that ought to have remained … hidden and secret and has become visible" (Freud 1919, 4). Freud notices that even though the words represent the opposites, they still coincide with each other to the extent that "what is *heimlich* thus comes to be *unheimlich*" (Freud 1919, 4). In this case, the negative prefix that appears in the word *unheimlich* functions not as a lexical negation but rather as a reminder that "even when something is negated, it still remains present in the unconscious" (Masschelein 2011, 8).

Freud presents a thorough analysis of "The Sandman", as this story constitutes the centre of his reflections on the nature of the uncanny. During his re-reading of the story, he shows much appreciation for Hoffmann and his work. Freud calls "The Sandman" a "fantastic tale" (Freud 1919, 5) and compliments the author by giving him the title of "the unrivalled master of conjuring up the uncanny […] in literature" (Freud 1919, 9). Freud even dares to say that Hoffmann is "a writer who has succeeded better than anyone else in producing uncanny effects" (Freud 1919, 5). Hoffmann uses the word *unheimlich* multiple times in "The Sandman" but Freud does not relate to that (Royle 2003, 45). He uses the story to prove that the uncanny effect of certain phenomena does not arise from the concept of intellectual uncertainty to the extent that his "reading […] [becomes] a violent attempt to reduce the significance of Jentsch's work on the uncanny" (Royle 2003, 41). Cixous also comes to the conclusion that Freud's attitude towards Jentsch's intellectual uncertainty resembles "a repression of the repression" merely due to the fact that "Jentsch say[s] more than what Freud wishes to read" (Cixous 1976, 534). Freud begins with a broad description of the novella that he calls a "short" one (Freud 1919, 7) but the fact that his summary is three-pages long and the original story has approximately twenty pages might be in fact recognised as an exaggeration. However, Freud's re-reading of the story became a starting point for other analysis (Royle 2003, 41) but many scholars perceive his interpretation as a manipulation of "the data and the text" (Masschelein 2011, 109). As Royle puts it, it seems that it is Freud's "own 'short story' [because] he recounts [it] as if it were an objective, disinterested, merely 'factual' summing up" (Royle 2003, 40).

The nonlinear plot of "The Sandman" is recounted by multiple narrators and as the story progresses the reader has the opportunity to meet various literary figures that bear a strong resemblance to the title character (Royle 2003, 39-40). Freud in his analysis comes to the conclusion that the Sandman and the fear of losing one's eyes that results from his actions become the main source of uncanny feelings because of their metaphorical connection with the castration-complex: "a morbid anxiety connected with the eyes […] is […] a substitute for the dread of castration" (Freud 1919, 7). By drawing such a conclusion, he undermines the significance of inanimate objects for creating the uncanny effect, which was the centre of Jentsch's research on the concept. Freud justifies his choice by saying that the "uncertainty whether an object is living or [not] [...] is quite irrelevant in connection with this other, more striking instance of uncanniness" (Freud 1919, 7). At this point, Freud fails to understand that there is more to how Jentsch perceives the concept than just doubts related to the matter whether an object is alive or not (Barnaby 2015, 981). Jentsch raised the question of "aliveness [and] how we respond to our own confusion regarding that issue" (Barnaby 2015, 981), which Freud does not take into consideration in his interpretation of the uncanny. Freud builds his uncanny theory on Jentsch's ideas, hence in his later analysis he focuses on the doll Olympia but his point of view differs from Jentsch's. Freud claims that people treat such objects as living beings to the extent that they actually want them to be alive. He considers such behaviour as "an infant wish or [...] an infant belief" that he propagates using various examples (Freud 1919, 9). The infantile factor can also be tracked down in the motif of the double. According to Freud, seeing an identical person in terms of appearance might be an eerie experience (Freud 1919, 9). He claims that this phenomenon is closely related to the ego by "present[ing] a missing link in the development of the ego-ideal" (Masschelein 2011, 41). It means that the body, mind and the soul have become separate elements that are presented in the form of the double (Masschelein 2011, 29) that Freud claims to be "a vision of terror" (Freud 1919, 10). He bears out his theory with Rank's definition of the double that "probably the 'immortal' soul was the first 'double' of the body" (Freud 1919, 9). Freud also ascribes the "principle of a repetition-compulsion", which he thoroughly describes in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, to "infantile psychology" (Freud 1919, 11). It leaves no doubts that the repetition of "the same situations, things and events" that happen in "certain circumstances" (Freud 1919, 10) is the source of uncanny feelings. Freud refers to such situations as ending up in the same street or coming across the same number. The above mentioned events are accompanied by the feeling of helplessness that comes from the belief that something is inevitable (Freud 1919, 11).

The last definition of the word *unheimlich* that was introduced in Freud's essay leads to other theories on the source of uncanny feelings. Freud claims that supernatural elements and certain phenomena that are linked to them could be responsible for the creation of such a feeling. He thinks that "our original emotional reaction to it, and the insufficiency of our scientific knowledge about it" (Freud 1919, 13) are to blame for the uncanny effect. According to Freud, religious texts and institutions propagate the belief in various forms of life after death, which is additionally strengthened by non-religious sources that claim that "a contact [with the other side] is not utterly impossible" (Freud 1919, 14). People are frightened of death and the paranormal. They tend to be afraid of their departed ones who might one day carry them off in order to share their life together. Freud also classifies such illnesses as epilepsy and madness as belonging to the same category: he claims that these disorders emerge from the act of supernatural forces (Freud 1919, 14). However, Freud ascribes the ability to create the most powerful uncanny effect to "the idea of being buried alive" (Freud 1919, 14) or the fear of being harmed. It is not necessary to verbalise bad intentions because they are usually betrayed in people's look, hence it is called "the dread of the evil eye" (Freud 1919, 12). Secret thoughts can be easily put into action, which makes it a common superstition (Freud 1919, 12).

2. The Uncanny After Freud

After the publication of "The Uncanny", Freud rarely commented on the concept and it seems that other scholars initially did not show much interest in the uncanny either. The only exceptions are Otto Rank and Theodor Reik. Their interests revolve around the motif of the double, which they use to develop their own conlusions (Masschelein 2011, 50). Rank's *The Double* contains a multiplicity of examples to support his view that "the double was a defence from the anxiety of death" (Seulin 2020, 10), while Reik's *The Strange God and One's Own God* uses the same motif to examine religious issues (Masschelein 2011, 50). In the 1970s the concept of the uncanny attracted deconstructionists' attention, whose primary strategy concerns focusing on the marginal in a text, and, in fact, "The Uncanny", perfectly fulfils this criterion. Derrida in *The Double Session*, Todorov in *The Fantastic. A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre* and Hélène Cixous in "Fiction and Its Phantoms" took a fresh look at the concept as they contributed to development of the uncanny in literary criticism, politics and theory of feminism and, thereby they changed how the uncanny was perceived in the future (Masschelein 2011, 73, Royle 2003, 25).

Todorov introduced in *The Fantastic* the theory of a literary genre, whose primary function is to invoke a feeling of hesitation in the reader. It is possible to find an analogy to Jentsch's intellectual uncertainty, as Todorov claims that "the text must oblige the reader [...] to hesitate between a natural and a supernatural explanation of the events described" (Todorov 1973, 33). The author puts emphasis on the role of the reader's attitude in the process of reading: "The fantastic implies, then, not only the existence of an uncanny event, which provokes a hesitation in the reader and the hero; but also a kind of reading, which [...] must be neither 'poetic' nor 'allegorical'" (Todorov 1973, 32). Todorov notices the importance of fear in the creation of the fantastic simultaneously rejecting it as an indispensible element of the genre (Todorov 1973, 35). However, as long as it produces such negative emotions and evokes the feeling of hesitation in the reader, it might be compared to Jentsch's notion of "psychical helplessness" (Jentsch 2008, 225). According to Todorov, the place of the fantastic is "between the genres of 'the uncanny' and 'the marvellous'" to the extent that there is no separate genre but rather "'the uncanny', 'the fantastic-uncanny', 'the fantastic-marvellous' and 'the marvellous'" (Masschelein 2011, 80-81). Todorov's perception of the uncanny differs from Freud's, which he explicitly expresses in his commentary on E.A. Poe's "The Fall of The House of Usher", where he claims that "[Freud's] hypotheses [are] still to be verified" (Masschelein 2011, 81). However, the ambiguity which appears in Freud's text creates a link between the literature of the fantastic and the uncanny, which could be achieved, again, due to "the notion of 'hesitation' [that] allows for a shift of the uncanny towards the fantastic" (Masschelein 2011, 94). The motifs of the fantastic and the uncanny seem to be intertwined as Todorov claims that "the themes of the fantastic have become, literally, the very themes of the psychological investigation of the last fifty years" (Masschelein 2011, 91). It seems though that the key role in the perception of Todorov's *The Fantastic* through the prism of Freud's "The Uncanny" is played by the translator's choice of words. The word *the uncanny* already had its equivalent in French, which is *l'inquiétante étrangeté*. The translator, however, decided to translate the word *l'étrange* as *the uncanny*, even though it rather means *the strange* – Masschelein claims that "this translation has generated a form of stickiness that had major consequences" (Masschelein 2011, 82). Todorov rarely mentions Freud's essay in *The Fantastic* but he supports his view with other examples such as *The Double* and *The Strange God and One's Own God* that directly respond to Freud's ideas. As a result, the uncanny became a significant part of Todorov's work and the concept itself is nowadays "regarded as an excellent tool to analyse the effects of the fantastic" (Masschelein 2011, 91, 94).

Derrida, on the other hand, focuses in his essay on "the themes of doubling [and] repetition", which were central aspects of the Freudian uncanny. Derrida, in his analysis of Plato's and Mallarmé's work applies these themes together with "the effacement of limits" in order to find "[a link] between reality, fiction and truth" (Masschelein 2011, 112-113). He mentions "The Uncanny" as he claims that certain words are undecidable in terms of lexical ambivalence. According to Derrida:

> We find ourselves constantly being brought back to that text by the paradoxes of the double and of repetition, the blurring of the boundaries lines between 'imagination' and 'reality', between the 'symbol' and the 'thing it symbolizes'..., the references to Hoffmann and the literature of the fantastic, the consideration on the double meaning of words [...] (to be continued) (Derrida 1981, 220 after Masschelein 2011, 113).

As Derrida promised in the passage quoted, he continued his reflections on the uncanny in 1993 in *Spectres of Marx* (Royle 2003, 25). This is a thought-provoking study about Marxism and the world's future after the collapse of the Soviet Union, where the uncanny is presented as "destabilizing concept" that "disturbs the ethical and the political order" (Masschelein 2011, 138). However, what is important for the concept of the uncanny is that Derrida takes into consideration the supernatural elements such as ghosts and spirits. He claims that the apparitions are the signifier of the future, not the past, which can also be applied to communism and democracy (Royle 2003, 67). For Derrida, the uncanny stands for:

a stranger who is already found within (das Heimliche-Unheimliche), more intimate with one than one is oneself, the absolute proximity of a stranger whose power is singular and anonymous (es spukt), an unnameable and neutral power, that is, undecidable, [...] and identity that [...] invisibly occupies places belonging finally neither to us nor to it" (Royle 2003, 68).

Derrida implies that all ideas presented in *Spectres of Marx* are "a matter of the uncanny" to the extent that the paper could have been called "Marx – das Unheimliche" (Royle 2003, 128). It seems that Derrida's works are haunted by the Freudian concept and as a result he coins a new term *hauntology* that means "[the haunt and] the return of the repressed, in which the spectral takes precedent over being, existence" (Masschelein 2011, 139, Royle 2003, 128). Moreover, he emphasized another important aspect of his theory, which is "to haunt does not mean to be present" (Derrrida 1994, 202). The new philosophy refers to "techno-hermeneutics" or "technologics" that describe "logics that shape and govern our contemporary society in which classical notions of time, space, and unity of the subject have disappeared" (Masschelein 2011, 146). Hauntology is characterized not only by scepticism towards technological advances but also by nostalgia. This sentimental longing is revealed in the constant returning of theorists to exemplary works of Freud and Derrida, which they analyse in order to solve the issues of time (Masschelein 2011, 146).

Hélène Cixous is another deconstructionist who offered a conceptualization of the uncanny by creating a close link between the uncanny, literature, queer studies and theory of feminism. In her essay "Fiction and Its Phantoms", she also tackles the problems concerning homosexuality and sexual identity. She claims that placement of the doll Olympia in a footnote of Freud's "The Uncanny" is rather a "typographical metaphor of repression" (Cixous 1976, 537 after Royle 2003, 42) and "it is a matter [...] of turning the episode involving Olympia into satire, thus managing to eclipse and obscure it" (Cixous 1976, 532). According to Cixous, Freud's view on the doll concerning that she "can be nothing else than a materialization of Nathaniel's feminine attitude towards his father in his infancy" (Freud 1919, 8) refers to "homosexuality" (Cixous 1976, 538 after Royle 2003, 42). She strongly summarizes Freud's choice of the Sandman and the diminishment of the Olympia's role in the production of the uncanny with the following words: "We get sand thrown in our eyes, no doubt about it" (Cixous 1976, 532). As a consequence of Freud's shift towards the title character of Hoffmann story and the focus on castration-complex, the uncanny became a subject of feminist discussions. Cixous also analyses the queer characteristics of "The Uncanny" not through the prism of contemporary meaning of the word but rather in the sense of

the open mesh of possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonances and resonances, lapses and excesses of meaning when the constituent elements of anyone's gender, of anyone's sexuality aren't made (or can't be made) to signify monolithically (Kosofsky Sedgwick 1994, 8 after Royle 2003, 42).

Cixous comes to the conclusion that *heimlich* and *unehimlich* become an androgyne: possessing both masculine and feminine features. From her point of view homo- and hetero- coincide with one another exactly in the same way as *heimlich* and *unheimlich* in Freund's analysis, which shows that the uncanny and uncertainties about sexual identity seem to be somehow intertwined (Royle 2003, 42-43).

4. Contemporary Approaches to the Uncanny

At the turn of the 20st century the uncanny covered a broad spectrum of problems in various fields of study from "political and social alienation" to "disturbing unhomeliness" (Masschelein 2011, 147). The uncanny started to be perceived as a literary concept as it became an integral part of today's literature and literary theory. Harold Bloom takes notice of Freud's contribution to "aesthetics, literary criticism and theory, but, above all, [...] to the resistant strangeness of literature" (Royle 2003, 15). One might even say that literature and the uncanny are interdependent as one is haunted by another, taking into consideration the fact that Freud's examples in his psychoanalytical essay were based purely on literature. David Farell Krell even claims that they are "marvellously narrated and beautifully crafted pieces of writing" (Royle 2003, 52, 14-15). The new figures such as "cyborg or technologically enhanced human" were added in literature and literary studies to already existing motifs of the double and robotics, where the protagonists are usually haunted by the past and have to deal with trauma and the loss of identity (Masschelein 2011, 149). Masahiro Mori introduced the uncanny in the robotics and at the same time popularized the concept of the uncanny valley. As he put it, the term *uncanny valley* refers to "the [...] relation between the human likeness of an entity and the perceiver's affinity for it" (Mori 2012, 2). Jentsch drew similar conclusions in "On the Psychology of the Uncanny" and the following passage proves the significance of his intellectual uncertainty and the notion of psychical helplessness in development of the uncanny in the field of modern technology, as it constantly casts doubts on Cartesianism:

> Among all the psychical uncertainties that can become a cause for the uncanny feeling to arise, there is one in particular that is able to develop a fairly regular, powerful and very general effect: namely, doubt as to whether an apparently living being really is animate and, conversely, doubt as to whether a lifeless object may not in fact be animate (Jentsch 2008, 221).

Mori's modernized concept has been put into use in the entertainment industry where technology correlates with the uncanny narratives. The uncanny valley flourishes in cinematography, especially in science fiction movies and animations for children that are fulfilled with uncanny creatures (Masschelein 2011, 147-152).

Conclusion

Sigmund Freud popularized the concept of the uncanny by claiming that something can be familiar and unfamiliar at the same time but the uncanny itself is much more than just the experience of alienation or uncertainty. The ideas of the uncanny find application in such fields as "art and literature, film, cultural studies and sexual difference" (Royle 2003, 12-13). In the past, the uncanny could be manifested in the form of mental disorders, inanimate objects, the figure of the double and fear of the dead but nowadays it tackles the issues of cloning, body transformation, literature, religion and politics (Royle 2003, 1-3). Freud was the first who brought attention to the dualistic nature of the word, focusing on the semantics of *heimlich* and its antonym. The ambiguity of the German word *unheimlich* and the translators' selection of *the uncanny* for *the strange* contributed to the creation of various theories and connected the Freudian theory with literature of the fantastic and literary criticism. The uncanny has indeed gone a long way from 1906 and it seems that each re-reading of Freud's "The Uncanny" brings to light new interpretations of the concept.

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THE PORTRAIT OF A MODERN WOMAN IN THE POETRY OF WANDA MELCER

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Abstract

The article tackles the topic of womanhood as a typical motif in Wanda Melcer's poetry, a topic which in historical-literary studies has so far been insufficiently discussed. Through the analysis of selected poems from her two published volumes as well as from other scattered poems, the portrait of a modern woman as presented in that poetry has been sketched out. This woman is a person who takes part in civilisational, social and manner-related changes. Her relations to culture, art and literature, her vitality and being active in life, all attest to her abandonment of roles imposed by the patriarchal system. It has been shown that the "new woman" breaks taboos and is educated. Above all she is independent and self-reliant, desires success and thirsts for new experiences, as demonstrated by how she frequently changes her surroundings and appropriates new spaces. She moulds her identity in confrontation with the outside world, she is open to otherness and changeability. At the same time she maintains personal consistency. Her creative identity is related to acting upon the principle of choice, and not obligation. Due to the multitude of biographical references present, the portrait of the female heroine contained in Wanda Melcer's poetry can be seen as a self-portrait of the author herself.

Key words

modernity, Wanda Melcer, female poetry, feminism, identity

1. A new mentality

Before a new wave of the feminist movement (led by Irena Krzywicka and Tadeusz Boy-Żeleński) developed in interwar Poland, and before the Customs Reform League and other organisations that demanded rights for women sprang up, Wanda Melcer created her own private front line in the fight for gender equality, something which was first reflected in her lyrical works. She wrote poems throughout the whole interwar period, but having published her second collection of poems she became more interested in prose. By boldly tackling taboos in both her novels and non-fiction works, she became a much appreciated writer and joined the artistic elites. In this area of her literary work, she expressed her support for feminism many times.

However, one needs to keep in mind that it was poetry where she first showed herself to be a supporter of women taking on roles that were not hitherto foreseen for them in traditional Polish culture. Literary researchers have to date not paid much attention to this aspect. Only recently, on the margins of the discussion of "the feminisation of the avangarde", has there been an attempt to see Melcer's lyrical output in the context of issues related to breaking cultural barriers, as a female voice striving to release itself from silence (Kraj 2019, 63).

In her debut volume of poetry, published in 1917, the poet included many poems characterised by a break with the sentimentalism of Young Poland and a directness in presenting relations between men and women. One can assume that it was then, during her years of collaborating with Zofia Nałkowska, that Wanda Melcer's modern social and moral awareness was formed - under the influence of her colleague, who had more life experienced. An additional factor in this was, undoubtedly, the family traditions of emancipated, educated women, as well as social and education activists[1].

In *Passing Hours*, alongside poems that echo Young Poland's atmospheric quality, one can also find several texts which are characterised by a reserved way of depicting feelings. The lyrical subject does not exhibit any tendency towards effusiveness, but it is more reflective. In *Tęsknica* (*The Demon of Longing*) and *Samotność* (*Solitude*), experiences that, in the preceding era, resulted in descriptions of a decadent breakdown become a pretext for a realisation in which one can see the mental strength of the speaker. The speaker thus delivers moral imperatives of Nietzschean origins, e.g. "I can feel creative power in myself", and "May your solitude be thunderbolt-like" (Melcer 1917, 7-8). Activeness of this sort demonstrates a process of going beyond oneself, the positive creation of a woman who has abandoned patterns of impotence: "Here I am – like a gushing, transparent spring,/ here I am, like a white, blossoming apple tree in an orchard" (Melcer 1917, 7).

In both of the quoted poems, Melcer praises life. Their vitalist tone is perhaps the result of the author's fascination with the works of Walt Whitman, whose works she translated into Polish, and who she introduced to readersin journalistic articles and lectures (Stradecki 1977, 283). She thus shared her adoration for the American poet with a young Julian Tuwim by preaching (just like the Skamander group did) a glorified view of the world (Melcer-Rutkowska 1920c, 8-9).

In her poem *Perwersyjna księżniczka* (*The Perverse Princess*), a seemingly banal and humorous story of a noble woman apt to have dalliances with men, one can identify an allegorical layer. It is a story of a woman who breaks moral conventions.

[1] The writer's mother, Helena, was a teacher; and her two sisters (Wanda's aunts) were engaged in public activities. Jadwiga Szczawińska-Dawidowa organised educational courses for women. Wanda Szczawińska, meanwhile, had two doctorates and contributed, among other things, to the foundation of a health pavilion for babies in the capital. The poem *W ochronce* (*At the Nursery*), from the volume *Płynące godziny* (*Passing Hours*), is dedicated to her.

She treats her unusual relationships with members of the opposite sex as if she were looking into their "souls' mirrors". Thus her nature is revealed, that of an explorer who wishes to go beyond the pre-determined role imposed on her (Melcer 1917, 61).

In Wanda Melcer's lyrical output, the question of self-reliance (both financial and social) is also present. The heroine of *Westchnienie* (*A Sigh*), who can be identified with the poet herself, is proud of her government job[2], has an active social life and rubs shoulders with the capital's high society. She strolls along Nowy Świat, one of the streets in the centre of Warsaw:

> I enjoy working,
> collecting a government salary,
> my room is warm and bright,
> believe my words!
>
> I meet a lady I know
> on the corner of Nowy Swiat:
> what time do you get up?
> Do you ever get paid in office supplies?
>
> With red ink I draw up
> an accurate budget.
> Oh, why can't this be poems?
> I really have such good ideas! (Melcer-Rutkowska 1920d, 5)

Introducing the name of the street, which evokes associations with expressions that were popular in intellectual circles after the end of the Great War (e.g. "the new man" or "a new beginning"), raises the idea of the world's renewal in the universal sense, which included the development of science and technology, as well as art and the social order. In the reborn Poland, it translated into a gradual equalling of women's rights (as far as education and participation in parliamentary elections was concerned), among other things. Hitherto, only a few women had had the opportunity to get a degree in higher education[3]

In the early 1920s, Melcer was one of the few members of the fairer sex who were employed in ministerial offices and were professionally successful. Since the post-uprising times, office work had remained the domain of men, and women were left with mere housework, sewing and giving private lessons (Lisak 2009, 277). The poem's subject thus does appreciate her work, but misses writing poems.

[2] In the autumn of 1920, Wanda Melcer-Rutkowska found employment as a secretary in the Department of the Publishing Houses at the Bureau of Foreign Propaganda, part of the Council of Ministers (see Kotowska-Kachel 2013, 96). The poem draws on her real life, as it was published in December of that same year.

[3] Exceptionally, they were able to study Higher Education Courses for Women in Saint Petersburg, andat the philosophical and medical faculties at universities in Galicia (see Siemieńska 2019, 54).

Despite increasing opportunities for women to attain a high social status, there were still limitations due to the stereotypical treatment of social roles ascribed to members of both genders by the patriarchal system (Gromkowska-Melosik 2011, 11-12). Melcer refused to be part of the traditional patterns, a state of affairs which was reflected in many of her works. This was related to going beyond the female "I", the desire to be equal to men, the creation of a go-getting personality, and assuming a calm, unsentimental attitude. Melcer breaks with confessional poetry to take up unceremonious poetry in the style of Futurism, which is hardly surprising considering her relations with the avant-garde movement (her collaboration with the "Zwrotnica" circle and the avant-garde magazine "Blok"). In her poem "Atalanta", the heroine resembles a strong man. She wants to compete with him for primacy. She believes in her strength, and she boasts about her athletic body. Not its delicacy and beauty, but its sheer physical strength. This is a portrait of a modern emancipated woman, albeit a slightly masculinised one:

> Nobody can outrun me.
> When I break, swiftly, into a run,
> I leave my rivals trailing.
> Take a look at my legs,
> compact, strong and agile,
> look at the ligaments in my feet,
> at my ankle, tendons and toes!
> It will make no difference to me
> if you're ahead of me running towards the finish.
> I am not afraid at all
> of even the fastest men [...] (Melcer-Rutkowska 1920b, 17).

This is a one-of-a-kind identity transformation for a woman, one who is aware of not only being equal to men but also of being able to tower above them.

In *Zarozumiałość* (*Conceit*) the poem's female subject also reveals extraordinary ambitions. She refuses to consent to being oppressed. She objects to the old order and manifests a youthful energy which she believes will make her successful:

> [...] I stood on a large square
> and announced I was there.
> What will you do with one like me,
> what lists will you put me on,
> because I want both a cat and pearls,
> and want to be prime minister?
> You won't kill me with a bullet,
> nor with a sword, like Heliogabalus
> I am youth after all
> and I'm off to dance at a ball (Melcer-Rutkowska 1920e, 8).

The role of leader, for centuries ascribed to men in Western European culture, becomes a challenge set by the heroine to herself and the whole world. Her desire for power might have been deemed controversial in the 1920s, nevertheless, she enters the fray by writing about herself as being as hard "as the edge of a sword of the best quality steel". By assuming the male role, she does not give up her feminine identity; she prides herself on her beauty and wants to be regarded as attractive.

In many of Melcer's pieces, there are women in new social roles. These are, for example: an artist who's giving a public performance of a piano concerto (*Popis,* (*Showing Off*)), a model revealing her body (*Modelka,* (*The Model*)), a reader of Hegel (*Książki,* (*Books*)), a traveller in a train compartment (*Sleeping*), a nude holiday-maker by the riverside (*Na plaży,* (*At the Beach*)), and writers (*Głos* (*Voice*), *Poezja* (*Poetry*), *Lampka* (*A Lamp*)). In her poem *Gotowalnia* (*Boudoir*), from her debut collection, the poet is already describing a mentally strong female who has confounded expectations so far:

> No, I am devoid of a soul. Read your poems,
> your words always make me sound so pretty,
> but stop telling me I have a soul, whatever are you dreaming of,
> you courtly rhymester. Tis ideas you are rich in.
>
> My soul's skin is of a bodily colour,
> I must therefore completely doubt its existence.
> As how does it differ from the body? I cannot tell,
> too red-haired, wild and pale it is (Melcer 1917, 66).

The declarations of the poem's subject, who opposes sentimental emotionality, accord with the critical discourse related to bourgeois customs. A woman's boudoir (the titular "gotowalnia") here becomes a place of physical and psychological transformation. The final metaphor presents the heroine as an actress who is performing a script made up by herself.

Melcer was not at all reluctant to present a woman's feelings in a non-prudish way, since in *Egzaltacja* (*Exhaltation*) she included a confession of passionate love:

> You are everything to me I didn't expect:
> childlike enthusiasm, hidden sense,
> everyday, profound truth and myth.
> Forever I am yours. I give you my whole self (Melcer 1917, 64).

However, one must not forget that the female character Melcer creates is not only interested in the realm of feelings. Apart from a heart, she also has instincts, a body and a mind. She lets us know that she is a member of the intelligentsia on many occasions: she is familiar with Rembrandt and the drawings of the Japanese painter Hokusai (*List* (*The Letter*)), the works of the impressionists (*Dwa sonety pointilistyczne*

(*Two Pointillist Sonnets*)) and those of the cubists (*Rozłożone skrzypce* (*Deconstructed Violin*)), and the tenets of the philosophy of Hegel (*Książki* (*Books*)), Leibniz (*Kaprys* (*Caprice*)), Rousseau (*Inwokacja* (*Invocation*)), and Plato.

2. Body and looks

The author of *Passing Hours*, deeply interested in the latest cultural phenomena, would engage in both literary and social activities even at a young age. Moral matters and gender equality were also of no less importance to her. Her positive attitude to avant-garde artists, who were bent on revolutionising many aspects of life by frequently tackling taboos in their works, is not surprising.

This was noticeable in *biologism*, a trend visible in the early works of those indulging in the new art forms. In the poetry of the Polish futurists it was related to primitivism, manifested in their praise of carnality and a sensual life, which was reflected in the first collections of poems by Anatol Stern (Delaperrière 2004, 121-122), who just like Bruno Jasieński astounded readers with his erotic vocabulary. The "biologism" of avant-gardists points to the somatic nature of humans. It seems plausible to assume that their interests were not unfamiliar to Melcer; they might have also inspired her praise of the body, found in her poetry, a direct expression of which is the poem *W ciele ludzkiem* (*In the Human Body*), which also includes a reflection upon physical-spiritual dualism:

> In the human body I most adore the way
> the arms are attached to the torso, the graceful line of the collarbone,
> which along with the blade bones closes the ring that is the shoulders;
> the deltoid muscles, underlined by angular shadows.
>
> [...] I love the body's passing moods,
> the disappointment of quiet, human misunderstandings.
> I love inevitability, a powerful stream,
> which flows through the stars and through my heart. (Melcer 1917, 25)

Melcer usually depicts the body as one of the inalienable attributes of womanhood. It can be strong if need be, but first of all it is imbued with allure. On many occasions, the things described in the female portraits are eyes, hands and lips. Occasionally, the motif of nudity appears, which highlights the expressiveness of the portrayal, an example of which can be found in *The Model*:

> In a red rag, which almost reveals
> your divine breasts, round and ripe,
> like a sinful fruit during the grape harvest,
> in a red rag you have dressed your glory.

And above your triumphant nudity,
which defends itself with just its shamelessness,
a red rag, dreams, which confuse the mind,
have you fastened together with the priceless clasp that is your hands (Melcer 1917, 26).

The bold act of presenting a woman's breasts as a reason for pride, though finished off by the focus on her hands - the clasping together of which may in body language suggest insecurity(as well as an attempt to control oneself) - is surprising. The gesture of clutching one's hands also appears in *Niepokój (Unease)*, a poem that simultaneously shows a certain feeling as well as an awareness of the physical and biological existence of the poem's subject:

I am astonished at my naked neck
which I clasp my hands around.
I'm sitting and listening to what you say to me,
but I can hardly hear.
I am astonished at my naked neck
which I clasp my hands around (Melcer-Rutkowska 1920b, 18).

Becoming sensitive to the biological aspect of life appears, furthermore, in several texts that illustrate the strong connection between humans and flora and fauna. In contact with it, the lyrical subject finds calmness and consolation (in *Jesion (Ash)*, *Leszczyna (Hazel)*, *Strumień (Stream)*). Communing with nature brings joy as well; and spontaneous physical activity is also important, as in the poem *Zabawa (Fun)*:

It's childlike happiness to run through virgin snow,
to fall into the deepest snowdrifts, to jump over ditches,
to laugh when underfoot fresh ice cracks,
it will break and scatter, hit at full pelt.

And then, with a young pointer which barks happily,
jumping, and putting its dirty paws on my fur coat,
to look for a hare's footprints, which, a most skinny creature,
hops around in the white snow near a forest in the distance (Melcer-Rutkowska 1920b, 46).

3. Expansion of the boudoir

A no less important question in depicting the modern woman is, for Melcer, the description of her boudoir, whose limits spread in the interwar period beyond the shelter of the home, located previously between the bedroom and the living room. An elegant lady feels at home in various places, including in new surroundings. Mirrors, which symbolise caring for and about one's appearance, appear with her in a lift, at a hairdresser's, and in a sleeping compartment on a train. Shop displays, with ladies' hats, become a ubiquitous element of the street landscape in a large town or city (in

Wiosenny kapelusz (*Spring Hat*). These are areas marked by a civilization-related revolution, areas which exist due to various inventions and conveniences, and are the result of technologisation. In this respect, Melcer's annexation of the urbanised and machinised spheres connects her poetry with that of the futurists. In her poem *U fryzjera* (*At the Hairdresser's*), changes in manners when it comes to the relationships that exist between the two genders have been masterfully captured:

> Two lamps, reflected in the mirror,
> and the hairdresser's white back.
> Harmony in vain seeks a rhyme
> for the dark-haired head, being cut over a basin
> of polished metal,
> and the two hands leaning over each other.
> [...]
> a pleasant nest of charm, where ladyness simpers
> over smiling mirrors, and greedy manliness
> in a fury of prose, secretly smokes a cigarette,
> cautiously hidden in a spherical electric ink blotter (Melcer-Rutkowska 1920b, 14).

It is worth noting that the men in this genre scene are merely a background for the women. This is a new situation which may suggest a momentary change of roles. A man (the hairdresser) is either serving a woman, or (a husband or a lover) is waiting for her.

Accessories from a woman's boudoir can also be found far from an urban space, for example at a riverside beach, which is described in the first of the "pointillist sonnets":

> Naked bodies on the sand tired by the sunny heat,
> children, young women. And a wave and its mane
> laps naked feet, resting on the sand.
> A red parasol. A white head-scarf's tip (Melcer-Rutkowska 1920b, 48).

The modern woman, as the heroine of this non-traditional poetry, is a dynamic person and is constantly in motion; we meet her on streets, on a journey, at a dance. Of course, she never fails to be well-dressed. Various types of dresses dominate, such as those with ruffles and frills, and different ornaments, and apart from them there are hats and furs, or fur collars. From time to time one hears of a sapphire necklace (in *Radość* (*Joy*), and parasols and shoes (*Marzenie* (*A Dream*). A woman's attachment to detail becomes visible in the charming miniature *Pióra (Feathers*). Melcer shows off her artistry via concise and synthetic speech, which reveals one of the characteristic traits typical of the female gender, i.e. the desire to be seen as physically attractive:

> Stylishly coiffured fans,
> ostrich feathers, rolled up into curls,

cool ones, spouting egret fountains,
and warm, animal-like, swan down:
all that is there
to help women be more beautiful (Melcer-Rutkowska 1920b, 23).

Wanda Melcer depicts a woman who sometimes devotes herself to jobs that are ascribed to her sex, such as embroidery; generally, however, she acts as energetically and as determined as a man. On some occasions she reveals her "dual identity" – she is independent and mentally strong, yet weak and lost at the same time – when she writes:

This is me,
proud,
not asking anyone for anything,
alone closed within myself,
commanding others.
This is me, the very same,
bitterly crying in an unfamiliar city,
helpless, like a child,
affectionate, poor, lost (Melcer-Rutkowska 1920b, 30).

In an equally interesting way, Melcer portrays herself in one of the poems she wrote at the end of the interwar period. A fur coat, associated with her in the memoirs of her contemporaries (Nałkowska 1980, 270), serves here as a metaphor not only for a Sunday (a day off work), but also for people and everyday matters, independence and mental strength:

It's Sunday – an enormous fur coat,
which is hanging in the hall on a hook,
I will hide there – there will be no trace,
and all the things past – I will forget.

I've been wounded by Tuesdays and Fridays,
blind, my feet are hot like fire,
how long are months without Sundays
with doorbells, phone calls and household chores.

[...] I'm sitting, resting a cheek on my knees,
I feel the fur on my lips and eyelids,
How nice it is not to be waiting for anybody,
To think of nothing and expect nothing! (Melcer 1935, 223).

Here the background is days filled with hectic contact with other people and energetic activities, the latter having been subordinated to a preordained schedule accepted in advance, the calendar of ordinary busy days.

4. A "creative" identity

Overcoming weaknesses that arise from the principles of living in a society, and also momentary personal setbacks, is an important character trait of the heroine in Wanda Melcer's poems, a heroine who in many aspects resembles the author herself. One could talk about poetic autobiographism, which usually is camouflaged due to the fact that proper names and dates are omitted. On the other hand, it can also be revealed ostentatiously, particularly in those poems, written in an avant-garde style, which break with the mental stereotypes of readers and the critics. A hint at the biographical interpretation of those works is also offered by one of Melcer's polemics in which she identifies herself with the lyrical subject of the poem *Koty* (*Cats*) (Melcer--Rutkowska 1920a, 11-12).

The bold role of a female writer, which can be seen in several texts but primarily in the title of Melcer's second volume of poems, was - at the turn of the second and third decade of the 20th century - an act of challenging and "ignoring the humility that had been imposed for ages" (Kłosińska 2009, 95). It is worth remembering that, at the same time, several female poets were still hiding behind male pseudonyms because they lacked the courage to reveal their identity.

Many years ago, Jerzy Kwiatkowski aptly noted that in the early interwar period certain strivings of female writers became apparent: they were fighting for equal rights between the sexes and mutual "freedom and sincerity in erotic culture". However, it is impossible to agree with his categorical claim that Maria Pawlikowska-Jasnorzewska was most important when it came to emancipatory activities in poetry (Kwiatkowski 1972, XII-XIII). Several years Pawlikowska-Jasnorzewska's junior, Wanda Melcer, who published the majority of her poems before the debut of the author of *Blue Almonds* even came out, undoubtedly preceded her in pursuit of independence.

Wanda Melcer's portrait of a modern woman was sketched in her poetry in a multiaspectual way. Her modern woman is a person who takes part in civilisational, social and manner-related changes. Her life's activities bear witness to the abandonment of roles imposed by the patriarchal system. The new woman breaks taboos (she does not avoid the topics of nudity, the right to be a member of the government, or to take part in education or artistic activities), and she is educated. Above all, she is independent and self-reliant. She does not need a guardian, she is looking more for a partner. She is also ambitious and creative, thirsty for success and hungry for new experiences, as demonstrated by how she frequently changes her place of abode and appropriates new spaces. She confronts the outer reality, she is open to otherness and changeability, but at the same time she longs to create her own world. That act of creation takes places via a search for the rules governing how one co-exists with one's environment. Just like Pawlikowska-Jasnorzewska, she experiences herself through engaging with nature, other people, or the world of culture, but she believes in the rule of choice and not obligation. Only this can guarantee that the harmony of an individual being is discovered, a harmony which is related to feeling closeness, acceptance, satisfaction and fascination (Morzyńska--Wrzosek 2013, 34-35).

In the poetry in question, the planned act of erasing gender differences in some relationships between humans is accompanied by a desire to highlight female distinctiveness. This applies to the aesthetic sphere in particular, but it also concerns the manner-related and psychological realms to some extent. The content of these ideas is reflected in Melcer's varied style and changeable forms of lyrical expression, which are often connected to the avant-garde concepts of the futurists and expressionists (cf. Sobieraj 2018, 173-174; Sobieraj 2020, 171-172; Kraj 2019, 72-75).

5. Portrait – Self-portrait

In Wanda Melcer's poems that depict a modern woman one can see a reflection of herself: an extraordinary and controversial personality with liberal views, demonstrating nonconformist behaviour, and interested in avant-garde art. Her utterances sometimes take the form of a story about her own life and one can find evidence of the "identiticality and narration's narrator", which makes it possible to state that there is an autobiographical element (Starobinski 1979, 307).

First of all, one should point to the feminist perspective of the poetry, which is most evident in the title of the collection *Na pewno książka kobiety* (*A Woman's Book for Sure*). In almost every one of the poems included there, there is a first-person "I" speaking, and it specifies her gender either by using feminine verb forms or one can deduce this information from the situations. The lyrical subject's revealing of her female gender makes it possible (in accordance with Grażyna Borkowska's assumptions) to talk about women's poetry in this case too (Borkowska 2009, 71). After all, Melcer herself got involved in the activities of the League for the Reformation of Manners, even though that was slightly later, when she had given up writing poetry in favour of prose. When it came to journalism, she was also concerned with the then thorny problems of the fight for equality.

The various incarnations and professions of the heroines in Melcer's poems are, on many occasions, a reflection of her own jobs and public activities. Apart from her autotelic poems, in which the lyrical subject presents herself as a female poet (e.g. *Głos* (*Voice*)), it is worth noting others, such as the poem *Pociecha* (*Consolation*), which probably concerns the public talks and readings given by the author at the Polish Artistic Club, or *Westchnienie* (*A Sigh*), which describes her thoughts after taking up a position at the ministerial Department of Publishing Houses. On the other hand, *Atalanta* is a reflection of Melcer's interest in sports; moreover, it is known that she was a member of the "Grażyna" sports club, based in Skaryszewski Park in Warsaw (Kotowska-Kachel 2013, 97).

A separate group is made up of poems about painting(s), which demonstrate the author's knowledge of the latest contemporary movements in art, knowledge she probably acquired while studying at the School of Fine Arts in Warsaw (Kotowska--Kachel 2013, 96). Yet she was also interested in sculpture and embroidery, which she displayed at an exhibition shared with her husband; she also commemorated these interests in two texts (*Hafty* (*Emroidery*), *Sen* (*Sleep*)).

On the other hand, musical elements (e.g. in *Symfonii Straussa* (*Strauss' Symphony*)) can be associated with the writer's father. Many of the poems from the first volume refer to her father and other close family and friends, especially in the frequent dedications. The cycle *Dziewięć sonetów wiejskich* (*Nine Countryside Sonnets*) is dedicated to her father, while the poem *Odchodzę* (*I'm Leaving*) is dedicated to her mother, *W ochronce* (*At the Nursery*) goes to her aunt Wanda Szczawińska, and *Inwokacja* (*Invocation*) is to Zofia Rygier-Nałkowska. Some of the statements contain slivers of the poet's memories of various places she had visited: Łazienkowski Park in Warsaw (*Pałac Łazienkowski* (*Łazienkowski Palace*)), the museum in Nuremberg (*Puchar narzeczonej* (*Fiancée's Cup*)), Switzerland (e.g. *Górska wycieczka* (*Mountain Excursion*)), the countryside, or unfamiliar cities. There are quite a lot of poems that show the lyrical subject on a journey. They are short and long journeys, local and foreign, by carriage or by train (*W obcym mieście* (*In an Unfamiliar City*), *Rozjazdy* (*Departures*), and *Sleeping* (*Sleeping*)). In *A Dream*, where exceptionally a proper name appears – that of the town Włocławek (which is an unambiguous hint at the hometown of Melcer's first husband, painter Szczęsny Rutkowski), the writer's *idée fixe* is included. Several years later it would find an outlet not only in her reportage writings, but also in her various travels across Europe and even to the Southern hemisphere (to Argentina and Brazil). This can be seen in the following excerpt:

> The ground burns me, wherever I step,
> through the thin soles of my little shoes.
> I have just returned, and again
> I would like to go somewhere.
> I don't care where,
> and I don't know at all why.
> I try to guess but can't for the life of me.
> It might as well be to that Włocławek,
> whence I came not long ago.
> It might as well be to that same village
> where I rode a horse in winter.
> The ground burns me, as it has done
> to so many poets by accident (Melcer-Rutkowska 1920b, 26).

The lyrical subject's self-identification as the poet and traveller, Melcer, gives reason enough to treat this attitude as an aspect of nomadic existence. And once again the issue of building one's own identity by recognising what's different and unknown rears its head. Both Melcer and the heroine she creates in her poems are energetic and dynamic people. Their life is determined by movement, action and a proactive attitude to their surroundings. The portrait of a modern woman, engaged in the revolutionary socio-cultural changes of the interwar years, as sketched in the poetry of the author of *Święta kucharka* (*The Holy Cook*), simultaneously becomes her self-portrait.

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"MY TONGUE SWORE BUT MY HEART DID NOT": VINDICATING ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY AGAINST THE PROCUSTEAN BED OF SCIENTISM IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

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Abstract

Often vilified, if not outright rejected, ordinary language philosophy has been sustained, from its very beginnings, due to the fame of authors such as Austin and the later Wittgenstein; but not, however, on its own merits. These, when recognized, are branded as either constituting a bad philosophy of language, or simply a bad philosophy altogether. Thus, some charitable interpretations have tried to domesticate its methods to make it compatible with a more orthodox philosophy of language. Very gradually, however, this situation is changing, largely thanks to the influence that Stanley Cavell's philosophy is having on several generations of philosophers. The main thing is to convince ourselves that ordinary language philosophy is not strictly speaking a philosophy of language. It is a philosophy that proceeds from the ordinary and pays attention to the importance that the ordinary has for philosophy. We will, in the course of this article, analyze the criticisms and attempts to domesticate ordinary language philosophy and will anticipate Cavell's defense of the ordinary language philosophy as practiced by Austin and Ryle in Cavell's inheritance of the former

Key words

ordinary language philosophy, Stanley Cavell, J.L. Austin, Benson Mates, Ludwig Wittgenstein

Introduction

I will not, even for the sake of argument, state that any specific period in the past was better than the present, but it seems to me that currently a particular crisis has developed in which the health of the human spirit hangs in the balance. The reason for this is primarily because the human spirit lies in the hands of people who have little or no patience for anything without practical use, or for anything that is not measurable, replicable, consumable, etc. This may not be absolutely bad, but it is definitely not good; and is one of the repercussions that the world-wide expansion of scientism is having on all aspects of our lives.[1] Being a professor of philosophy myself, it is sad to see that the field of study appears to be voluntarily taking part in what can only be described as nonsense.

I consider myself to be a Wittgensteinian at least in that I am, like Wittgenstein, convinced that the nature of philosophy is somehow connected with the way "people live": that is, with features of our culture and civilization. However, these do not need to be extraordinary features, ordinary ones serve just as well (indeed, maybe this is the reason why this kind of philosophy is quite extraordinary). Wittgenstein was said to be an ordinary language philosopher, and, the way I see it, the main goal of ordinary language philosophy (OLP) is, paraphrasing Austin, to remind us of our responsibility for the things we say where and when we say them, as well as the everyday commitments resulting from the things we say. In other words, it is an approach meant not so much to elaborate a theory of meaning, but rather to describe the way we – creatures endowed with language – experience and create meaning. Against the reductionism and bias characteristic of a scientistic, decoupled rationality, OLP finds in the understanding of meaning a manifestation of human life (PI: §§80-81). In effect, this is no different from understanding a piece of music, a painting, a poem, or even a joke as a manifestation of a form of life. *Our* form of life.

I claimed in the opening section of this article (somewhat melodramatically and for the purposes of emphasis), that the health of the human spirit hangs by a thread. I have also suggested something the need to vindicate OLP in order to reverse this situation. Its critics, however, think that OLP is just a "sign of the sickness of our souls, a revolt against reason itself and a self-deceptive attempt to procure by theft what one has failed to gain by honest toil" (Rorty 1967, 3)[2]. Consequently, following its dazzling appearance in the 1940s and 1950s, in the 1960s OLP suffered a quite abrupt fall into oblivion and became regarded as a failed project. Now, there are enough reasons to maintain that the discredit suffered by OLP was largely a result of the distorted image that most philosophers have made (or assumed) of it. Thus, some familiar criticisms which form the basis of this distorted image are as follows:

> Philosophy is, or should be, concerned with the foundations of knowledge, the relation between mind and body, the nature of justice, and other such issues, not with what ordinary people think and do.

[1] My experience tells me that one is never careful enough when making such statements. Suffice it to say that what I am pointing to in my accusation is not science, but rather "scientism." I mean by "scientism" the tendency in the social sciences and humanities to assume and apply the scientific method in their own practices, and to accept that the only valid knowledge is that which can be obtained by means of the scientific method. In other words, scientism is equivalent, in my opinion, to a propositional, cognitivist colonization of reason that turns those disciplines following other procedures into epistemic epiphenomena. This is very different from criticizing science, which is unquestionable in its own right.
[2] Rorty attributes the thought to Russell.

> Practitioners of ordinary language philosophy fail to distinguish between the semantic and pragmatic features of language.
> Practitioners of ordinary language philosophy make claims about how 'we' use words based solely on how they use words, but such a sample size is far too small to yield the wanted results. (Coleman y Welty 2010, 210; quoted in Vilanova forthcoming)

These three criticisms are easily dismantled, and indeed we will dismantle them below (sections 3 and 5 trough 7 *passim*). Firstly, however, I would like to draw attention to the fact that this situation is currently being reversed through the number and quality of publications that in the first decades of the 21st century have, albeit slowly, recovered lost ground. And, secondly, I would like to mention that most or a significant number of these publications are directly or indirectly influenced by the thought and work of Stanley Cavell.[3] Cavell is not to be considered a mere spokesman or defender of the philosophy of Austin or Wittgenstein: on the contrary, Cavell's defense of ordinary language philosophy is to be regarded as the "most detailed explanation and defense of the procedures of ordinary language philosophy ever made" (Chapell 1964, 13).

Cavell met Austin at Harvard in 1955 when he was still a student, and in December 1957 he was invited to participate in a meeting of the APA held at Stanford. He was given the task of defending Austin and, as a consequence, OLP, from criticisms by the logician and historian of ancient philosophy Benson Mates, who also attended the same meeting.

Mates (1958) took a firm stand on the side of empiricist semantics and a scientifically oriented philosophy against what he considered to be an anti-empirical philosophy. The latter, to make things worse, in his view appealed to informal methods of investigating ordinary language. In the paper he read on that occasion, Mates questioned whether ordinary language philosophers had gathered the kinds of evidence that their "statements on ordinary language" required, and whether these could be adequately verified. The fact that some of their statements seemed to contradict one another—he was referring to statements by Austin and Ryle on whether an action is made voluntarily—was considered by Mates to be symptomatic of the arbitrariness of OLP's methods. This arbitrariness, in his view, invalidated those methods as genuine sources of knowledge. Therefore, it was a question of either empiricism or arbitrariness (Hare 1960, 208).

My aim, in this paper, is somewhat in that it entails examining, first, what I believe are the causes of the almost complete disappearance of OLP from both academic curricula and fashionable debates; and, second, why I think these causes were biased and self-serving. I will start by making a brief presentation of the linguistic turn(s) that characterized much of philosophy during the twentieth century, before I then

[3] Some works in the Cavellian orbit include Baz (2012), Laugier (2013), Hansen (2017), de Lara and Crary (2019). See also Hanfling (2000), Dauber and Jost (2003), Coleman and Welty (2010), and Parker-Ryan (2010).

offer a glimpse of what OLP is (or should be taken to be). I will next review some criticisms of OLP. Then, with the help of Austin and Cavell, I will address these criticisms. Thus, among my questions will be: What is OLP? What were the reasons for its abrupt disappearance? Why is it necessary to vindicate it now?[4]

1. The Linguistic Turn(s) in Philosophy

Rorty (1968) divides the ranks of the linguistic turn's protagonists, the linguistic philosophers, into two great families: on the one hand those who opt for a philosophy of ideal language, and, on the other, those who opt for a philosophy of ordinary language. The former are characterized by the conviction that the problems of philosophy are solved by reforming ordinary language. The latter are characterized by the idea that the problems of philosophy are solved by deepening one's understanding of ordinary language.

It may be little more than a question of nuance, but my opinion is that we should speak of not one but of *two* linguistic turns, each of them corresponding to one of the two aforementioned families. Firstly, we have the logicist-semanticist turn initiated in the last decades of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, in the works of such authors as Frege, Russell, the early Wittgenstein, and the logical empiricists, among others. This first, paradigmatic turn runs in parallel with the development of analytic philosophy throughout the first half of the twentieth century, and reaching the end of its golden age due to a series of critical views, some of them internal (Quine's, Strawson's, Kripke's) and others external, the latter being the main cause of a further turn, namely the pragmatic turn. In what follows I will develop this distinction a bit further in order to mark important differences between the two types of philosophies of language resulting from each of the two turns: one semantic, the other pragmatic.

1.1. The Semantic Turn

At the end of the nineteenth century, philosophy underwent a turn with respect to the very epistemological domain characteristic of Modernity. This turn was of a

[4] While preparing this paper I have benefited from my participation in two research projects sponsored by the Spanish Government: "Perspectivas personales. Conceptos y aplicaciones" (RTI2018-098254-B-100. Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades. Programa Estatal de I+D+i Orientada a los Retos de la Sociedad. Gobierno de España) and "Comprensión intercultural, pertenencia y valor: aproximaciones wittgensteinianas" (PGC2018-093982-B-100. Ministerio de Economía y Competencia. Gobierno de España). Several versions of this material were read in different meetings and seminars held in the last two or three years in Barcelona, Madrid, La Laguna (Tenerife), Sao Paulo and (online) in Siedlce (Poland). I am very grateful for all the comments I received on those occasions. But I would especially like to thank Byron Davies for his invaluable help with the revision of my English. If this article has something interesting to tell anyone, they will be able to understand it thanks to Byron's help. Needless to say, any errors in the text are entirely my responsibility.

linguistic nature. Authors like Frege and the early Wittgenstein were convinced that most philosophical problems had their origin in some kind of linguistic misunderstanding caused by the vague and ambiguous nature of ordinary language. In order to avoid these misunderstandings, they proposed that the answer to traditional philosophical problems – such as those related to being, substance, or mind – should be obtained from careful attention to language. This attention was not given to the superficial grammar of each particular language, but rather to the logical form of language.

This linguistic turn imposed a new philosophical method – the logical analysis of language – and meant the birth of analytic philosophy, whose golden age lasted until the 1950s. Throughout those 50 years, analytic philosophy dominated a good part of the Western philosophical scene with something of an iron fist. Also, just as with the social sciences and to a lesser extent the humanities, analytic philosophy succumbed to the siren songs of scientism, and, even worse, voluntarily participated in the process of epistemic and cognitive colonization of all orders of human experience (empirical, aesthetic, moral, religious, etc.).

The interest of the "semantic turn" in language was certainly genuine, but it did not exactly coincide with the interest that linguists or philologists may have had in language. It was not strictly speaking a linguistic philosophy. The ultimate goal of the logical analysis of language was to bring to light its formal structure. But contrary to what many have thought, this goal is not so different from the traditional goals of philosophy[5]. For instance, the logical analysis of language was needed because, according to the likes of Frege, the early Wittgenstein and the logical empiricists, considered ordinary language as irredeemably vague, ambiguous, and ill-formed. The linguistic turn meant a search for an ideal, formal language free of ambiguities and in which, therefore, thoughts and propositions could be adequately expressed. This was to be achieved by means of the logical analysis of language, since it was assumed that the deep logical structure of our propositions kept a privileged relationship with the structure or form of reality. The semantic turn, thus, emphasized the representational capacity of language and its ability to say things about the world under the guise of the relationships between the meanings of our sentences and their truth conditions. Knowing the meaning of a sentence, then, is the same as knowing what the world would have to be like for the sentence to be true.

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[5] Curiously enough, this criticism is very similar to the one made of OLP that depends on the assumption that it is a linguistic philosophy concerned only with language. More specifically, this is the assumption that OLP's main concern consists in revealing important aspects of ordinary language that we might have overlooked, determining what are its correct uses and denouncing abuses. But as Austin said, OLP does "not *merely* [look] at words (or 'meanings', whatever they may be)" (Austin 1979b, 182).

1.2. Pragmatic Turn

In the 1950s the method of logical analysis of language had to face some important critical views that shattered its foundations. Some of these criticisms were *internal,* for instance: Quine's criticism of the two dogmas of empiricism; Strawson's criticism of Russell's theory of descriptions; Kripke's criticism of the descriptive theory of reference; and Rorty's criticism of representationalism; while other criticisms were *external* (mainly Austin's and Wittgenstein's).

The main consequence of both kinds of criticism was the same: the abandonment of the method of logical analysis of language. But while the internal criticism in fact meant a face-lift and a flight forward on the part of analytic philosophy of language, the external criticism gave way to a new linguistic turn: the pragmatic turn.

According to this second turn, firstly, the participation of certain pragmatic elements and processes in the determination of meaning is not residual, but rather permeates all language in such a way that the study of language, as though it were an abstract and decontextualized object, is completely meaningless. Second, ordinary language is perfectly precise and wholly adequate to its task, which cannot be reduced to just representing the objective world. As Austin reminds us, ordinary language embodies all the practical distinctions that prove useful in human life. Ordinary language, then, does not need to be analyzed logically, nor indeed in any other way. Its use should be observed and recorded as a means for accessing the normative background that sustains our way of life.

In their heyday, the so-called ordinary language philosophers were mainly located in Oxford. Their leader was J. L. Austin, who proposed the expression "linguistic phenomenology" as the name for this new way of doing philosophy, which proceeded by examining "what we should say when, what words we should use in what situations" (Austin 1979b, 182). Other OLP philosophers taught at Cambridge, like Wittgenstein and some of his early followers. These philosophers renounced conceptions of language as constituted by sets of pre-existing propositions, or of meaning as something hidden and to be discovered by means of logical analysis. Thus, they also rejected the supposed isomorphism between language/logic and the world. Representationalism ceased to be the main factor in the philosophy of language. This literally put in check the supposed relationship between truth and meaning. Consequently, what is important according to OLP is not representing or mirroring the world, but how we (each one of us) use language on a given occasion. Language was no longer seen as an ideal that is subject to the laws of logic. Instead, language begins to be seen by OLP a something alive, situated, contingent, and in continuous change.

1.3. The meaning of "Ordinary Language Philosophy"

Ryle (1953) warned of the dangers we face if we are unclear about what we mean (or what we do not mean) by the word "ordinary" in "ordinary language philosophy"[6]. I could not agree more with Ryle's warning, but what is at stake here, in my opinion, is something far deeper. I believe that after having presented the two linguistic turns (the semantic and the pragmatic), we are in a position to specify that what is at stake is our conception of *rationality*.[7] That is, what the pragmatic turn entails is a profound change in our conception of rationality: it advocates leaving behind a Rationality decoupled from our way of life, in favor of another notion of reason coupled to it. It is not, then, a confrontation between a rational and an irrational conception of language, but between a Rationality that threatens to colonize and phagocytize everything falling out of the limits of its area of influence, and a different kind of rationality whose informality overflows into those limits. Certainly, defenders of the more traditional, uncoupled Rationality will think that this is a bad justification or even worse, since on their conception irrationality and informality are practically synonymous. I will deal with that thought in the next section. In what remains of this section I will concentrate my efforts on trying to show how a realistic image of OLP modifies the notion that an "Orthodox conception" (Ambrose 1952) has of certain philosophical concepts[8].

The Orthodox conception is engaged in the search for truth. According to this conception, language is a representational tool, "a 'formal' calculus with abstract, timeless, precise contents..., which serves to represent and explain reality." For its part, OLP considers language to be a "repertoire of conventions for carrying out actions of many different kinds, and pragmatically dependent".

If we now turn to the conception of knowledge that follows from the above, we will find that, contrary to the conception supported by ideal language philosophy (according to which "knowledge is necessary, infallible, monotonous, well-founded and free of pragmatic conditioning"), OLP considers knowledge to be "fallible, approximate, not absolutely grounded, not monotonous, conditioned by practical issues".

The sum of the above results is a profound change in our conception, our rationality. In this case, the orthodox conception ("uncoupled," as I have called it) behind ideal language philosophy is one in which Rationality is "a priori,

[6] For instance, we should be clear that it is not the same use of ordinary language as the ordinary use of language. We should also be clear that OLP's investigation is about what we do with our words and not about the characteristics or properties of those words. In this regard, a comment by Parker-Ryan´s comes to mind: "Indeed, the figures we now know as 'Ordinary Language' philosophers did not refer to themselves as such – it was originally a term of derision, used by its detractors" (Parker-Ryan 2019).

[7] In fact, this should surprise no one: it is obvious in the quotation from Rorty in which he refers to critics of OLP and to Russell in particular.

[8] Here I am closely following Vilanova (forthcoming) and the next three quotations are from this yet unpublished paper.

foundational and 'stark'". The new (coupled) rationality promoted by OLP is "contextualized, weak, historically and anthropologically determined, content-varying, and 'embodied'": A wild horse that the orthodox conception set out to tame.

2. Taming Ordinary Language Philosophy

Although few people in academia really know what to do with Wittgenstein, he and Austin are two of the most respected and widely read philosophers of the 20th century. Nevertheless, OLP has not attracted the same amount of attention as these philosophers: or when it has, this has been to belittle its assumptions, its methods, and its alleged results. In my opinion all the criticisms made against OLP belong to one of the following two categories: (1) criticism claiming that OLP is a bad philosophy of language; and (2) criticism claiming that OLP is simply a bad philosophy.

Let us first pay attention to the second objection. According to OLP, *what we usually say* is a significant factor in doing philosophy. But this view is simply and plainly unacceptable for the many philosophers who think that philosophy is a much more difficult task, even an epic one. I would like to mention here the names of Ernest Gellner and Bertrand Russell.

In his unmistakable style, Russell (1957) begins with the following ironic remark:

> My purpose in this article is first to discuss G. F. Warnock's 'Metaphysics in Logic' [...] Mr. Warnock belongs to the 'Philosophy-Without-Tears' School, so named because it makes philosophy very much easier than it has ever been before: in order to be a competent philosopher, it is only necessary to study Fowler's *Modern English Usage*; post-graduates may advance to *The King's English*, but this book is to be used with caution for, as its title shows, it is somewhat archaic. (225)

Warnock was regarded as a disciple of Wittgenstein, so the good connoisseur would have immediately realized that when Russell says "'Philosophy-Without-Tears' School" he is actually referring to OLP and to (the later) Wittgenstein in particular: a philosopher whom Russell regarded as having thrown his talent overboard and as having philosophically degraded himself by taking common sense seriously.

> The later Wittgenstein... seems to have grown tired of serious thinking and to have invented a doctrine which would make such an activity unnecessary. I do not for one moment believe that the doctrine which has these lazy consequences is true...
> The desire to understand the world is, they think, an outdated folly. (Russell 1959, 161)

And still more, he states the fundamental dogma of OLP to be the assumption that:

> common sense [i.e.: ordinary language] is sacrosanct, and that it is impious to suppose it capable of improvement. (Russell 1959, xii)

Gellner (1959) shows the same kind of concern when he considers that that OLP renounces any serious solution to those problems and questions relevant to the increase of scientific knowledge. But he also criticizes what in his opinion is one of OLP's most undesirable features: namely, the view that linguistic practices with certain expressions are what determine the meanings of those expressions, so that every time our use of an expression changes, its meaning also changes, making it impossible to discuss even the degree to which our discourses are faithful to the nature of what we are talking about. In other words, according to Gellner, if OLP were correct, then linguistic activity would be immune to (orthodox) rational criticism.

It seems, then, that according to this kind of criticism OLP is just bad philosophy: trivial and naïve, having so surrendered to common sense that it is immune to rational criticism, etc. As Stanley Cavell has pointed out on several occasions, this criticism is nothing but yet another manifestation of the mistrust that philosophy shows towards common sense. But beyond this display of distrust based on a superficial and, I suspect, a biased reading of OLP, we do not find good arguments on Gellner's part. His book is at times a libel made up of an endless succession of comments *ad hominen*, which should make us want to ask where exactly this need to reject or to overcome ordinary language philosophy comes from (Mulhall 1994, 445).

If we focus exclusively on the criticism directed against the alleged conservatism of OLP, it is very easy to show how much the critics miss the mark, for as Austin made very clear, OLP neither considers ordinary language to be immutable and incapable of improvement and therefore "sacrosanct", nor does it claim that ordinary language is the last word in any philosophical dispute. It is rather only the first word.

> Certainly ordinary language has not claim to be the last word, if there is such thing. It embodies, indeed, something better than the metaphysics of the Stone Age, namely, as was said, the inherited experience and acumen of many generations of men [...] that experience has been derived only from the sources available to ordinary men throughout most of civilized history: it has not been fed from the resources of the microscope and its successors. And it must be added too, that superstition and error and fantasy of all kinds do become incorporated in ordinary language and even sometimes stand to the survival test [...] Certainly, then, ordinary language is *not* the last word: in principle <u>it can everywhere be supplemented and improved upon and superseded</u>. Only remember, <u>it *is* the *first* word</u>. (Austin 1979b, 185; the underlining is mine)[9].

Be that as it may, such criticisms as Russell's and Gellner's, especially the latter's, have contributed in the construction of a distorted and very unfair image of OLP: one that is informal and dogmatic, to say the least, as well as an image tailored to those

[9] Think, for example, of the philosophical elucidation of meaning. In this case the first word would consist in the "explanation or perhaps regulation of the ordinary notion of 'meaning'," whereas the last word would be the "philosophical concept of meaning," the result of the typical process of reflection (See Blanco Salgueiro forthcoming).

very same criticisms. According to this distorted image, OLP's bomb-proof fidelity to ordinary language limits its work to nothing more than establishing correct uses of language and criticizing incorrect ones (mainly carried out by philosophy) based strictly on its knowledge of and trust in ordinary language. According to Gellner this alleged short-sightedness on the part of OLP turns it into a propaedeutic or a mere therapy. But OLP is not propaedeutic. It seeks neither to reform nor to justify any concrete use of our language because, to start with, there are no uses superior to others. In fact, pace Gellner and Russell, PI is full of examples of how the extra-ordinary uses of philosophy stretch the limits of meaning so that they can find a suitable context[10].

Moving on to the second objection outlined above, it is easy to see why an ideal language philosophy might find OLP to be a bad philosophy of language. For the former, a good explanation of natural language and of meaning is one that will include references to the formal structure of language and to its compositional features; and then the result should be verified on the basis of objective evidence by means of reliable methods. According to this way of thinking, nothing can be less reliable or unsystematic than focusing on the contextualist nature of uses of language: the incidence of contexts, it is assumed, is incompatible with the required formal and systematic treatment of them. Critical reactions to this supposed contextualism were not long in coming[11], and consisted either in recommending the conversion of OLP into a kind of philosophy of linguistics (e.g., Mates, Fodor and Katz, to name just a few), or in taming it in such a way that it would be compatible with the exclusive determination of meaning by semantics (e.g., Grice, but also others like Kaplan and Searle). I will make my assessment of the first reaction when I introduce the exchange between Mates and Cavell, and I will discuss the second in the following paragraphs.

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[10] See Cavell: "the philosopher who proceeds from ordinary language is concerned less to avenge sensational crimes against the intellect than to redress its civil wrongs [...] This inevitably requires reintroducing ideas which have become tyrannical (e.g., existence, obligation, certainty, identity, reality, truth...) into the specific contexts in which they function naturally. This is not a question of cutting big ideas down to size, but of giving them the exact space in which they can move without corrupting" (MWM, 18).

[11] It is a common mistake to confuse OLP with a radical version of contextualism. However, the difference between the former and the latter is, in spite of everything, very evident. Contextualism is part of the business of determining the truth-conditions of what we say, and it adds to the traditional picture a certain sensitivity to the pragmatic and contextual aspects involved in determining those conditions. Ordinary language philosophy could not be more indifferent to the question of the truth conditions of what we say. The meaningful unit according to ordinary language philosophy is not words or even utterances, but rather "the total speech act in the total speech situation" (Austin) or the language games shaping our way of life (Wittgenstein). Thus, if there is any empirical fact about language according to ordinary language philosophy, it would be this: the boundary between semantics and pragmatics is neither impenetrable nor opaque, but rather the opposite. That is, there is a constant and uninterrupted traffic from one to the other, the important thing being not so much the determination of the truth conditions of what is said, as rather the recognition of what is said when, where, and by whom.

If there is one thing OLP is known for, it is the full embrace of the pragmatic turn. In a nutshell, what this means is that the involvement of pragmatic factors and processes in determining what is said must be taken into serious consideration. The consequences of the pragmatic turn in its purest and most extreme version are such that it makes no sense to continue asking about the truth conditions of the proposition expressed by means of what is literally said[12]. The proposition is contextually determined, and this is a phenomenon that pertains to the whole language and not only to those regions of it that are more clearly sensitive to context. Semantics cannot do all the work by itself, and the boundary separating semantics from pragmatics is not impermeable in the way that Grice intended.

A notable difference between Grice, on the one hand and Russell and Gellner, on the other, is that the Grice does not ridicule OLP. Although he is the leading proponent of what I call the attempt to domesticate OLP, Grice also believes in the usefulness of a philosophy that proceeds from ordinary language[13]. What Grice achieves is not without merit or interest. His attempt at domestication begins with the distinction between what a speaker says literally and what his utterances imply conversationally (what Grice called an "implicature"). Grice never had reason to question the mutual independence of semantics and pragmatics. Accordingly, he never doubted that the meaning of what is said belonged in the domain of semantics:

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[12] In a footnote just after the paragraph on whether ordinary language is the last word or the first word, Austin asks us to "forget, for once and for a while, that other curious question 'Is [ordinary language] true?'" (Austin 1979b, 185 footnote #2).

[13] In this respect one can never be too cautious with Grice, since, for instance, it must be borne in mind that in the 1960s he was part of the group of Oxonian philosophers led by Austin—the "Play Group"—one of whose main tasks consisted, in Grice's own words, of "careful examination of detailed features of ordinary speech" (Grice 1986, 51). Grice even replaced Austin in the leadership of this group for a short period of time. In fact, he was explicitly against Russell's and Gellner's criticisms and in favor of the philosophy that "proceeds from ordinary language":

> Another dogma to which some may have supposed us [i.e., ordinary language philosophers] to be committed is that of the sanctity, or sacrosanctity, of whatever metaphysical judgments or world-pictures may be identified as underlying ordinary discourse. [...] In fact, the only position which to my mind would have commanded universal assent was that a careful examination of the detailed features of ordinary discourse is required as a foundation for philosophical thinking; and even here the enthusiasm of the assent would have varied from person to person, as would the precise view taken (if any was taken) about the relationship between linguistic phenomena and philosophical theses. [...] When properly regulated and directed, 'linguistic botanizing' seems to me to provide a valuable initiation to the philosophical treatment of a concept, particularly if what is under examination (and it is arguable that this should always be the case) is a family of different but related concepts. Indeed, I will go further, and proclaim it as my belief that linguistic botanizing is indispensable, at a certain stage, in a philosophical enquiry [...] (Grice 1986, 50-56; quoted by Blanco Salgueiro forthcoming).

However, it is no less true, and above all more decisive, that the driving forces of Grice's thought included both a set of more traditional convictions and a desire for systematicity, as can be seen in other statements of his in which he mentions his later "efforts to arrive at a more theoretical treatment [i.e., the elaboration of a grammar of ordinary language] of the linguistic phenomena of the genre which had occupied me for so long at Oxford." In other words, he had full confidence in the possibilities of revealing a pattern reiterated beneath the varied and even chaotic use of language, and thus of accessing "new levels of generality" (Grice 1986, 59); More on this point in Acero forthcoming). This was so much the case that, according to Soames, "Grice's work is the end of the ordinary language philosophy" (Soames 2003, 198).

what the speaker literally says already determines by itself a truth-evaluable proposition. Implicatures, on the other hand, since they do not affect, according to Grice, the truth value of the proposition uttered by a speaker, are a matter of pragmatics. The distinction is defined as that between the semantic or literal meaning, and the pragmatic or speaker's meaning. Grice does not stop there, but rather goes on to systematize the study of the speaker's meaning by endowing the pragmatic aspects of linguistic communication with its own rational logic. Thus, Grice aspires to systematize any informal aspect of our use of language and, by doing so, he ends up domesticating and, in a way, trivializing OLP. In other words, he presents it as a clearly irrelevant addition to the philosophical enterprise of determining the truth conditions of what is said.

The shadow of Grice's attempted taming of the pragmatic turn along more orthodox lines is, indeed, long – so much so that the neo-Gricean orthodoxy wants nothing to do with pragmatic novelty (i.e., with its chaotic consequences for the theoretical study of language.) Thus, the latter has also focused its efforts on taming OLP. This could be represented even more graphically: it is as though the semantic turn had assimilated the pragmatic turn, or rather faced with the apparent impossibility of governing the pragmatic turn, the most orthodox thought opted for a strategy (sadly) characteristic of a more reductionist philosophy. This was the strategy of accommodating it to the Procrustean bed of formalism and semantics. In my view this has been achieved throughout the enterprise of sponsoring contextualism, so that the latter occupies the place that should belong to OLP[14]. However, what exactly is achieved by this move? Above all, contextualism becomes the champion of pragmatics and is presented as the main adversary of the standard semanticist position, namely literalism. This has the consequence of keeping semantics and pragmatics separate, even though they are in fact two sides of the same project: that of systematically determining the truth-conditions of what is said.

3. A Friendly Face to Ordinary Language Philosophy?

A place often visited even by would-be supporters of OLP is the distinction between what, following Hansen (2014), we will call Austin's "constructive project" and Wittgenstein's "therapeutic project." Framed this way, the aim seems to be to rescue from the above criticisms at least one half of OLP (namely, Austin's project), even if this comes at the cost of losing, since it is impossible to tame, the other half (namely, Wittgenstein's project). This division derives from tendencies to contrast Austin's more systematic vocation with Wittgenstein's anti-theoretical spirit, so that it is as though Austin's philosophical project were located somewhat closer to the semantic turn's area of influence. Here I will take this division for granted solely for the sake

[14] See footnote #13, above.

of argument, but also with the aim of showing that this attempt to tame even Austin's seemingly more propitious philosophy is based on a misunderstanding of it.

The following is how Austin describes what is believed to be his constructive project:

> in examining what we should say when, what words we should use in what situations, we look not only at words (or meanings, whatever they may be), but also at the realities we speak of through words: we are using a heightened awareness of words to sharpen our perception of [...] phenomena (Austin, 1979b, 182).

The main hypothesis of the constructive project is that it is possible to discover facts related to the meanings of words and to reach certain conclusions about the realities to which we refer through our words by observing how those words are used (Hansen 2014, 557). Thus, according to Hansen, we can distinguish two different phases:

> The *Semantic phase*: it is divided in two, a first phase in which the ordinary language philosophers make statements about the use of certain expressions, and a second one in which they offer explanations of such uses (that is, of the meaning of the expressions) based on the statements made, for example like this: "the best way to explain that the expression 'X' is generally used in the way 'Y', requires that the semantics of 'X' possess the feature F".
> The *Metaphysical phase*: from the fact that an expression possesses certain semantic traits it follows that that to which the expression refers is of such and such a form: if the semantics of 'X' possesses F, then the nature of that to which 'X' refers possesses the trait G.

Proponents of the constructive project insist that in the semantic phase, Austin employs an informal experimental approach to gather evidence of the existence of certain almost imperceptible distinctions between the meanings of different words and of expressions that apparently have the same meaning. This method, though informal, is intended to ensure that the intellectual respectability of Austin's project is in keeping with scientific standards of rationality; for instance, evidentialism. The "heightened word awareness" Austin mentions in the text above would be obtained by collecting evidence that is "almost imperceptible" but nevertheless measurable. What Austin proposes, according to this interpretation, are linguistic experiments thanks to which it is clear that it is better to use one word rather another in a particular situation. This is needed because, according to its critics, ordinary language philosophers make descriptive claims about uses of language, but the methods they employ to gather that evidence are unreliable.

But this insistence on interpreting Austin from an evidentialist perspective does not take into account another possibility that is much more accurate, or at least more in line with what seems to be the spirit of Austin's philosophy. In fact, the evidentialist perspective is completely refuted not only by Cavell's interpretation of Austin and Wittgenstein, but also, despite Hansen, by a close reading of the works of these authors themselves. It is thus worth stressing at this point the differences between, on the one hand, Hansen's evidentialist-scientistic interpretation, however informal it may be, of Austin's methods, and, on the other hand, Cavell's own interpretation of those methods, which consists in comparing Austin's ability to offer examples of ordinary usage to the phenomenon of having perfect pitch (Cavell 1994, 21). In this regard, it is revealing to bring up Wittgenstein's remarks about acquiring "a nose" for recognizing imponderable evidence (PI, part II, section XI). It is striking that Hansen himself echoes Cavell's analogy but fails to recognize the difference with his own interpretation. However, this should not come as a surprise since, in the same work, Hansen subscribes to the more-or-less widespread view that explicating, and therefore understanding, Cavell's views about ordinary language "is no picnic" (Hansen 2014, 560; Hansen echoes Bates and Cohen 1972). And it is plain to see that he has not understood him. In short, what in this context Cavell is trying to achieve by means of the perfect pitch analogy is to subtract Austin's philosophy from the field of epistemology – where what is important is verification or justification on the basis of ponderable evidence of the truth of our knowledge claims – and to bring it closer to more informal fields of thought: for example, a field such as ethics, where what is important includes recognizing the positions we occupy as speakers and whether we are willing to accept responsibility for the things we say, etc.

4. Enter Benson Mates

Now, is Austin's informal method in fact a reliable one for gathering evidence about how we ordinarily use an expression? This is the starting point of Mates's (1958) argument against OLP. The positions in the debate are very clearly defined: Mates argues that neither Austin nor any other ordinary language philosopher has a reliable method for settling the kind of question that is at stake when it comes to determining the meaning of what we say or whether this or that use of language is correct or not. Cavell's response is as complex as it is illuminating. First, he manages to show that Mates's way of posing the question does not do justice to OLP since the latter is not in the business of gathering the kinds of evidence needed to support a systematic theory of meaning. He also manages to show that precisely the novelty and strength of OLP (of the pragmatic turn for that matter) makes clear that it is unnecessary to appeal to matters of fact in order to determine the correctness or incorrectness of a given use of language. If this is interpreted as laziness or hastiness on the part of OLP by the likes of Mates, then so much the worst for them.

As might be expected, Mates's criticism was not exclusive, and neither was he the first philosopher to formulate this kind of criticism against OLP. Chisholm (1951), for instance, had already criticized OLP on the basis that a right or wrong use of language is a question of truth or falsity, and therefore settling this question should be considered an empirical matter, and not one to be solved by mere speculation. To be fair, we must say that Cavell's response was also broadly anticipated, for example, by Alice Ambrose (1952). This will be discussed further in section 7.

For now let us quickly review the main points of Mates's critique. There is no better way of doing this than to check what Mates himself has to say about what he thinks are the main difficulties facing OLP:

> In this paper I shall discuss certain difficulties which seem to me to stand in the way of understanding or properly appreciating the work of the so-called "ordinary language" philosophers. These difficulties concern the interpretation of the various seemingly factual statements which such philosophers make about language. I am mainly interested in the question of how one would go about verifying these statements; *insofar as meaning is bound up with verification, this is also a question of their meaning* [...] Even among those [ordinary language philosophers] who can claim to be "in the know" or to "get to the point" there are wide disagreements both as to the truth and as to the meaning of given assertions of the sort under consideration, and these disagreements are by themselves a basis for skepticism. When in addition it is seen that such assertions play a crucial role in the discussions which are supposed to answer, dissolve, or somehow get rid of the traditional problems of philosophy, a philosopher may perhaps be excused for looking at the matter a little more closely (Mates 1958, 161; emphasis added).

According to Hansen (2017, 7), Mates' argument can be summarized as follows:

> (1) Statements about language made by ordinary language philosophers are descriptive (evaluable as true or false), not normative (i.e. not advice on how to use language).
> (2) Skepticism about the ordinary language philosophers' descriptive claims about language is warranted by the fact that (i) speakers are often not reliable reporters of their own linguistic behavior, and (ii) there is disagreement even among practitioners of ordinary language philosophy (Ryle and Austin, for example) about how expressions are used.
> (3) There are two basic approaches to verifying descriptive statements about language: the extensional approach, which looks at the use of expressions, and the intentional approach, which involves eliciting the beliefs of speakers about the meaning or use of expressions. Ordinary language philosophers 'tend toward an armchair version of the extensional approach', ignoring the intentional approach. The two approaches may yield conflicting results, so relying only on one method will not give a complete picture of ordinary use.

Even more succinctly: according to Mates, philosophers of ordinary language make descriptive claims about uses of language, but the methods they employ for gathering the evidence needed to make those claims are unreliable.

5. Extending The Limits Of Rationality I: What does knowledge mean??

What decisively shows how poorly Mates understood Austin is that Austin did not aim to elaborate a theory of meaning, and so the reliability of his methods should not be judged from that angle. Austin's real aim was to clarify some traditional philosophical disputes (e.g. about which actions are good or bad, right or wrong, what is the nature of action, the problem of free will, etc.) by clarifying what are the correct uses of expressions such as '(by) error', '(by) accident', 'deliberately', 'intentionally', 'voluntarily', 'cause', 'know ('I know that p')', etc.[15]

In order to show that this is the case, I will following de Lara (2019) and take a closer look at the pages in which Austin compares "I know" and "I promise."

> when I say, 'I promise', a new plunge is taken: I have not merely announced my intention, but, by using this formula (performing this ritual), I have bound myself to others, and staked my reputation, in a new way. Similarly, saying 'I know' is taking a new plunge. But it is *not* saying 'I have performed a specially striking feat of cognition, superior, in the same scale as believing and being sure, even to being merely quite sure': for there *is* nothing in that scale superior to being quite sure. Just as promising is not something superior, in the same scale as hoping and intending, even to merely fully intending: for there is nothing in that scale superior to fully intending. When I say, 'I know', I *give others my word*: I *give others my authority for saying* that 'S is P' (Austin 1979a, 99**)**.

As de Lara – closely following Cavell on this point – reminds us, this is a passage that for Austin's interpreters, especially those belonging to the analytic family, and regardless of their possible sympathies with Austin, represents a "fundamental, pervasive error in Austin's way of looking at words and things" (Cavell 2010, 320; See de Lara (2019)). The accusation is that, by means of this analogy, what Austin ends up doing is "performatize knowledge." That is, it is as though Austin were claiming "that to say 'I know' is to produce a performative (not descriptive) utterance" (320). Of course, the orthodox conception cannot accept this, because what Austin would be implying is that "just as when I say 'I promise' or 'I bet', in appropriate circumstances, then *eo ipso* [...] it follows that I (*ipso facto*) promise or I bet, in the same way if I say 'I know' then *eo ipso*, by that fact, it follows that I know" (320). But, of course, saying "I know that p" or "I know p" is neither necessary nor sufficient to know that p or to know p, and "[a]ny theory leading to such a conclusion has repudiated itself" (320). But as obvious as this may seem, it is worth considering the view that what these critics seem to be trying to safeguard at all costs is a descriptive or factual use of "I know", instead of trying to account for Austin's intended novelty. This is nothing new on the part of those criticisms of OLP that we have been considering: they appear unable to see beyond the limits of the orthodox conception of rationality, and they consequently try to accommodate any dissonance within those narrow limits.

Austin does not claim that saying "I know" is equivalent to performing an act of knowledge (expressing, as it were, mere subjective certainty). In fact, he denies it (Austin 1979a, 101). But what he may be suggesting, according to Cavell, is that using

[15] See Wittgenstein: "All these, however, can appear in the right light only when one has attained greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning something, and thinking. For it will then also become clear what may mislead us (and did mislead me) into thinking that if anyone utters a sentence and *means* or *understands* it, he is thereby operating a calculus according to definite rules" (PI: §81).

the words "I know" in a certain way implies that we are doing something *similar* to making a promise "*in a specific respect*, namely, that just as saying that you promise takes a step, makes a commitment, beyond saying that you fully intend to, so saying that you know takes a step beyond saying that you are, for your part, absolutely sure" (320). "A step beyond" here means "'going beyond' the cognitive accomplishments in being or making sure" (321), which for Austin, if we stick to Cavell's interpretation, means "that the step beyond can be said to be the *same or sufficiently similar* step that is taken in the case of promising, on the ground [...] namely, that *you give others your word*" (320-21). This suggestive way of looking at language is, though still incomplete, what decisively characterizes OLP, as well as Cavell's inheritance of Austin. Furthermore, what it reveals is that "human speech [is] radically, in each uttered word, ethical. Speaking, or failing to speak, to another is as subject to responsibility, say to further response, as touching, or failing to touch, another" (321). Whatever guarantee is there here, it is not based on empirical facts (Lara, 2019).

When Austin (1979a) asks, "How do you know it's a goldfinch?" what is at stake is not the justification of a claim to knowledge, but rather what position the person making the claim to knowledge occupies, since it is from that position that she can make that claim. In other words, what is at stake is whether she is in a good position to know what she claims to know. It is the position occupied by the speaker that determines her authority or legitimacy to make her claim. What is relevant, according to Austin, are "past experiences, our opportunities and our activities in learning to discriminate or discern, and, bound up with both, the correctness or otherwise of the linguistic usages we have acquired" (Austin 1979a, 80). All of which boils down to the following question: "How have I come to be in a position to know things about goldfinches?" whereby what is being questioned are my credentials as a speaker (experience, training, knowledge of the subject in question, etc.). Thus, what an ordinary language philosopher like Austin seeks is a proper "situation assessment" (Austin 1979b, 194). For him, the rationality of what we human beings say (claim) has less to do with whether it can be right (true) than with whether we have the right (or the legitimacy) to say it. If someone claims to know p, and later it turns out that p was false, it is not correct to say that she was wrong when she claimed to know p (Austin 1979a, 98). What according to Austin would allow us to judge that the person was wrong is that she could have been expected to occupy a position allowing her to know that p and yet did not occupy it at that time. By placing at the center of our attention the speaker's responsibility for what she says, what Austin manages to do is change the terms in which we value the rationality of a claim to knowledge.

It is the task of the speaker to make sure that she is in a position to claim to know what she claims to know; if she has any concrete reason to doubt this, then she is irresponsible in making that claim. What Austin's analogy suggests, then, is that "ostensibly epistemic language" ("I know") is as much about the careful assessment of a situation and the responsible understanding of our words' implications and effects as it is about ostensibly non-epistemic language (e.g., "I promise"). When I say, "I know", I am responsible for what I say (that I cannot be wrong): I take a risk and give my word, thus risking my reputation. In that sense, it is no different from assuming the kind of commitment that comes with saying "I promise."

6. Extending The Limits Of Rationality II: "Must We Mean What We Say?"

Cavell's defense of Austin at the 1957 APA conference revolved around two main themes: first, showing that the practice of OLP does not depend on the kind of evidence demanded by the likes of Mates; second, that the metalinguistic observations of ordinary language philosophers about the ordinary use of language are not descriptive, but are covered by a necessity of sorts, something that should make us want to reconsider what are the true limits and nature of our rationality.

Cavell admits that Mates is indeed right in insisting on differences between Austin and Ryle: Austin produces examples of what we say when and why (for example "let's take 'voluntarily'... we can make... a gift voluntarily"), while Ryle offers explanations (generalizations from examples) of what we say: "In their most common use 'voluntarily' and 'involuntarily' are used... as adjectives that apply to actions that should not have been done. We ask ourselves if a certain action was voluntary or not only when it seems that it is someone's fault... etc." (MWM, 2-8).

Mates, of course, assumes that the only acceptable option is understanding ordinary language philosophers' metalinguistic claims as though they were empirical claims to be contrasted by the right kind of evidence. For his part Cavell asks the following: Do we really need to conduct a survey to decide which of them – Austin or Ryle – is wrong? Would it indeed be dogmatic, Cavell continues, to conclude simply that, in this case, Ryle is wrong, and that Austin's examples are counterexamples of Ryle's generalization? Cavell answers negatively: but not because, as Mates argues, Ryle needs evidence to support his claim, but rather because he generalizes too hastily.

Ordinary language philosophers, Cavell notes, are neither linguists nor anthropologists studying a language which is not their own. An ordinary language philosopher makes observations about the language of which she herself is a native speaker. The metalinguistic claims, Cavell observes, are also uttered by a native speaker of a particular language. And generally, a native speaker does not have to go through the same procedures as a non-native speaker (for example, a foreign linguist researching our language) in order to be able to say when it is correct to say this or that. It is part of the process of learning a language that we know when an action is voluntary. Native speakers of a given language are themselves the source of evidence. They are, for example, the source of evidence used by linguists in their empirical descriptions of language.

The final result of the process of acquiring a language is that we share "routes of interest and feeling, modes of response, senses of humor and of significance and of fulfillment, of what is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is an assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation" (Cavell 1976d, 52). To paraphrase Wittgenstein: we share a grammar by the mere fact of having acquired the same language in a process that consists of aligning language with the world. The grammar of a word refers to its role within a given language game. OLP can be understood, then, as though it were a repository of grammatical reminders (more on this below).

Cavell observes that there is some kind of necessity in the metalinguistic assertions made by ordinary language philosophers, which is sustained by the intrinsic normativity of language. If someone at a party asks me if I have dressed the way I have voluntarily, this not only implies that my way of dressing is peculiar: it *must* mean that my way of dressing is peculiar. The only thing the ordinary language philosopher needs as a support for his metalinguistic observations is that something follows from the fact that a term is used in a habitual way: this authorizes us to make certain inferences, to draw certain conclusions; and this refers, again, to language-learning: "*learning what these implications are is part of language learning* [...] They are an essential part of what we communicate when we speak" (MWM, 11-12). By learning a language, we acquire an intimate, implicit understanding of these implications. It is not always possible to make explicit everything that we communicate, and so mistakes and misunderstandings are always possible. In contrast to Mates, then, "the philosopher who proceeds from ordinary language is entitled, without special empirical investigation, to [the kinds of] assertions [they make about ordinarily language, e.g., about how a word is used]" (MWM, 12, 37). There is no single way to specify that what we imply is appropriate. Therefore "the question of evidence is irrelevant" (MWM, p. 14).

I will now draw attention to Ambrose (1952) as a way of closing my attempt to vindicate OLP against the orthodox position of language, of knowledge, and – in short – of reason[16]. In fact, Ambrose successfully put distance between OLP and the orthodox conception. The latter is concerned with reliably establishing the truth conditions that an empirical statement must fulfill. OLP, for its part, is interested in the elucidation of linguistic facts. Now, although these are not strictly speaking the facts about the world sought by the orthodox position, they are, nonetheless, real. OLP, then, aspires to be able to say something about how we use language in referring to the world: it is just not a search for *the* truth. When a philosopher of ordinary language claims to understand an utterance, she is not claiming to be right about

[16] I am indebted to Juanjo Colomina-Almiñana for putting me on Ambrose's trail. In the same context of criticism and defense of OLP, Colomina-Almiñana (2018, especially 384 and ff.) devotes several pages to Ambrose's response to Chisholm, among many other interesting issues relevant to the present topic.

what the world is really like, but is rather saying something about her as well as our own image of the world, about what sense it has for us. Ordinary language is not strictly speaking about the world, but rather about how we deal with the world, how we use language to express what is the case. What ordinary language philosophers do, therefore, can be seen as a sort of collection and issuance of grammatical reminders. These are reminders about our responsibility, when using language, to refer to what we believe is the case. If anything, these reminders about ordinary language point to the structures of thought shaping the domains of meaning for the speakers and thereby, as Cavell (MWM) argues, make explicit the intrinsic normativity of language.

7. Acknowledging the "reasons of the heart"

Although we have not yet needed to introduce the Cavellian reception of the later Wittgenstein, what has already been said should suffice for realizing that Cavell's own conception of OLP is more radical than Austin's. Let's see how this is the case by looking at two of Austin's most important insights. First, we have seen that Austin (1979a) shows a claim to knowledge to be more than just a descriptive statement. Second, regarding the normativity of language, Austin (1975) offers an institutionalized view of language, one in which normativity is derived from the conventionality of those procedures that establish when an utterance is happy and when it is unhappy. Cavell finds this view to be too superficial: it is an insufficiently intimate view of the normativity of ordinary language.

Thinking about Austin's "step beyond" the descriptive claim to know, Cavell acknowledges that he

> was [...] convinced that Austin was right in finding something amiss with this ancient philosophical picture of knowledge [...] But I had little idea how to clarify my intuition that Austin's idea of the claim of knowledge as "going beyond" the cognitive accomplishments in being or making sure and certain was not to be *modeled* on the act of promising as going beyond expressing an intention, but was a separate interpretation of excess, say, of my stance toward my accomplishment, my stake in it, expressing authority toward it. Some ten years later I will be able to begin articulating this region "beyond" knowledge by taking into account the concept of acknowledgment (2010, 321)[17].

[17] To glimpse the profundity of the change in the conception of rationality driven by OLP it might be a good idea to keep in mind Cavell's comparison between judgment in OLP, on the one hand, and aesthetic and ethical judgments, on the other. For instance: "I will suggest that the aesthetic judgment models the sort of claim entered by these philosophers [of ordinary language], and that the familiar lack of conclusiveness in aesthetic argument, *rather than showing up an irrationality, shows the kind of rationality it has, and needs*" (Cavell 1976b, 86. The emphasis is mine). Aesthetic judgments comprise our position; they are not merely questions of personal taste. (For a critic writing in a newspaper it is not enough to write: "I did not like yesterday's piano concert by Mr...;" she would have to give her reasons for thinking that if she is going to be taken seriously.) Cavell relates the success of such judgments not to the accuracy with which they

According to both ideal language philosophers and ordinary language philosophers, what we say is subject to some kind of necessity, or at least manifests some regularity, because otherwise communication and mutual understanding would be impossible, or a mere miracle. The difference between them is that while for the former such regularity obeys the internalization of a hidden, predetermined structure which the philosophy of language must discover, for the latter it consists in a mutual attunement of judgments, practices, and responses, as well as in our sensitivity to the linguistic behavior of others. This is a process whose success does not always depend (or rather, never depends) on detecting objective evidence, but instead depends on *acknowledging* those gestures, inflections, aspects, etc., which in a strict sense are not ponderable. (Think of, say, the meaning of the expectant gaze accompanying a promise, or of the smile driving the story of an unexpected event, or of a tear burdening with emotion the memory of a shared past). We must mean what we say because meaning what one says is, to a great extent, one's responsibility.

We expose ourselves to public ridicule if we permanently fail to be sincere. And, of course, there are occasions in which we lie or make a strategic use of language. But even lies are subject to codes allowing us to recognize them in such a way that if we fail to do so, it will not be because we have missed some objective fact, but rather because we are not willing to make the necessary effort, or are insensitive to certain stimuli, or have lost our interest, or do not feel like doing that thing at that precise moment, etc. After all, we are only human.

If like Hippolytus we take an oath and then regret it, relying on the excuse that we were not sincere ("my tongue swore to, but my heart did not"), the consequences can take on the size of a Greek tragedy. The regularity of our linguistic practices and

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describe facts, but to their ability to make an interlocutor adequately appreciate the situation by acknowledging what the relevant facts are.

On the other hand, in the third book of CR, Cavell compares the ordinary language philosopher to what he calls the moralist: "[The moralist is] the human being who best grasps the human position [and therefore] teaches us what our human position is much better than we know it, so that we cannot escape it except by distraction and brutalization [and if this is so] then our first task in putting ourselves on trial is to distinguish the moralist from the moralizer" (CR, 326). What makes the moralist capable of performing such wonders is not that she is in possession of a knowledge of what is right or reasonable to do in a given situation, for there is no such thing (Cf. CR, 254), as seems to follow from the existence of incompatible and equally legitimate positions in almost any ethical and moral discussion. But if this is so, one might ask whether a moral argument is or could be rational. Well, for Cavell, the objective of moral argument is not to ensure agreement on what is right. "[Evaluating the moral claim] consists [...] in determining what your position is, and challenging the position itself, questioning whether the position you take is appropriate to the claim you have introduced [...] the point at issue is to determine what position you are taking, that is, what position you are responsible for – and whether it is a position that I can respect" (CR, 268). What, in short, makes a moral argument rational

> is not the assumption that in every situation there is only one thing that should be done and that we can know what that thing is, nor the assumption that we can always agree on what should be done based on rational methods. Its rationality lies in following the methods that lead to the knowledge of our own position, where we are; in short, to a knowledge and definition of ourselves (CR, 312).

meanings depends greatly on our interest and on whether we are satisfied with speaking through others or not. Living a human life, in a human world, means that ordinarily we are attuned with each other. Ordinary language philosophers are in the business of acknowledging the tune that we, members of a linguistic community, share. OLP, then, helps us to *fully* (i.e., without subjecting our experience to the bed of Procrustes) inhabit our ordinary world: "morality is in that world, and so are force and love; so is art and a part of knowledge [...] and so is religion [...]. Some mathematics and science, no doubt are not" (MWM, 40). A world in which certain actions are voluntary and in which we will never find out what a voluntary action is unless we can see when we should say that an action is voluntary.

Austin's (1975) reference to *Hippolytus* is even more striking if we take into account Russell's reference to a well-known aphorism of Pascal: "the heart has its reasons which reason knows nothing of" (Russell 1959, xiii). This is especially the case if we take into account the fact that Russell mentions Pascal's statement as exemplifying what he interprets as a surrender to epistemic obscurantism, conformism, and conservatism. In his view, Pascal's statement is obscurantist insofar as it admits the existence of reasons lying outside the reach of reason's light. One of the objectives of my defense of OLP has been precisely to show how wrong this point of view is. There are more things in Heaven and Earth than are dreamt of in Russell's philosophy (or in Gellner's, or in that of the many practitioners of a scientistic philosophy). These conceptions of reason are reductionist, and therefore incapable of appreciating all those not-necessarily-ponderable nuances of our experience.

Conclusion

Against any semanticist/literalist/reductionist view of language, OLP shows that learning a language means learning a world. The world – unless we are willing to give OLP another chance – is in serious danger of being colonized by the likes of reductionism, cognitivism, and, more generally, scientism.

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